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PREFACB

A study of B. w. Dempsey's contributions to the
socio-economic field seems varied and great. Certainly,
the thousands of interviews and letters, often to
prominent men, in themselves deserve to be recognized as
an outstanding contribution in the field of social
endeavor.
His sound advice, his counsel, and his
academic direction were eagerly sought for and just as
freely given, though often, unbeknown to others, at a
terrible toll on his physical powers. He demanded much
from himself and frequently was heard to say: "ONE WHO
IS NOT WILLING TO 'PUT HIMSELF OUT' FOR OTHERS JUST HAS
NOT IN HIMSELF THE MAKINGS OF A MAN. 11
Our study necessarily confines us to a study of his
scholarly contributions in the field of socio-economic
ideas. Four main categories of endeavor strongly suggest
themselves: his own framework of socio-economic thought;
his doctrine on just price; his recognized contribution
in the field of interest and usury; and, lastly, his
mature thought on just wage.
Undoubtedly, his main
contribution in the field of socio-economic thought lies
in these spheres.
In a study of B. w. Dempsey's writings, some are
puzzled not by what he says, but by what he does not say.
It is important to remember that in his writings he
assumed much Scholastic tradition and made the thought of
Joseph __Schumpeter and to a lesser degree that of Heinrich
von ThUnen his own. This is true to such a degree that
to fully understand B. w. Dempsey one would be wise to
treat the Theory of Economic Development by Joseph A.
Schumpeter as part of B. w. Dempsey's basic economic
thinking. In his own writings he saw no need to repeat
the ideas contained within this book that were already so
well-said and that he so firmly held himself.
His
thinking owes most to these three: st. Ttomas Aquinas,
Joseph A. Schumpeter, and Heinrich von ThUnen.
To facilitate accurate and expeditious indication of
footnotes, references to each of B. w. Dempsey's three
most important works will be abbreviated by means of a
single letter: The Functional Economy -- [F]; Interest
and Usury -- [IJ; and The Frontier Wage -- [WJ.
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INTRODUCTION
Task and Jlethod

B. w. Dempsey directed nearly all of his extensive
writings on economic and social matters toward the
solution of practical problems.
Yet one would be
mistaken to accuse him of being primarily interested
merely in practical problems as such.
Always the
academic economic analyst and social philosopher,
practical problems provided his keen analytical mind with
the opportunity of seeing the principles embedded in
them. He took a keen delight in sketching and bringing
forth these principles, as the purpose of all his
analysis and writings was the "necessity of and the means
for improvement of the economic community, the great the
challenge that lies in man's call for the restoration of
social order, the historical development of man's moral
attitude toward economics" [F,V], All of this analysis
he endeavored to accomplish in the light of sound
economic theory and traditional Scholastic philosophy.
He set before himself the large task of "examining
systematically the forces and facts present in every
real, working economy" [F,V] •
His endeavor was the
balanced approach, to "project the ideal situation, which
intelligent adherence to the enlightened teachings of the
Church and constant awareness of the lesson of history
can achieve, against the background of historic and
existing economic communities" (F,V]. To present the
principles necessarily underlying any economic community
because these were necessary for its long-run improvement
was both the purpose of his life's endeavors and within
must lie his contribution and his influence as well,
The PUrpose of This study

1.
2.

Hence, the chief purpose of this study is threefold:

To investigate whether or not a common set of
unifying principles runs through B. w. Dempsey's
social and economic writings; and
whether or not within this framework of thought he
made certain outstanding recognized contributions
in socio-economic thought; and (if the answer is
affirmative)
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3.

to investigate further in what precise elements
(e. g., just price, interest and usury) these
contributions in thought and influence can be
claimed to exist.

It is hoped that in the search for a unique syn
thesis and for the main contributions this study will
also be able to make some evaluation of this synthesis
and of those contributions of thought and influence which
are treated.

PART I

1

Chapter one
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1.

Life Statistics

2.

Early Life (1903-1920)

3.

At Marquette University (1920-1922)

4.

Early Jesuit Years

5.

Jesuit Studies

6.

Theology (1932-1936)

7.

Ordination (1935)

8.

At Harvard University

9.

Group Discussion and Social Justice

10.

Dempsey's Dissertation

11.

At st. Louis University (1940-1951)

12.

Nirmola College (1951-1953)

13.

At Marquette University (1954-1959)

14.

Rome Bound (1957)

15.

Preparing for Death (1959-1960)

16.

His Death (1960)

17.

Jesuit, Priest, and Scholar

3

TBB LIFB AHD TIMES OF BElUtABD W. DEMPSEY, S.J.

There are people who make a difference in this life.
B.W. "Bud" Dempsey was one of them.
B.W. Dempsey spent much of his active life dealing
with those who "seek honors, reputation, and the credit
of a great name upon earth." He strove to lead them to
embrace the good. Whether it was Prime Minister Nehru,
with whom he had frequent contact while in New Delhi
(1951-1953), or then Vice-President Nixon, with whom he
exchanged letters on social and economic matters, or a
world authority in the field, Joseph Schumpeter, who
thanked him publicly for his assistance, or some unknown
college freshman, Father Dempsey gave of himself without
reserve. His was a lifelong consuming desire to draw all
to the praise, reverence and service of God, especially
through economic endeavors, and by this means to prepare
mankind for the kingdom of God.
2.

Early Life

Bernard William Dempsey, the youngest child of John
Michael and Caroline Welsh Dempsey, was born in Milwaukee
on January 21, 1903, almost within sight of Gesu Church.
He was baptized at Gesu, from which fifty-seven and one
half years later he was buried. Only two years after his
birth his father died as a result of exposure during a
fire in the family furniture establishment. Mrs. Dempsey
was forced to go to work. Hired by Marquette University,
she began a lifetime connection for herself and for Bud
and his two sisters.
As soon as he was old enough, Bud augmented the
family income by working after school hours. He entered
the Old Marquette Academy in 1916, participating in many
school activities. He was a talented student, president
of his class, and an ambitious worker. In 1920 he
enrolled in Marquette's School of Journalism with plans
to enter the newspaper field. He already held the job of
Assistant Circulation Manager for the local Milwaukee
Sentinel.
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3.

At Marquette University (1920-1922)

In his freshman year, because of his mother• s
declining health, Bud was obliged to curtail his ex
tracurricular activities at college to be free to help
care for her. At the end of his sophomore year, his
mother died. This same year (September 2, 1922) he
entered the Society of Jesus (Jesuits).
c.

Early Jesuit Years

During his novitiate and his first year of juniorate
(third year as a Jesuit) B.W. Dempsey was plagued by ill
health and defective eyesight gave him trouble. In later
years, students would approvingly observe that his eyes
gave him the look of a wise old owl. He had inherited,
too, a tendency to chronic bronchitis, which forced him
to spend long months in the infirmary. Throughout his
life he had recurring chronic bouts with bronchitis.
s.

Jesuit Studies

The Jesuit juniorate is ordinarily the third and
fourth year of Jesuit studies, with emphasis on Latin,
Greek, English, and modern languages. In the juniorate,
in spite of poor health, B.W. was brilliant in his
studies. After only one year, though, his juniorate
studies were interrupted and due to poor health he spent
the year teaching history at Regis College, Denver.
Much improved after two years, Dempsey returned to
St. Louis to take up his philosophical studies. With his
keen.analytic mind, philosophy was a joy, yet it did not
completely occupy his time. Appreciation of the need for
scholars academically prepared in all fields, especially
in the social sciences, brought about his request to go
into economics. His superiors, realizing how brilliant he
was both in languages and philosophy, were reluctant to
grant this. With some misgivings, they allowed him to
profit by the opportunity as a resident at a university
and to 11 try 11 graduate studies in economics. None were
ever sorry!
Finished with philosophy and equipped with a
master• s degree in economics, B.W. Dempsey spent the
following two years teaching mainly history at the high
school level. In later years, his excellent grasp of
history made others think that his field was primarily
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history, not economics. All of his life he concentrated
on economic thought and historical development, following
in the steps of his mentor, Joseph Schumpeter. Frequent
discussions on historical topics with his life-long
friend, the eminent historian Joseph Donnelly, s.J.,
sharpened his skills. After two years, steeped in the
daily teaching of history, he moved on to theological
studies.
6.

Theology (1932-36)

In 1932, B.W. Dempsey began his theological studies
at st. Mary's College in Kansas. Here he revived old
seminary friendships, while 11 pushing 11 the need to study
economics for an adequate response to social problems
among his fellow theologians, especially Leo Brown, S.J.
Quadragesimo Anno (1931) had come out the previous year,
the 40th anniversary of Leo XIII's Rerum Novarum (1891).
This encyclical sparked renewed interest in economics and
social justice among catholics throughout the world.
Under the leadership of B.W. Dempsey a number of st.
Mary's theologians, notably Leo Brown, became intensely
interested in social justice and economic problems.
While the seminarians seemed far from the firing
line, they were quietly forming a nucleus of intellec
tuals who were destined to make a real difference in
American Catholic social teaching. A seminar group that
included B.W. Dempsey, Leo Brown, and Thomas Divine began
to research the economic teachings of the lesser-known
but important early Jesuit scholars, such as Leonardus
Lessius (1554-1623) and Luis de Molina (1535-1601). At
the same time they formulated tenets to support a
"Catholic" approach to problems of social justice. Among
the first topics handled by this seminar nucleus were
questions of a just price and interest and usury.
The two encyclicals, the subsequent arrival of
economics as a practical discipline, the rise of Keyne
sian ideas for government intervention in economic
planning, and the New Deal of President Franklin Roose
velt encouraged the Catholic hierarchy to seek Catholic
scholars for the social field. There were few Catholics
trained in social thought, even at catholic universities.
The superiors of the American Jesuits saw the need and
decided it was time to train young Jesuit priests in
social studies, aiming at the art/science of economic
thinking.
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During his four years of theology, B.W. Dempsey
instituted a seminar among those theologians who were
intereeted in studying the papal encyclicals and the
Scholastic economists. Among other life-long advantages,
B.W. Dempsey's seminar brought about an enduring friend
ship with his colleague, Leo Brown, S.J., affectionately
known as "Browny."
out of this seminar, too, came
Dempsey's book entitled Reorganization of Social Order,
a badly needed commentary in English on the social
encyclical Quadragesimo Anno The encyclical was written
in 1931; Father Dempsey published his commentary in 1936,
the year he finished theology.
Obviously, the st. Mary's nucleus was a likely group
to make a start. As soon as B.W. Dempsey, Leo Brown, and
Thomas Divine were ordained, all three began doctoral
studies in economics. Thomas Divine (1900-1979) 1 went to
the London School of Economics, while Leo Brown and B.W.
Dempsey, arriving together at Harvard University,
cemented a life-long close friendship. Whereas in the
1930's the Church in America had been concerned primarily
with social action, in the 1940 1 s, largely through these
three professional priest economists, the Church sought
and attained more solid research roots. The priest
economists fostered understanding in the Church of the
economic forces behind the socio-economic environment.
The prestigious academic credentials of these Jesuit
economists made �t more likely that the counsel of the
Church would be heeded in seeking solutions to nationwide
economic problems.
To understand B.W.- Dempsey's early years (1922-1937)
it must be remembered that the Society of Jesus as
founded by St. Ignatius Loyola (1491-1556) made rigorous
demands on its members' formation for the sake of later
effective evangelization. The seminary life that B.w.
Thomas Divine, s.J. after doctoral studies went to
Marquette University where he remained for most of his
life, first as Chairman of the Economics Department and
Director of the Labor School, then as Dean of the College
of Business Administration. He is the founder of the
Catholic Economic Association and for many years edited
their Review of social Economy.
He welcomed B. W.
Dempsey to Marquette in 1954, and as Dean he immediately
appointed B. w. Dempsey to be Chairman of the Economics
Department.
1
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Dempsey led involved a strict regime of spiritual
exercises and study in an atmosphere of separation,
solitude, and silence. One major purpose of the disci
pline was to bury self. What went on outside seminary
walls for a number of years, therefore, was not "real" to
B.W. Dempsey. On one occasion, with a chuckle, B.W.
Dempsey recalled how he mentioned to an acquaintance that
he has not kept up with events "since he left the world."
The amazed acquaintance asked him where in "heaven" he
thought he was at this moment!
His scholastic years coincided to a great extent
with the great depression years. In a real sense, though,
the great depression passed B.W. Dempsey by. For him it
was an historical event; academically, a business cycle,
not a personal experience. He had surprisingly little
sympathetic understanding of the scars resulting from
deprivations of this depressing period. His sole personal
contact with poverty was at his father's death, and this
he asserted was overcome by "a willingness to work." He
never fully appreciated that at the depth of the depres
sion there were no jobs available.
His appreciation of events, situations, and even
principles was highly conditioned by his personal
experiences. For example, B.W. Dempsey went beyond
ordinary criticism of Keynesian theory and policy. To him
the whole Keynesian revolution was something foreign. He
was uncomfortable with it, for he had finished his
economic studies at the beginning of the Keynesian era,
and always felt that he had "escaped" its popular appeal
tentacles. In this regard, with obvious approval, e.w.
Dempsey quotes Schumpeter (History of Economic Analysis,
p. 121): "The much greater success of Keynes's General
Theory is not comparable" (to Chamberlin, Hicks and
Hayek's theoretical books) says Schumpeter, "because
whatever its merit as a piece of analysis may be, there
cannot be any doubt that it owed its victorious career
primarily to the fact that its argument implemented some
of the strongest political preferences of a large number
of modern economists. Hayek's swam against the stream."
B.W. Dempsey points out that while their roots are
similar, the analytical works of Chamberlin, Hicks and
Hayek are superior (The Functional Economy, p. 15-16).
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7.

ordination 1935

B.W. Dempsey was ordained in 1935 and celebrated his
first Solemn Mass, predictably, at Gesu Church in
Milwaukee. By this time he was already well versed in
several languages (Latin, Greek, French, German, and
Spanish), possessed an excellent background in history
and the social encyclicals, had done brilliant studies
and had earned a master's degree in economics.

a.

At Harvard university

B.W. Dempsey was content to be assigned to special
studies in economics. He chose Harvard's Graduate School
principally because of his high regard for Joseph
Schumpeter, the famous Chairman of Harvard's Economics
Department. He was also influenced by respect for his
friend "Brawny" (Leo Brown, S.J.) who had already chosen
Harvard. In later years, Bud admitted that a Harvard
degree gave him added status, but always denied that his
education in economic history or economics came from his
Harvard years. "My previous studies at several Jesuit
universities had already completed my real education."
Perhaps with tongue in cheek, Father Dempsey liked to
boast that he had not made a mistake in basic education,
for example in English grammar, in over twenty years. No
one dared to challenge him.
During hi� three years at Harvard (1937-1940), he
held a scholarship every year except the first. He soon
became known at Harvard Graduate School as a scholar to
be respected, a priest to be admired. On one occasion he
challenged his history professor on certain facts and
interpretations of Scholastic economic thought. As Joseph
Donnelly tells it, "Needless to say, Bud won the fray and
day. 11 His work at the school restored to respectability
Catholic economists in the Scholastic tradition of
Lessius, De Lugo, Molina, Christian Pesch, and others.

t.

Group Discussion and social Justice

In the 1930 1 s Harvard university's economics faculty
boasted some prominent names, Joseph Schumpeter (economic
development, 1883-1950), Edward Mason, Alvin Hansen,
William Crum, Abbot Usher, and summer Slichter among
them. All doctoral candidates participated in seminars,
and B.w. Dempsey found himself in a circle of fellow
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students who had already distinguished themselves in
graduate economic research at other teaching universi
ties. He soon became a leader in these discussions.
Frequently the groups would meet for dinner and then
adjourn to an empty classroom in the Harvard yard. The
sessions would last several hours. Members of the group
would take turns analyzing and discussing various
propositions in economic theory. Dempsey was a leader in
analysis; Leo Brown excelled in synthesis and practical
affairs.
Dempsey, with his deep interest in history (some
claimed that he was first of all a historian, secondly an
economist), would ground his material deep in history
before developing some understanding of economic thought
and development. To their mutual and enduring satisfac
tion, B.W. Dempsey was assigned to Joseph Schumpeter as
his doctoral advisor. It was the beginning of a lifetime
of mutual respect and admiration. B,W. Dempsey looked to
history as a foundation stone for economics. He insisted
that no one could claim to be a real economist who was
not versed in history and economic thought. Nor did he
consider a historian complete or adequate without some
accompanying knowledge of economics.
The two Jesuit doctoral candidates made such an
impression on both their teachers and their peers -- and
it fanned out from there -- that never again did econo
mics departments fear that Catholic priests had a basic
bent for do-good-ism rather than scholarship. Further
more, they soon discerned that Leo Brown had a vast
practical knowledge much wider than that of rectory
existence. B.W. Dempsey shocked his confreres in demon
strating that Scholastic economists were for real and
their thought was to be reckoned with. No longer in their
minds did the old dichotomy between activists and
researchers surface. The priest scholars had gained much
respect.
Throughout his entire life, B.W. Dempsey was quick
to seize opportunities to practice social justice. He
possessed both the virtue and practice of that Scholastic
virtue of balance and fairness in economic thought. His
own life defined social justice: a scientific habit of
mind so that with ease and facility he could act together
with a group (class/seminar/committee/bull-session) to
arrive at a consensus that contributed economic ideas and
thought to the group in question. As we shall see in the
following paragraphs, he joined in seminars at Harvard,
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"bull-sessions" at Harvard Square, and met regularly with
a close-knit group at st. Louis University. Later, at
Marquette University, B.W. Dempsey instituted a similar
atmosphere of "bull-sessions."
Daily, he practiced
social justice, as with ease and facility he joined with
like-minded people to bring about a consensus of socio
economic thought and fairness. He was convinced that
nothing was more powerful than an idea shared. On more
than one occasion he expressed the thought that these
active discussions were more effective than passive
classroom lectures. Besides possessing the philosophical
habit of social justice, Dempsey was also a competent
economist: in other words, he was capable of making
scientific decisions given relative scarce resources with
ease and facility -- he had high ability to "economize."
There were other facets to Bud Dempsey and Leo
"Browny's" lives besides Harvard. Both stayed at Jesuit
Bobola House on Newbury street and benefited from daily
contact during the whole period of studies. Another haunt
of the two during their stay at Harvard was Wursthaus
near Harvard Square. Here they would gather with class
mates after seminar sessions, literally lingering over a
single beer until after midnight. Bud would often lead
the discussions: Browny would sum up at the discussion's
end. The priests did not hesitate to bring other Catholic
scholars into the discussions. Always the emphasis was on
the scholarly, an objective approach to economic problems
as a more effective way of finding solutions in the long
run. In B.W. Dempsey's eyes a roman collar was not a sign
of a do-gooder who displayed a sincere but disruptive
influence by his ignorance of the facts of economic life
and with his soap-box techniques, but the sign of a
scholar.
Discussion at st. Louis University
Such discussions continued when he moved to st.
Louis University. After dinner an inner circle of St.
Louis administrators and faculty members including B.W.
Dempsey and Leo Brown would meet at the Coronado Hotel
near the university for a snack and discussion before
bedtime. Just as at Harvard's Wursthaus, discussions at
the Coronado covered various socio-economic subjects, as
well as the future of business education. While this more
homogenous group was in general philosophical agreement,
means toward social goals were frequently in dispute.
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B.W. Dempsey, a recognized expert in the field of
monetary and fiscal policy since his publication of
Interest and Usury, invited his many friends from the
business community to the "Coronado discussions." B.W.
Dempsey and Leo Brown were in demand as doctoral ad
visors, influencing greatly the caliber of research among
faculty and graduate students.
B.w. Dempsey years at St. Louis University coincided
with World War II. He had his work cut out for him,
trying to keep the Commerce School from falling apart as
a result of faculty manpower shortages and the reduction
of student population of draft age. Yet, in 1951, B.W.
Dempsey proudly announced the fact that there were seven
Ph.D.'s to be awarded in economics for the year 1952. In
this same year, B.W. Dempsey was also referred to as a
"trade expert, 11 for he was the first President of the st.
Louis Chapter of the American Marketing Association. This
year, too, he left st. Louis University to head the
Jesuit contingent which responded to a request by the
Indian government to take over the faculty duties at
Nirmola College at the University of New Delhi. Before he
left st. Louis University, in appreciation of his years
of work, B. W. Dempsey was awarded a Doctor of Law Honoris
Causa.
10.

B.w. Dempsey•s Dissertation

B.W. Dempsey wrote his dissertation on the Church's
teaching on interest and usury in order to demonstrate
that the Church's position was not only valid, but also
to demonstrate that modern economists did not understand
it. The thesis, published as Interest and Usury, was
reprinted in many foreign languages, including Japanese.
Joseph A. Schumpeter, one of America's great analytic
economists, went to great length in his monumental
History of Economic Analysis to commend B.W. Dempsey for
making it possible for economists of today to understand
what the Scholastic economists were saying. (Cf. section
III below on B.W. Dempsey's thought on interest and usury
for treatment in greater depth.)
A simple persistent error that would get a snort
from B.W. Dempsey was the assertion by critics that the
Church changed its mind on usury, that is, that in the
middle ages the Church said interest and usury was wrong
but in the modern day accepts interest as morally right.
Such superficial critics forget that the economy in the
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middle ages was static, without saving, lacking alterna
tive opportunities for investment. Thus, interest was
zero percent. Today, with saving and alternative opportu
nities for investment, the Church, living in a modern
dynamic economy of cost, recognizes a positive interest
rate. The Church did not change its doctrine, but the
economy moved from a static condition (zero interest) to
a dynamic condition (positive interest).
11.

At st. Louis university (1940-1951)

At the end of his second year of teaching at St.
Louis University, B.W. Dempsey was appointed Regent
(ambassador representing the administration) of the
School of Commerce and Finance. Within a short time he
was appointed consultor of the st. Louis University
Jesuit Community and a Trustee of the University. From
1943-1951, B.W. Dempsey was Chairman of the Department of
Economics. This writer as a young Scholastic graduate
studying economics met Father Dempsey for the first time
in 1944. It was flattering to receive his attention and
time and to be taken under his wing. From then on I
regarded Father "Bud" Dempsey as my mentor.
Tbree Professionals
With commendable foresight the Missouri Province of
the society of.Jesus (which included st. Louis, Marquet
te, Creighton, Rockhurst, Regis, Loyola of Chicago,
Detroit, and Xavier) began preparing talented Jesuits for
solid careers in economics. These were the depression
years of heightened interest in socio-economic problems.
Unfortunately, a number of priests of good will but
misplaced zeal had spoken out on the social problems in
a do-good manner. Having no professional economic
background, these men were given little credence.
Suddenly, three priests -- Thomas Divine, S.J., Leo
BroTA."ll, S.J., and B.W. Dempsey, S.J. -- burst almost
simultaneously on the scene with doctorates in economics.
Needless to report, when it was realized that there
were priests with credentials to backup an interest of a
professional nature in socio-economic questions, they
were eagerly sought after. B.W. Dempsey was in constant
demand to conduct courses in many dioceses in the
country. He began to give talks and write numerous
articles, pouring into them his combined knowledge of
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economics, philosophy, and theology. Soon his articles
and his books brought him recognition as an economist of
distinction.
In late 1958 he gathered together these articles of
current import into a book:
The Functional Economy
(Prentice Hall). In this book of articles a reader will
look in vain for B.W. Dempsey's underlying grand scheme,
synthesis, plan or model. His lifetime forte was analysis
not synthesis. He, himself, claimed that underlying his
book was an underlying theme: the basis (principles) for
a functional (organic) economic organization. Often he
would assume that his overall philosophical, theological,
and economic foundations were clear to his listener.
Then, again, perhaps he considered that his economic
thought was sufficiently presented by Joseph Schumpeter
and that his social, theological, and philosophical
thought was well presented by St. Thomas Aquinas and the
others (i.e.: Lessius, De Lugo, Molina, etc.). He tended
to be frugal, sparing, even chary in repeating his
thoughts!
However, although Dempsey was busy giving talks,
writing, and researching, he still sought personal
contact with students, especially young Jesuits. He
eagerly listened to them and would advise and counsel
them. Always the teacher in any discussion, he insisted
on the teacher-student relationship. The author of this
biography recalls an occasion on which he carried on
(too?) vigorously a discussion on Economics with Father
Dempsey. Father turned and with a half-smile and asked a
rhetorical question, "How old are you? You are not yet
50! I never met a person who had the "habitus" (fully a
scientific economist) before he was 50, so I suggest you
be more quiet and listen carefully to your elders." It
was good advice if I wished to retain the precarious
relationship between teacher and student. The advice was
given whimsically, objectively, and without rancor. I
heeded it, and it helped me move forward as an economist
to my fateful 50th year. He never assumed mannerisms or
became unapproachable. If I had wished to terminate the
teacher-student relationship (before I was 50), he would
have accepted it. But the subsequent relationship would
have been different. Before my 50th birthday I would have
lost an excellent teacher!
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Depth of Vision

One example chosen from among many will suffice to
demonstrate his breadth of vision. In 1950, when it was
suggested that microfilm copies of a few medieval
documents might be procured from the Vatican Library,
Father Dempsey assumed the responsibility -- he never
hesitated to seize responsibility for an endeavor -- of
obtaining funds for the venture. With characteristic
boldness, he obtained permission from Rome. Then he
personally made the approach to the Knights of Columbus,
convincing them to furnish the funds, and the project
became a reality.
Bxcellence of Jesuit B4ucation

As an academic administrator, Father Dempsey
wholeheartedly supported the Jesuit ideals and methods of
conducting universities. What was useful in other
academic institutions of repute he was willing to respect
and even to adapt or modify for Jesuit use. He insisted
that 11 we 11 need not slavishly copy others. "Four hundred
years of Jesuit success should preclude this." Whenever
the opportunity presented itself, he eagerly put forth
the excellence of Catholic Jesuit education. When
reminded that he, himself, had a prestigious doctorate
from a non-J�suit university, he would reply that long
before he went to Harvard he had a full education
received from Jesuit Catholic "finishing" schools. He did
appreciate the status the Harvard degree conferred upon
him, but always showed a deep loyalty to Jesuit educa
tion. He backed up his affirmation by being an assiduous
student of Jesuit constitutions and history. Always the
insightful historian, he had a more profound understand
ing than most others of Jesuit objectives and methods.
His closeness and many lengthy discussions with Joseph
Donnelly, S.J., a foremost historian, added credence to
his positions.
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The catholic Economic Association (19,2) 2
During this same period there was a lack of catholic
participation in the activities of learned social science
societies, particularly in the discipline of economics.
This lack was attacked on another front. Thomas Divine,
on his return to Marquette University with a Ph.D. from
the London School of Economics, saw the immediate need
for an association of catholic economists. He was joined
in this endeavor by Bernard W. Dempsey, Leo Brown, and a
number of others. Thus, in 1942, The Catholic Economic
Association (CEA) was born, with T. A. Divine as its
first president and the editor of its official publica
tion, The Review of Social Economy. The organizing
committee was in agreement that while economics is
primarily a positive science, it is in large part also a
normative science, and its main usefulness is as a means
of promoting the (economic) common good and social
justice.
The Catholic Economic Association was founded to
promote scientific discussion of economic problems, the
solution of which requires a knowledge of both economic
science and (Christian) social philosophy. Other objec
tives were to evaluate in light of Christian moral
principles the assumptions, methods, and objectives of
economic science and to assist in the formation of
practical programs for the application of Christian
social principles.
Many give T. A. Divine credit as being the founder
of the Catholic Economic Association. He was somewhat
reluctant to accept this honor but admitted that maybe he
was the instigator or even the chief architect. He felt
that all of those who attended the first meeting in New
York City in 1941 could be considered co-founders,
especially the members of the organizing committee formed
at that first meeting. B.W. Dempsey, who attended the
first meeting, stated in his usual decisive manner that
"without doubt Tom Divine was the prime mover and truly
the founder."
T. A. Divine, together with some other members of
the Catholic Sociological Society, was disappointed with
"The Origin of the Catholic Economic Association,"
Review of Social Science, vol. 2, No. 1 (1944), pp. 102103, by Thomas Devine, s. J.
2
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the annual meetings that devoted a "paucity" of time to
economic subjects. Therefore, he suggested to this
disappointed group that they form a separate Catholic
Economic Association. They agreed and suggested that
Divine do something about. By the end of 1942, the CEA
was formed; 136 persons accepted invitations to charter
membership and 38 to student membership. Thomas Divine,
S.J. was elected as the Association's first President in
1942.

The Catholic Economic Association decided to work in
close cooperation with the American Economic Association
and to hold joint meetings. In 1943, the official journal
of CEA, The Review of Social Economy, was founded. In
1948, the review became a semi-annual publication with T.
A. Divine, S.J. as Editor-in-Chief, a position which he
held until 1959. on the 25th anniversary of CEA (1967)
Thomas Divine, the "founding father," was deservedly
awarded and honored.
12.

Hirm.ola College (Nev Delhi)

In 1951, the General of the Jesuits directed the
Missouri Province to take over a college in New Delhi,
India. Immediately, Father Dempsey came to mind. Con
sidering his constant delicate health over the years, he
was asked, not told, to "discern" whether he wished to
go. Advised that his health was likely to suffer from the
rigorous Indian climate, he still considered the request
a mandate from Father General. With his usual calm
demeanor, he therefore prepared to leave America,
apparently forever. Promptly, he resigned from national
committees and arranged for others to direct his graduate
students. This detaching himself form his graduate
students was difficult for him to do; he had become very
close to them. Lastly, as was his wont, he was preparing
a quiet departure, but his non-Jesuit friends would have
it otherwise and a civic dinner was given in his honor.
st. Louis University then bestowed on Bernard w. Dempsey,
S.J. an honorary doctorate for over ten years of tremen
dous scholarship, research, and superb teaching at the
University.
Preparing for Hirm.ola College
With consummate foresight, Father Dempsey planned
every possible phase of the new operation. He learned
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everything he could about India, even beginning the study
of Hindi. Once the Jesuits opened Nirmola College in New
Delhi they found themselves almost from the start in a
most difficult situation. There was deep unrest and
agitation among both students and faculty. Dempsey also
met constant resistance from Indian anti-religious and
anti-American forces. The government remained suspicious
and unbelieving of stated Jesuit motives. There was no
willing acceptance of the Jesuit-approved double social
purpose: to work for the renovation of Indian people and
simultaneously to build a better Indian society, nor
could the government believe or accept that the Jesuits'
stated purpose of preparing people for the Kingdom of God
was for real.
Treasurer ot Hirmola College

As treasurer of the College, B.W. Dempsey was
obliged to find his way through the intricacies of
India's legal system, her Department of Education, her
customs barriers, and her governmental bureaus. In later
years, he was reluctant to speak of the hostility and
resistance met with in those years. Those who lived with
him in India well knew the difficulties and were quick to
express what a tower of strength he was during those
problem years.
work outside of Nirmola College

Father Dempsey's work in India was not confined to
Nirmola College alone. He drew up excellently-designed
articles of incorporation for missions and dioceses which
helped them in dealing with the Indian government. He
made several survey trips at the request of the Indian
government to appraise economic conditions in northern
India. He combined a trip to Jerusalem with a visit back
to the United States to approach American foundations on
behalf of Nirmola. During his short stay in America,
particularly in st. Louis, he had no word of complaint
for the conditions in India, not did he mention his
deteriorating health. His single purpose in America was
to approach American foundations on behalf of the newly
founded college, not to criticize and air the difficul
ties encountered in Indian.
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Health Deterioration

The years in India severely tried Dempsey's health.
His chronic bronchitis and ability to breathe worsened in
the sometimes high New Delhi humidity. For some months he
was bedridden with what was thought to have been a heart
attack, but which was actually hepatitis complicated by
amoebic dysentery. The fall of 1953 found B.W. back in
st. Louis undergoing intensive medical care. In whimsical
fashion, Bud wondered out loud whether the amoebae would
devour his liver before the competitive "sulphur" cure
did so. "At least I don't possess an American liver
cirrhosis!"
13.

At Marquette university (1954-1959)

In the summer of 1954 Dempsey was assigned to
Marquette University. Given his delicate health he taught
a light schedule that fall. With the drive, determina
tion, and patience characteristic of the man, by the
spring of 1955 Dempsey was much improved and literally
ready to take on the whole world. This year he helped
direct a seminar at Claremont College, California, and
another at Harvard. In 1956 he was fully in the saddle
and helped to plan projects for the Business Bureau of
the Marquette University College of Business Administra
tion and the City of the Milwaukee.
Dempsey was. again Chairman of an Economics De
partment, this time at Marquette University, a task he
retained until his untimely death in 1960. With en
couragement from higher University administration,
Dempsey began to beef up, gearing the Economics Depart
ment.for a possible doctoral program. A number of top
notch economists gifted in research, teaching and
recognized reputation were added to the economics
faculty. He gathered a dozen or more students with
doctoral potential to Marquette University. Some were
guided and recommended to Marquette because of Dempsey's
reputation. Several were guided to B.W. Dempsey by Joseph
Schumpeter. Others Dempsey recruited personally. At his
death, it was decided to retain a strong Master's Program
in Economics, but not to begin a full doctoral program at
that time. Obviously, the advent of the doctoral program
had depended much on the expected direction of B.W.
Dempsey.

19
14.

Homa Bound

During the summer of 1957, Dempsey's Jesuit province
(now the Wisconsin Province) held its provincial congre
gation preparatory to the general congregation to be held
in Rome. Appointed as one of the two Roman delegates,
Father Dempsey flew to Rome and worked hard and produc
tively during the fall months. On his return to Marquette
University, he expressed pride and enthusiasm for the
real accomplishmets of the congregation. He remained in
lifetime admiration of the government of Jesuit Society.
15.

Preparing for Death

After the first of January, 1958, Father Dempsey's
health was never really good. His bronchitis gave him
more and more trouble. He spent the first two months of
the year in the hospital. Then, during March and April he
was confined most of the time to his bed, yet he never
really rested. His friends and acquaintances beat a path
to his Jesuit Residence door. This arrangement pleased
him immensely.
During 1958 his health continued to deteriorate. At
this time he decided to draw together and edit a number
of his previously published articles and publish them in
book form under the title: The Functional Economy. His
own self-criticism was that the various chapters or
articles were not synthesized -- there was no integral
whole blending the chapters together. Admittedly, his own
lack of energy made it physically impossible for him to
correct his own self-criticism. Dissatisfied and with
time growing short, he sent The Functional Economy to
Prentice Hall. During the spring and summer of 1959, he
worked assiduously on his book The Frontier Wage. He
thought this book was most important, not only to
complete his own economic thought, but to supply the need
in economics for an "adequate" theory of wages (cf.
Chapter IV, "The Frontier Wage") . B.W. Dempsey's last
work was published posthumously, within a few days of his
demise.
In April 1960, he had serious difficulty breathing,
yet he had promised to address a convention of bankers on
April 21 and insisted on giving the address. Father
Joseph Donnelly, S.J., long-time friend and colleague,
insisted on accompanying him to the meeting because
Father Dempsey looked so exhausted and Father Donnelly
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feared he might collapse. B.W. finished his address,
patiently sitting through a long and trying question
period. Then Father Donnelly convinced Bud to go directly
to the hospital. A few minutes after he reached the
hosp! tal his heart suddenly gave out and only frantic
medical efforts prevented him from dying then and there.
This writer, together with Father James McGinley, S.J.
(Fordham), a long-time fellow economist and friend,
rushed to his hospital side. We found Bud alert. He
announced that "going directly to the hospital was
providential; otherwise I would be dead at this moment!"
During the weeks of his convalescence, Friends flew
in from around the country, ostensibly to visit, but
really to seize the last opportunity to consult him. He
returned to his Jesuit community in late May in a much
weakened condition. Just before the July 4th weekend, he
suffered another serious attack and was forced to return
to the hospital for a 10-day rest. When he came home, the
shadow of death was upon him, though only a few of us
surmised it. Bud himself anticipated his death. on
several occasions he remarked to the author that he
thought that he "had just about done the work which God
had assigned."
1fii.

Bis Death

In July Bud spent his time quietly preparing for
death. Although weak, he insisted on going daily to the
community chapel for Mass and communion. He spent his
time quietly clearing up the last few tasks necessary to
complete his book on wage theory. He never actually said
that he expected to die soon, but he asked various people
to 11.take care" of tasks which were to be done in the
remote future. He asked this writer to "administer" for
the time being the Economics Department. Any policy
changes should still be referred to him. Again, he
repeated the thought that "my work assigned by God to me
is about finished."
on the morning of July 23rd, Father Dempsey was dis
covered quietly stretched out on his bed. As in life, so
in death he appeared placid and composed, without signs
of struggle. The news of his death was carried in every
important newspaper in America.
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17.

Jesuit, Priest, and Scholar

As a Jesuit, B.W. Dempsey was, in this writer's
opinion, one who always sought to be close to the ideal
which St. Ignatius Loyola proposed. He was a friend and
advisor to the great and famous, yet he carefully
refrained form reaping any advantage for himself. He
lived simply. He traveled widely, yet frugally. He obeyed
his superiors meticulously.
His Simple Faith
For all of his brilliance in academic matters, he
had a simple faith. He was deeply devoted to the "Blessed
Virgin," as he affectionately referred to her. A rosary
was an essential to his daily life. He had a childlike
confidence in the providence of God. In his last days,
his only request was that those present should say the
Litany of the sacred Heart. All of his life he had a
militant devotion to the Jesuits and was a crusader for
their ideals.
This writer knew Bud well and 1 ived in the same
residence with him during two separate periods in Father
Dempsey's life. As a young Jesuit Scholastic (1944-1948)
I knew him at st. Louis university as teacher, Father
Dempsey. From 1954-1960 at Marquette University I knew
"Bud" as friend and colleague. I never forgot that he was
my teacher and mentor. In all those years never once did
I see him lose his temper or be knowingly unkind to
anyone. His charity embraced all men, but particularly
students. I can personally attest to his solicitude. Even
apparent disorder and disorganization, which he abhorred,
evinced a favorite but mild expression: 11 What a way to
run a railroad!"
Calmness and Objectivity
B.W. Dempsey was always calm and objective. This is
not to say that he did not take strong positions and feel
deep emotions concerning issues. He did! Admittedly, he
never claimed to be neutral on any issue. Notwithstand
ing, at all times he maintained a calmness of demeanor,
a controlled objectivity. He was definitely on the
"conservative" side in his opinions and major premises.
His minor premises in an argument were irreproachable and
difficult to "refute," providing you granted his major.

22

As an argument heated up and become more emotional,
producing more heat than light, Father Dempsey lowered
his voice, spoke more calmly, and argued almost in
syllogistic form. Always, he argued without rancor,
although aggressively and persuasively. His demeanor did
not make him always "right" but made him more formidable
in any discussion. Never did he seem to be trying to get
the upper-hand in an argument. Always, you felt he was
seeking the truth. Added to the above was a characteris
tic manner and style of expressing himself, so that even
simple thoughts sounded impressive. He spoke with an air
of authority. Few had the courage to challenge him head
on. As one listener expressed it, "if Dempsey tells you
that black is black and white is white, you are so
impressed that you catch yourself jotting it down. 11
several days before his death, Dempsey asked this
writer to open and read aloud a letter of medical
evaluation concerning his health. It was very pessimistic
with one phrase stating that the prognosis for his future
did not look good. He calmly asked me to repeat the
phrase. Then he stated, "This expresses the gist of the
report. Underline it. Please read on!"
sunahiner

Although Dempsey had lived all over the world, he
never ceased being a "hometown boy. 11 His home never
ceased being Milwaukee, so he became known among those
"select" Jesuits as a "sunshiner." To him, Milwaukee was
a most wonderful place. Perhaps only tnose from San
Francisco rival "sunshiners" in loyalty to their home
city. It is not my task to defend or attack, for I am a
"sunshiner, 11 too.
Research an4 Teaching

In asking a (student) a question, Dempsey was quick
to tap his forehead and say "think. 11 If he had asked
why, he did not tolerate a what, a where, or a when in
response. He expected that his students had the ability
to distinguish between contraries and contradictories.
For him, "to think clearly and express accurately" were
marks of a Jesuit education. Dempsey operated from a
solid foundation of scholarship, knowledge, science, and
practical wisdom and above all with abundant good will
and generous sharing of himself. Although he was labeled
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a "conservative" in thought and action, he tried to avoid
tags of any kind. With st. Thomas Aquinas, he held that
virtue "stat in medio. 11
All of his life, B.W. Dempsey stressed a needed
balance among good teaching, research, and scholarship at
a university. "Let us not be lopsided nor top-sided." At
a faculty seminar he listened for an entire day to what
he considered an over-emphasis on research, although he,
a Harvard graduate, was well known for his own research
and scholarship. He ended the seminar with these ringing
words: "I have listened attentively for an entire day.
I can only conclude that if Matthew, Mark, Luke an John
were alive they would be promoted for their research and
publishing. But poor Jesus Christ, a mere teacher, would
be terminated. Something is out of whack!"
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1.

A Kan of the Classical Period (1891-1961)

Dempsey was born in 1903 and died in 1960. His life,
therefore, coincided almost precisely with the chronolog
ical years of the Classical period (1891-1961). More
importantly, Dempsey's life not only chronologically
coincided with the Classical years, his own thought
conformed to and mirrored this period. He was a champion
of the era. In the opening words of his Functional
Economy (Preface), he states categorically his task is
"to project the ideal situation, which intelligent
adherence to the enlightened teachings of the Church and
constant awareness of the lessons of history can achieve,
against the background of historic and existing communi
ties" (F,V).
Dempsey was a skilled scientist in the presentation
of social principles and the relationship (insight into)
among these principles. In his own Scholastic terminology
he possessed that "habitus" (scientific habit or virtue
of the mind) by which he could with ease and facility
explain, analyze, and deal with the principles of the
Vatican social documents. The opening words of his
chapter, significantly entitled "The Bases of Economic
organization," (F,65) are:
The restoration of the social order according
to the principles of sound philosophy is the
goal of the Church's interest in current
social matters. For this reason, only natural
truths and logical reasoning will be used to
derive and establish the Pope I s teaching on
human society and its members. Where the
encyclical cites passages taken from scrip
ture, careful examination shows that this is
not done by way of proof but rather to stress
the conformity of his logical conclusions with
the teaching of the Gospel [O. van Nell-Breun
ing, S.J., Reorganization of the Social Econo
my, tr. B.W. Dempsey, p. 16],
The modern period (1961-1991+) differsi other fonts,
as well as natural reason, scripture, theology, social
argumentation, etc., are integral parts of today's
Vatican social thought. His age called for much "natural
law" (reason) and authority, and he met these criteria
fully!
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In modern Catholic Social Vision, the person is
described as a self-project engaged in a lifetime work
task within communities, in order to become a complete
/full personality (Cf. LE, 9). These five communities
are: 1) Trinity,
2) Church, 3) Present living (de
facto) community, 4) Kingdom of God, 5) Ideal (de jure}
community of "what should be," or unchanging principles.
All five have an appropriate place in modern social
thought: a person is engaged in all five communities, and
the emphasis is no longer only on the fifth. In recent
years an emphasis has grown in recognizing the interre
latedness of these communities and in being concerned
that through development the gap between the de facto
groups (family, economic, political, voluntary, cultural)
and the de jure communities (Trinity, Church, Kingdom,
Ideal) can be lessened if not closed (Cf. Catholic Social
Vision, below).
World of B.w. Dem.psey

The world of B.W. Dempsey was the ideal (de jure)
world of principles. He strove mightily over a lifetime
to polish, define, and relate these principles one to
another, providing a foundation/basis for a viable
Functional Order. In this/his world there was 1 ittle room
for change or signs of the times. He dealt mostly with
the unchanging principles (person, law, rights, justice,
society, peace, subsidiarity, etc.). For B.W. Dempsey,
the task of the social documents was to deal with prin
ciples. "The instructions of the Holy See in social and
economic questions are general for the reason that they
are expressly concerned with principles" (F,72). The work
of applying these general principles was for others.
"Thus the limitation of dealing in principles leaves a
great volume of indispensable work to be done in each
community --- and by no means the least, the man with a
living to earn" (F,73). For, Dempsey, if he had lived in
the modern period, would have felt that much that was
taken up (MM/GS/etc.} should not be in social documents
but rather left for the man-earning-a-living to deal with
by applying social principles to de facto social prob
lems.
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Argument froa Authority
A typical man of this Classical period, Dempsey put
great emphasis on authority, much emphasis on reason,
"natural law, 11 less on theology , and very little on
theological argumentation and scripture. Remember, his
life had been run before the modern period with its full
use of all fonts was in vogue. It is only recently that
sacred scripture has become integrated into Catholic
social thought (Cf. Economic Justice for All).
To Dempsey, Vatican principles carried immense
authority. His task was not to dissent or disagree, but
to explain the "authenticity" for the lay person. To him,
these principles with which he had such familiarity and
facility were more than simple Vatican thought; they were
"dogma." "We are concerned here with 'social doctrine',"
states B.W. Dempsey, "as applied more specifically to
economic organization in modern industrial society on a
basis of natural reason" (F, 65). Therefore, the first
effect of the encyclical of 1891 (Rerum Norvarum) was "to
give the sanction of Papal authority and with this a
degree of respectability that formerly they had not
enjoyed" (F, 68). At times his instincts and Classical
background forced him to rely on authority even to the
extent of not bothering to state rational arguments for
a position: to quote authority was sufficient reason.
Surely, certain attitudes of the modern period would have
distressed him. But he was not of the modern period --
his heart and mind had stopped by 1960.
In 1960 Dempsey was ready to depart. On several
occasions he stated that he thought his work was fini
shed. Certain social movements and trends were making him
unhappy. Looking back from this (disad)vantage point of
1991, we see why his work was finished. An attitude of
many Jesuits (since their life work is the Lord's) is
that when God sees their work is done, He will take them
unto Himself. Ora pro nobis! R.I.P.
2.

Deapsey•s Social Attitudes
on Pace• In Terris

Pacem In Terris was published in 1963, three years
after Dempsey's death. Yet PT basically belongs to
Dempsey's era, to the Classical social document period.
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The intention of P'l' was to put forth a functional
(organic) ideal (de jure) order of society.
The underlying argumentation of P'l' is simple. It is
the same development which B.W. Dempsey employed during
his entire career. The building block of society is the
family (the person is the family's nucleus). within the
family a person works to complete self. All society is
made up of these building blocks, namely, families. If
all the families (building blocks) within each nation
have a healthy orderliness, the resulting "family of
nations" provides good opportunities and power to act
justly and charitably. If each family is fair (just) and
loving (charitable), the result will be a tranquility
born of order, namely, peace on earth, a II Pacem in
Terris." P'l' is the last of the encyclicals belonging
basically to the Classical period. Mother Teresa ex
pressed the above simply: All goes back to the family. If
we have a world made up of good families -- a "family of
nations" --- acting in a lovable manner, there will be
peace on earth (paraphrased).
Both P'l' and Dempsey treated the functional society
(organic) principally through reason. Little emphasis was
placed on the other fonts, particularly theology and
scripture. The full incorporation of all the fonts had to
wait until later in the modern period.
As the Pope did in Pacem in Terris, Dempsey began
with the person, one who is freely self-directed, is
engaged in a li.fetime work, a calling, a vocation, who
seeks opportunities and power to act for the common good,
who practices justice a�d charity, and has certain moral
powers and rights. When people are successful in this,
there results a tranquility born of order: peace. Above
all, the person was considered a social being. Only
later, in Laborem Exercens, is the person treated as
constitutively, essentially, a worker, too. Not only Karl
Marx, but Dempsey, too, in his mature work, The Frontier
Wage, assumed that all persons by their very nature are
also workers (Cf. Chapter Seven, "The Functional Wage").
Arguing from reason, Dempsey begins with the social
person, looks at the inclinations/drives that follow upon
a person's structure (nature) -- directing the intellect
and moving the will toward the fulfillment and completion
of the person within society -- namely law. Law, itself,
implies the need of moral powers (rights) in order to
achieve a good society. The logical movement and close
interrelationship from person, to law, to rights, moves
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to justice as a protector of those rights. Charity
completes what justice begins. Society, as a union of
persons acting together for opportunities and power-to
act (common good) through the practicing of justice and
charity, results in an order born of tranquility called

peace.

on Subsidiarity
As treated in PT (139 and 140), the principle of
subsidiarity was also a mainstay of Dempsey's social
treatments. In theory, B.W. saw the right and duty of the
state under certain conditions to enter the economic
sphere. These conditions were namely four: when there is
(1) a real loss to the common good, when (2) the loss
continues, when it becomes (3) a last resort, the state
could then enter (4) to help the economic sphere help
itself ( Principle of Intervention). Dempsey, at this
point, liked to paraphrase Abraham Lincoln, namely, "the
state should enter only to help others help themselves."
In practice, he saw very few instances in which the
right to enter was verified. And he could not see a
practical case in which the state had a duty to intervene
into economic affairs. He loaded the dice even more by
choosing to employ the word II interfere" rather than
"intervene." Usually, he would inform the listener that
it was his experience that once a horse was allowed to
put its nose into a full feedbag, it was most difficult
to get it out. It is better that the state never get the
opportunity to "interfere" in economic affairs.
The principle of subsidiarity was all important to
Dempsey in his treatment of a functional society. It set
up definite interrelationships between the various groups
(e.g., family, economic, political, and the many volun
tary groups) that make up the larger society. Dempsey
never confused state and society. "It's a Marxian trap."
Always, he would point out that the state was only one
member of the larger society. Going back to QA (1931),
Dempsey expressed subsidiarity function as "the outer
order (state) that should foster, stimulate, regulate,
supplement, integrate, review, restrain, encourage,
direct, watch, stimulate, etc., but not absorb the inner
orders (family, economic, voluntary and the person
itself) of society. The principle in practice took on the
function of a "linebacker" in football, in reserve and
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ready to help the others, especially the prime line of
the family -- "family primacy."
on Aca4emic Bzcellence

Thirty years before PT, Dempsey and his Jesuit
companions (the three professionals) advocated and
practiced scientific competency, technical capability,
and recognized skill in their profession. If Dempsey had
lived to read Pacem in Terris, particularly paragraph
149, he would have given his characteristic sigh of
agreement, namely, an audible "amen."
But in a culture and civilization like our own
which is so remarkable for its scientific
knowledge and its technical discoveries,
clearly no one can insinuate himself into
public life unless he be scientifically com
petent, technically capable, and skilled in
the practice of his own profession (PT, 149).
On occasion, in a firm but a kind manner, he dropped
students from the graduate program. He decided that they
did not measure up to this three-fold standard. When B.W.
was told by another faculty member that he thought a
certain person "promising," his brief response: "To be
promising is not enough!"
on Alpha Sigma ·•u

Dempsey was proud to be the moderator of Alpha Sigma
Nu, the Jesuit honor fraternity. He considered Alpha
Sigma, Nu the "elite" of honor fraternities. All 28 Jesuit
universities in the United Sates have a chapter of this
fraternity. B. W. was particularly enamored because of the
criteria for membership in Alpha Sigma Nu: character
shown not only through scholarship (as in Phi Beta Kappa)
but also loyalty and service to all the groups (societ
ies), especially intermediate groups and particularly the
Jesuit university attended.
In choosing candidates, Dempsey made these criteria
operative and practical. Besides scrutinizing a prospec
tive member's degree of scholarship, loyalty and service,
he also emphasized the honor and privilege of any member
to arrange a personal appointment with the university
president. He insisted that the active university
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membership (juniors and seniors) submit in the course of
a year three (3) reports to the President on both the
good/bad of the faculty, the administration, and student
involvement. After B.W.'s death, this writer became
Fraternity Moderator and helped achieve a dream of Father
Dempsey's -- opening the honor fraternity to qualified
women.
In his last year of life, B.W. welcomed to Marquette
University the National Alpha Sigma Nu convention and
banquet. Enthusiastically, he chose a graduate of
Fordham, a Jesuit University, as speaker and to be
honored, namely, Vince Lombardi, the new and as yet
unknown coach of the Green Bay Packers. B.W. Dempsey had
already taken full measure of the man and declared him in
one word to be "superb." I recall "Bud" taking me by the
arm to be sure that I met this "great man." Certainly,
Dempsey regarded Lombardi as a kindred spirit in outlook
and character.
During Coach Vince Lombardi's excellent talk on
motivation and how to achieve one's goals, Father Demp
sey's face glowed as Lombardi emphasized the five D's:
dedication, determination, discipline, desire, and
decision-making. He echoed Dempsey's life philosophy,
too, when he declared that blocking and tackling done
only 85 percent right were just insufficient. At least,
the endeavor should be a full 100 percent. If alive
today, Dempsey would be advocating the current recognized
need for the United States to target perfection in its
economic endeavors, not just to settle by "doing a good
job."
on Dempsey, The Teacher
This protege of Father Dempsey, teacher, sealed his
fate when he agreed to place himself under his tutelage
for a number of weeks, totally unaware (still being under
SO) of what a hard taskmaster, disciplinarian, and
demanding teacher to whom he had indentured himself. The
task was "to attack together" the history of economic
analysis. As text, Dempsey chose his favorite learned
book: History of Economic Analysis by Joseph Schumpeter,
his favorite economist -- 1,260 pages of small print
including footnotes. Our bloody sessions were two hours
long. My exhausting assignment work requirement was to be
prepared to demonstrate complete (not 85 percent)
knowledge, understanding and integrative insight into a
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sizable chunk of the book. Of course, the expression or
recital had to be precise, accurate and eloquent. Never
before did I have an understanding of what complete
mastery meant. Never before did I appreciate how bloody
an entrance knowledge makes. Not only was the preparation
fatiguing and exhausting, the rough sessions were even
more so. Having survived the ordeal, I was never the
same. I shall always be grateful for being taught how to
think!
Father Dempsey, teacher, was quick to insist that
his students excel. On one occasion a very good student
complained to Father Dempsey that he thought he deserved
an A in his course. Father Dempsey seldom "gave" A I s!
His reply was, "You may be a genius, but I had to
overwork you -- you did not overwork yourself. An A is
completely self-earned!"
on John xx:n:I
In the late 1930 1 s, Dempsey's background and love of
history resulted in a somewhat startling prediction.
Sometime before Roncalli became John XXIII, Dempsey
raised in conversation that "it would make sound Church
historical sense if the coming Pope would choose the name
John XXIII." When Dempsey was scoffed at for his state
ment, his brief but friendly answer was "Please don't
contradict me, I am well aware of what I am saying."
Roncalli and hi.story proved Dempsey right!
on St. Thomas Aquinas
Dempsey always had a high regard for Aquinas. But in
his earlier years he looked elsewhere for systemized and
organized bodies of economic knowledge. Only in his last
years did he fully utilize st. Thomas. An extensive and
intense reading of St. Thomas gave him a deeper apprecia
tion of st. Thomas•s understanding of economic ideas. In
fact, in his last years he tended to "abandon" some of
the later Scholastics (Lessius, De Lugo, etc.) and go
directly to St. Thomas for economic answers.
The discussion of fundamental economic ideas
in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas, however
penetrating and acute, was at all times a by
product of some other activity. St. Thomas was
not an economist, and at no time was he con-
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cerned with the analysis of economic problems
for their own sake. Though he touches upon
many economic topics and touches them with
characteristic neatness and accuracy, he is
always primarily interested in some other
problem [F,164].
Although references to economic subjects occur in
many parts of Aquinas• larger works, his principal
economic statements are in his comments on the virtue of
justice (cf. s.Th. Summa Theologica, 2a, 2ae, qq. 57-80)
and in the Commentary on the Ethics of Aristotle.
Dempsey considered the discussion of the economic
ideas of st. Thomas as being "extremely difficult to set
forth in satisfactory sequence."
The concepts are so closely interrelated that
the analysis of each threatens at any moment
to branch off into an apparent digression, but
when the whole analysis has been presented,
the digression will appear integral to the
topic [F,392].
In St. Thomas, for example, a discussion of
property cannot proceed without some inquiry
into the division of labor coincident with the
division of resources. Once this notion is
introduced, the concept of exchange constantly
hovers on the horizon. Exchange is the princi
pal instrument by which goods privately owned
still minister to the common good. With ex
change comes the introduction of money, with
money, the question of price, and of just
price specifically [cf. Chapter 5). With the
question of just price comes the question of
the just price of money, that is, of usury
[F,392) [cf. Chapter 6].
on the Font of Theology
For several months, Dempsey's constant companion was
the other Wisconsin delegate to the Roman congregation,
namely, Father Cyril Vollert, S.J. (Dean of the Jesuit
Theologate, Professor of Theology, and publisher of
theological works). At this time, Dempsey not only
discovered st. Thomas fully, but also the need for using

36

theology as a real font in the social documents. In his
short span of life remaining, he did pursue this aim.
on Bconoaic syst8Jll.s
From his heavenly vantage point, Dempsey must be
looking down in prayerful and thankful amazement. World
communism is on its deathbed. Dempsey was a life-long
implacable enemy of communism, all the more so because he
considered it a reaction, an attempted displacement for
the capitalistic system. In spite of his often sharp
criticism of even a mixed capitalistic system, he was
quick to defend the capitalistic system as the only
viable, existent, practical economic system.
In SRS (1987), John Paul II spoke out against
injustices in both the political and economic spheres. To
the chagrin of critics in the first world, he attributed
injustice equally to both the communist and capitalist
systems. Such a papal statement would have caused Dempsey
in his characteristic manner to pause and hold his breath
-- for a moment or so!
Dempsey, the historian, fully expected thirty years
ago that the political experiment menacing the world with
totalitarian domination would mercifully come to an end,
but not even this accomplished historian predicted the
demise would be so abrupt and so complete. Dempsey did
have a penchant for predicting social and economic events
accurately from past historical events, but this sudden
demise of communism was not one of them.
John XXIII, in his opening address at Vatican II,
referred to many of his counselors as "prophets of doom
who know no history. 11 Dempsey would be in substantial
agreement with this assessment: "Don •t predict the worst;
neither history nor you can bear that out." He spoke of
theories of a world evil conspiracy as absurd and
preposterous and would have applauded his fellow histori
an John.
Today Dempsey must be showing tremendous interest,
with eyebrows raised, as he stares owlishly upon the
changing attitudes and solutions offered in the world
which had begun within five years of his death. Cer
tainly, he would be greatly impressed by the official
Church teaching of Vatican II, Gaudium et Spes (GS).
Dempsey, who was never known to take a neutral stand on
anything controversial, would more likely accept its
close reasoning, and of course the document itself, on
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the basis of the authority of the Church, than to accept
a seemingly reasonable argument not sanctioned by Church
authority. Authority always had priority over reason, at
least in the practical order, both in his mind and in his
actions.

on Religious Freedom
During Dempsey's time religious freedom was much
debated, and he willingly participated in these discus
sions. He saw the Church as given a divine mandate for
religious freedom. For an argument from reason, he
referred to John Courtney Murray, s .J., as his authority,
without going into Murray's reasons. In his authoritative
manner, Dempsey would state, "one would do well to 1 is ten
to John Courtney Murray, for he has much to say on this
matter." He was quick to state that the Church had not
yet spoken clearly on religious freedom. A man of his
time, he was wont to quote the slogan "error has no
rights. 11 But this was more than five years before Vatican
II (although Murray had much to say) had published its
Decree on Religious Freedom (1964).
One who knows Dempsey's social attitudes can say
that he would be thrilled at the advent of Pacem in
Terris (PT). In 1963, John XXIII cut through the argu
ments dealing with human rights which had befuddled some
in the Church for over a thousand years. In this docu
ment, John maintains that every human person, as the
image and 1 ikeness of the Creator, is entitled to an
essential freedom which must be respected by Church and
state alike. He also puts forth that the right of the
individual to religious freedom is founded in the
straight secular (de facto) order on purely rational,
philosophical principles.
Dempsey would have welcomed this philosophical
argument based on the dignity of man. There would be full
acceptance on his part, not because of its rationality,
but because of the authority of Pope John XXIII, as
expressed in PT. For him, authority always came first;
reason had to find a way to accommodate. And yet he
derived most of his principles from reason or "natural
law."
In PT, the axiom "error has no rights" still stood.
But John insisted that only human persons had rights.
Even in error, individual persons retain the right to the
inviolability of their persons. Of course error should be
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repudiated, yet the one in error retains a personal
dignity which must be respected. In political and
religious matters, no one is to be forced to act in a
fashion contrary to personal beliefs.
In Vatican II, the Decree on Religious Freedom
reiterates that an individual has no right to err, but at
the same time must follow a fully formed conscience, a
process of practical reason, which is the only way one
can arrive at practical truth. It would be a good guess
that for Dempsey this would be another troubling matter
for discussion, as he strove "to arrive at a satisfactory
conclusion."
Option for the Poor
In 1968, Pope Paul VI dedicated the Church to a
radical "option for the poor. 11 As a boy, Dempsey had
overcome personal poverty in a short period and proudly
and repeatedly spoke of this success. But this talented
and strong-willed man would have succeeded under almost
any circumstances. Dempsey really never understood the
powerlessness of ordinary people forced to remain poor
for extended periods. He grew up in an individualistic
atmosphere in which he breathed notions that all are born
industrious, frugal, and honest, and therefore destined
for economic success, providing only that they put in the
effort. Personally, he held that one should resist any
"interference"' in individual liberty, especially by the
state and its many institutions. In various ways he
expressed the notion · that one need not· remain poor
(powerless), for each one has the power to "overcome" the
poverty.
It would be interesting to see Dempsey wrestle with
the emphasis given recently by both the Church and his
own Society of Jesus to this "preferential option for the
poor." We can be assured that he would bow to the
authority of the Church and his beloved Society, regard
less of his "reasonable opposition." A man who could
assure a group of listeners and make it sound plausible
to them that a football team had won a "moral victory"
when it had lost 30 points could certainly bring himself
around to the desired conclusion.
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TODAY11S CATHOLI:C SOCI:AL VI:SI:OB

1.

The Modern Social Period (1961-1991+)

The most startling and amazing happening of the last
30 years has been the sharpening and clarifying of the
all-embracing Catholic Social Vision. Such a vision is
not built on "reason" alone, but on the fonts of theol
ogy, scripture, philosophy, the social sciences, and
"natural law" (reason). The most gratifying happening
within the Catholic Social Vision is the fleshing out of
the concept of Development. Beginning with Gaudium et
Spes (GS) and continuing with Populorum Progressio (PP)
and Sollicitudo Rei Socialis (SRS) there is movement
toward a new century of social documents (1991 and
beyond). There is the wholeness of a complete vision. If
Dempsey were alive today -- after he got over his initial
"alien" shock -- to see the tremendous JO-year movement
in Vatican social thought, I believe he would calmly
embrace/accept it, if not from reason, then from authori
ty, as a new challenge. A man who said in 1957 -- before
Michael Harrington et al. -- that "In the united states
the rich have not grown richer and the poor poorer"
[F,288] would have much catching up to do!
2.

The catholic social Vision

The Christian Social Vision (CSV) is the cornerstone
of modern Catholic social teaching. since Vatican II,
there has been a radically different vision of the Church
-- more historical, more dynamic, more vital. Much of the
basic social vision is drawn from two of the social
documents of Vatican II, namely, Gaudium et Spes and
Lumen Gentium (LG).
The Trinitarian society relates to the entire
universe and especially to human societies. The Triune
God -- Father/Son/Spirit -- founds and supports through
the son the Church society; demonstrates power and
presence to the Secular society (our world); is present
and penetrates the Kingdom Society. The Trinity furnishes
a real exemplar of the Ideal Society in Jesus Christ and
calls the human person to co-creation (partnership). In
turn, the Church helps the people of God prepare for the
Kingdom and directly assists the persons and societies
which make up the present order.
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The Catholic Social Vision not only relates to the
immediate vision of a realizing process of human persons
and their societies, but to the larger context of man and
God working together (co-creation) to achieve a universal
mission of a complete realization of the entire CSV. For
many, the traditional "vision" (including B.W. Dempsey's)
is no longer meaningful or attractive.

RN

QA

DR
SP
DA

MM
PT

GS

LG
RF

OA
JW
MD

Main Catholic Social Teachi ngs {CST) and Symbols

Rerum Novarun (1891) Leo XIII (On the Condition of the worker)
Quadragesimo Anno (1931) Pius XI (Restructuring the Social

Order)

Divini Redemptoris (1937) Pius XI (On Communism)
La Solennita della Pentecoste (1941) Pius XII

Christmas Address on Democracy (1944) Pius XII

Hater et Hagistra (1961) John XXIII (Christianity & Social

Progress)

Pacem in Terris (1963) John XXIII (Peace on Earth)
Gaudium et Spes (1965) Vatican II (The Church in the Modern

World)

Lumen Gentium (1965) Vatican II (Constitution on the Church)
Declaration on Religious Freedom (1965) Vatican II (Dignitas
Humanae)
Octogesimo Adveniens (1971) Paul VI (Development of Peoples)

Justice in the·. World (1971) Synod of Bishops
Medellin Documents (1968) (Justice, Peace, Message of the
Peoples of Latin America)
10th Anniversary of Pacem in Terris (1973)
RR
Evangelization of the Modern World (1974) Synod of Bishops
EWW'
Redemptor Hominis (1979) John Paul II (Redemption of Man)
RH
·Laborem Exercens (1981) John Paul II (On Homan Work) (90th
LE
Anniversary of RN)
Economic Justice (1986) U.S. Bishops
EJ
Sollicitude Rei Socialis (1987) John Paul II (On Social
SRS
Concerns)
ECPC Ethical Choices and Political Challenges (1983) Canadian
Bishops

(Such documents (GS, JW, MD, RR, EWW', EJ) although not written under
papal direction are included since the promulgating authority
depended on papal approval.]
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Chapter 3 -- The Christian Soc1al V1s1on
(GS; Lg; St. Th, S,T.I)
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The first test of any philosophy or theology is
whether it makes real sense in terms of the reader's
experience. Does it enrich the reader's life?
In
considering Vatican documents, the question is whether
their treatment conforms to the last hundred years of
social encyclicals. After 40 years of reflection on these
social documents, my conclusion is that they do. My early
exposure was to the Classical documents, Rerum Novarum
(RN) and Quadragesimo Anno (QA), and later to the modern
social documents, Mater et Magistra (MM) and Gaudium et
Spes (GS), etc. Recent openness has been to the neo
modern or latest documents, Populorum progressio (PP),
Redemptor Hominis (RH), Laborem Exercens (LE), and, most
recently, Sollicitudo Rei Socialis (SRS) with its
emphasis on integral development.
Five Macro-societies
over the last hundred years, Catholic social
Teaching has formed a distinctive catholic Social vision.
Unfortunately, not only have the Vatican social documents
been a well-kept secret, even in Catholic circles, but
the Catholic Social Vision has, too. The center or
nucleus of the vision is the human person. But the
family, made up of persons, is the building block of all
earthly societies.• A human person is essentially a social
being, an image of the Trinity, having a basic need for
society to complete itself, as well as to provide
opportunities to display generosity, love and knowledge.
The catholic Social Vision includes five macro
soci�ties: Trinitarian Society, Church Society, Secular
(de facto) Society, the Ideal (de jure) Society, and the
Kingdom society (cf. accompanying diagram). The human
person has contact in all these five macro-societies and
also is engaged through the family building block in the
micro-societies: political, families, economic, interme
diate, which make up both the de facto present secular
society and the de jure ideal society.
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3.

The Vatican Social Documents (1891-1991)

Classical Vatican Documents (Bsp. RR and QA) 1891-1961)

These documents dealt almost exclusively with the
Ideal Society: what should the earthly society become?
Argumentation was mostly from the font of reason or
"natural law" philosophy. By 1960 some social experts,
B.W. Dempsey among them, felt that a framework of social
principles was solidly in place. They did not expect to
see more important encyclicals, but only the drawing out
of known principles in greater detail.
Kodern Vatican Documents (Bsp. HK and GS) 1961-1971

With a shift in emphasis from the de jure, the
should be, to the de facto, what is, major new social
documents did appear. Certain old Classical social
philosophers did not consider the new teaching of actual
present events and signs of the times as appropriate
material for Vatican 11 dogma." They held that such
"application of principles" should be the daily work of
the laity, not of Vatican documents. The de facto
treatment (cf. MM and GS) detailed the shortcomings of
the present situation, "the mess we are in, 11 in relation
to the ideal. Briefly, what is is considered in relation
to what should be.
Of course, the illumination of principles continued
with the further inclusion of the fonts of theology,
sacred scripture, and social science (e.g., economics,
political science, sociology). In addition to philosophi
cal reason, these other fonts have made important
contributions. Today, with emphasis moving to the de
facto society, social philosophers and theologians are
more likely to speak of Catholic Social Teaching, rather
than using the traditional tag of Catholic Social Dogma.
Recent (Beo-Kodern)
1971-1991

Documents

(Esp.

PP, RB, LB, SRS)

The social problem broadened over these years and
became a global problem, embracing all peoples, not just
Christians and Catholics. In early Classical times the
social problem was referred to as a social question: the
maldistribution of income in the economic order. The gap
between the de facto and the de jure of world society is
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now treated, and the problem came to be seen as global.
Thus, the global gap became the global problem. The
recent encyclicals are putting forth integral development
as the means to diminish or lessen the gap. The answer to
the Global Problem is the achieving of rights (moral
power and influence) in the various micro-societies.
Integral Development means growth in rights of persons
living in the family, political, economic, and immediate
orders in an interrelated and integral unitary fashion.

,.

catholic social Vision an4 the Human Person

Recent encyclicals have stated elements of a modern
definition of the human person (cf. LE, et al; RH). The
human person is described/defined as a self-project
engaged in a life-work task within community in order to
become a full npersonality n (self-realized) in prepara
tion for living in the Kingdom of God.

(See Diagram on Page 47)
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This free human being, because loved by God, thereby has
dignity bestowed on the person; constituting the person
as esse11tially a social being and a worker.
The person is an image and reflection of Trinitarian
Society, yet has a need to overcome inadequacies and
incompleteness. Being a person is only relatively self
realized, opportunities are needed for growth in love and
knowledge as a social being. Recent documents have
emphasized the partnership of the human person with the
Divine Persons. Together, they are truly co-creators and
co-decision-makers. The human is considered a true,
although admittedly a junior, partner with God.
Today's description of the (human) person includes
engagements in a work-task (calling/vocation) both as a
reaction and a response to God's love. The human person
is constitutively/essentially a worker with a twofold
purpose: firstly, to develop into a better person through
virtuous achievement; secondly, and simultaneously, to
produce a better society by mastering domination/submis
sion over goods.
"Making up one's mind" (making decisions/choices).
The whole earthly universe is summed-up in the human
person. The person is not only a part of the rational but
also of the inanimate, vegetative, and sensing world. All
these levels are integral, interconnected, and interre
lated within the person. When a person "makes up his/her
mind, 11 all levels of his/her being contribute to this
final decision .. More accurately, there are many levels
that are determinants, including a co-creating partner
God. Many determinants, rational, and non-rational, enter
into any person's make�up and the making up of one's mind
in coming to a decision.
,In making up a person's mind, there is the uncon
scious organizing activity, plus the conscious decision
making. Such a human II switchboardII results in dynamic
interrelationships. All the determinants (human and
divine) work in relative "harmony" toward a conscious
final rational decision. At each moment, the non-rational
structures of a human person make a statement -- present
determinants. At every moment, the person spontaneously
organizes the data arriving to the nerve centers of the
brain from the external senses and internal organs of the
being. Fully conscious decisions are invariably the
result of reflecting upon one set of components in fully
conscious decision-making.
This is a reflection on a
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whole series of determinants rising (from a sub-conscious
level}.
The Dignity of the Person
God loves his creation, the human person. This
theological fact gives the human person worth (dignity).
Just as the fortunate child knows that mother loves
him/her above all others -- an unconditional love giving
the child worth and dignity in mother 1 s eyes -- so God
loves all persons unconditionally, thereby bestowing on
them dignity. Thus, all persons have dignity (worth). All
human persons, therefore, must be fundamentally equal.
God does not love human persons because they possess
worth, but makes them worthy because he loves them. The
reverse would put the cart before the horse!
Knowing that one has dignity (worth) because loved
by God can instill tremendous hope, confidence, and trust
within a person. Immeasurably, this helps the person
accept the pains and crosses of life -- perhaps cheerful
ly!
For example, Father Dempsey was one of those
fortunate people knowing -- and frequently expressing -
that he was loved both by his earthly and heavenly mother
and God too!
s.

Trinitarian society

Drawing upon the theological font, apart from any
relation to creation, the exchange of life and love
between the Father, the Son, and the Spirit in the
Trinity is unending. All three persons are needed to
sustain Trinitarian Society's common life; hence, their
unity with one another is strictly indissoluble. Human
persons, being reflections and images of Trinitarian
Society, must be naturally (essentially) social beings.
While human society tries to achieve and keep the unity
of the Trinity, the most achievable unity for a finite
society is a degree of unity. The life flowing among the
three persons is the metaphysical basis for the incor
poration of created beings (mankind} into divine social
life.
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The Father -- First Person of Trinitarian Society
God the Father creates and conserves all creatures
(human and non-human). The Father gives an impulse of
life and love to each, giving them their very essence and
existence. All beings are expected to act in accordance
with their natures. Non-humans without choice (freedom)
must act in such a manner. Human persons should follow
their natures, but have freedom of choice, are not
necessitated to do so.
In a broad sense, non-humans make built-in decisions
in accord with God's directives. They are determined,
that is, they must follow their natures, which are
determinants of their actions. The human person includes
in his/her very being all levels of non-human earthly
being, but also has human rationality. On the lower
levels, the vegetative, the sentient, etc., God works
within the person giving a set mode of operation.
These non-rational or pre-rational operations (some
of which must be resisted!) express these lower levels.
These determinations are for the most part not conscious
ly made by humans. (Of course, all determinations and
decisions are made consciously by the Trinity.) Humans,
however, for example, exert gravity, digest food, feel
emotion at a non-rational or pre-rational level. When
someone makes up his or her mind, these determinants,
plus the conscious, rational function, come into play in
making the decision. Only persons, rational beings, make
conscious deci'sions, though with varying degrees of
awareness.
Humans do make free decisions contrary to their very
nature. No one says that they should go contrary to their
natur.e, but they do. The nature and laws of a human being
are givens. Freedom lies in the choosing between finite
available goods. Of course, the degree of responsiveness
is each one's personal decision. We remain free to
respond -- make up our minds -- in the way we choose to
the divine offer of life.
The Trinity of Human Persona
If any entity could say "no" to the Trinity's
creation, it would, of course, cease to exist. In some
way and to some degree, all beings must respond to their
(created) natures. The degree of compliance may vary from
one entity to another.
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Human persons can relatively fail to respond to
their natures; they are free to deviate. They can to a
degree deviate from what the Father has in mind for them
at any moment of world history. such deviation brings
evil, disorder, sin. Even subhuman beings seemingly can
deviate to some degree from their natures, but not
really. In other words, de facto there is disorder/chaos
in creation, but not all chaos need be destructive.
Sometimes chaos is paradoxically the necessary prelimi
nary to the emergence of higher forms of order. For
example, in the seasons of the year, fall brings dying,
winter slumber, and spring sprouts forth new life. The
Trinity continually adjusts at each moment, ultimately
bringing the whole universe through evolvement to a
Divine Milieu. Even Genesis speaks of order coming out of
chaos. From a human vantage point, we tend to see chaos,
disorder, suffering, as ends. But the stance of faith is
that they may be glorious means moving toward a final,
universal end. Generations of disorder may perdure, yet
ultimately a higher good is to come forth from the
apparent evil; order can evolve out of chaos.
The vision embodied in the divine aims of the
Trinity for the universe must be the only basis for a
true evolving lasting order within the universe. over
time the Trinity restores peace, the tranquility born of
order. This gives serenity and harmony to the working of
the world of creation. As was seen above, any creature
must respond to this divine impulse in some degree simply
to continue to exist.
Jesus Christ: second Person of Trinitarian society
Jesus Christ is working on all levels for all
humankind. He works to achieve a better world and
simultaneously to renovate the human persons within this
better world. He tries to assist all to become better
persons in a better world, thereby preparing all for the
Kingdom of God. The more anyone responds positively and
wholeheartedly to Jesus Christ's life work, the more s/he
is in union with the will of the Father, namely, the
Kingdom of God. Together with Jesus Christ, human persons
as co-creators (partners) work to make a better people
within a better society through the practical power of
the Spirit.
Jesus•s life-task
(vocation/calling),
therefore, is to carry out the Father's plan, the
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salvation of the world through the Holy Spirit
preparing all humans for the Kingdom.
The Xnoarnation of the son
In his Spiritual Exercises, st. Ignatius has the
members of the Trinitarian Society look down upon this
earthly universe to peer at the chaos reigning among the
persons and within the de facto secular society. Chaos
rules among individual persons, families, political and
economic groups, etc. The Trinity's decision is to send
the second person of the Trinity to enter this chaotic
world and lead all men/women and the societies they live
in to ordered life and, eventually, the Kingdom.
I try to enter into the vision of God, in his
triune life, looking upon our world: men and
women aimless, despairing, hateful and kill
ing, men and women sick and dying, the old and
the young, the rich and the poor, the happy
and the sad, some being born and some being
laid to rest. The leap of divine joy: God
knows that the time has come when the mystery
of his salific plan, hidden from the beginning
of the world, will become manifest (Sp. Ex.
106, 107, 108, tr. Fleming; cf. Luke 1:26-28).
The coming ·of Jesus Christ -- The .Incarnation
brings the divine presence and active power within the
world of creation. Jesus arrives to do the Father's will,
to bring the whole universe to its ultimate good, the
Kingdom. Direct confrontation exists now between good and
evil', order and disorder (chaos).
Every created being (human and non-human) joins with
the Son in building the Kingdom of God. This is carried
on at every moment of existence through response to the
life-giving offer of the Father in the power of the
Spirit. The perishable world strains toward God. The
earthly world's sole enduring value is its contribution
to the fullness of the Kingdom.
The son Jesus submits to the promptings of his
Father. At every moment of his earthly life, he either
consciously or unconsciously coordinates his human
thought and action with his ongoing response as son of
the Father. His humanity, therefore, becomes an ever more
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perfect instrument for the revelation of what it truly
means to be divine.
Holy Spirit -- Third Person of Trinitarian Society
At every moment, on all levels, the Holy Spirit
works within the human person -- Paul calls us "temples
of the Holy Spirit." This work is demonstrated by our
non-conscious determinants and our conscious decisions.
The Spirit takes the lead, guiding the human person to
achieve the world good on all levels. Even the sub-atomic
inanimate components make statements in accordance with
their nature. Even more so do human persons, having
rational decision capacity added to lower level determi
nants or sub-decisions. All the drives/inclinations of
the human being are led at every moment of existence by
the Holy Spirit to the good of the whole person. The
Spirit guides these inclinations by directing and moving
the person on all levels. This is often referred to as
making up one's mind!
st. Ignatius, in his retreat treatise, refers to a
similar process as Spiritual Exercises:
For just as taking a walk, journeying on foot,
and running are bodily exercises, so we call
Spiritual Exercises every way of preparing and
disposing the soul to rid itself of all inor
dinate attachments, and after their removal of
seeking and finding the will of God in the
disposition of our life for the salvation of
our soul [Sp. Ex. no. 1).
Making up one's mind, that is, being self-aware of
determinants under the constant guidance of the Holy
Spirit, makes human persons co-creators and co-decision
makers. This results in a real relationship with the
Trinity, which may be designated prayer, friendship or
fellowship and so on.
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Trinitarian Society and catholic Social Vision
(CSV)

Trinitarian
Society

Outer Life
of the
Trinity
(Economic
Trinity)

7.

inner life

3 Divine Persons
living within a
perfect society

outer life --

creation, giving
essence and exis
tence to beings -
with outer life
ordered to inner
life

creates --

entire universe,
especially persons

conserves --

entire universe,
including persons

co-creates --

making the human
person a "partner"

relates to entire
universe --

through creation/
conservation

Church society and catholic social Vision (CSV)

Today there is a new "vision" of the Church Society.
Emphasis has changed since Vatican II. There is less of
an individualistic and more of a social approach, greater
enga-gement in the work-task of the "marketplace," more
participation and emphasis on the dynamism of the person
who is in the process of "becoming." The world picture
(vision) is now different.
Today there is no dichotomy between Church Society
and (world) Secular Society. With the coming of Vatican
II, the seeming split or drifting apart of the notion of
being a Christian and being human is healed. No longer
does this "schism" (split) threaten the Church. Christian
humanization has been declared decent, desirable,
authentic. Man is again asked to love the world, which is
an image of God. It is up to men/women to make this world
and society better. Man is again asked to live and love
the world in the process of self-realization. Long before
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Vatican II, B.W. Dempsey promoted the above and would
feel gratified at this work of Vatican II and its
aftermath.
The Church Society assists the Secular Society,
incorporating the secular members into the "community of
disciples," the Church Society. Dempsey would applaud.
For 100 years, Catholic Social Teaching (CST) has put
emphasis on the two-fold goals of the members to renovate
themselves and reconstruct (build a better) society.
Dempsey was in full accord. In his thinking there was no
dichotomy between Church Society and the secular world.
By this renovation and reconstruction of the present
society, the "people of God" prepare themselves for the
Kingdom Society; Dempsey would appreciate the emphasis on
the final end, the "Kingdom Society."
The Church is not synonymous with the Kingdom of
God. In fact, the Church is the divinely chosen instru
ment for the Kingdom's realization. The Kingdom is
broader, including all of creation to the extent it is
joined to the Son's ongoing relationship with the Father.
The Church is basically a society, a community of
disciples. The Church is described as an association of
those human persons to whom the Father's plan for the
salvation of the world has been fully revealed.
Christians alone profess belief in God as Triune.
Christians alone believe that Jesus is the Son of God.
The Church, therefore, bears a special responsibility for
carrying on the work of Jesus, not simply as individual
persons, but as members of a community called the Church.
Christians are expected to internalize the very pattern
of Jesus•s life. Christians should think and act as Jesus
did. Christians should respond to the inner promptings of
the Father as Jesus did, in fellowship, friendship, or
prayer.
Like all persons, Christians are essentially social
beings. For a human person and a group to call themselves
Christians, there must be established an immutable/unmis
takable link with the very person and message of Jesus.
This link must be visible in the behavior of that person
or that group.
a.

Ideal society and Catholic Social vision

Of course, the Ideal Society does not really exist.
Nor should it be confused with the Kingdom. CST postu
lates the Ideal Society -- what ought/should be --today
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in the image of the Trinitarian Society. The basic thrust
of the entire Classical period was to present an ideal
order, a "utopia." At best, the ideal can only be
approximated in this life. Thus, for the most part, the
Classical period of CST (1891-1961) presented what should
or ought to be. The modern period of CST (1961-1991+)
deals foremost not with the de jure, but with the de
facto Secular society. Modern CST deals with development,
how the gap (the social problem) can be closed and how
the Ideal Society reflecting unchanging principles can be
approximately reached. Thus, the modern period is filled
with change, historical sequence, signs-of-the-times,
etc.
9.

Xntegrative Development an4 catholic social Vision

Integrative development is defined as the "basic
right of a person to participate progressively in rights:
on all four (4) levels of (integrated) being
(supernatural/rational/sensible/vegetative)
in all social order (family/economic/politi
cal/intermediate)
and in the cultural heritage of society.
Integrative· development refers 11 to the dynamic
interpretation of all those fundamental human rights upon
which the aspirations of individuals and nations are
based" (JW, 15). Integral development is the means of
modifying and relatively closing or lessening the gap
between the secular and the ideal order. Today this gap
is referred to as the Global Social Problem (GS/PP/SRS).
10.

Kingdom Society an4 csv

The Kingdom has its beginning in this life; com
pletion must wait until the next. In this life, pre
paration is made for the full Kingdom of the next life.
Wherever the presence and power of God exists within, the
Kingdom lives (exists). The Kingdom is found wherever
justice and fellowship (charity) abound.
The Kingdom is not some heavenly territory, but the
way God shows his presence and power. God as Father has
the great purpose to establish the Kingdom. Jesus,
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behaving as his Father's Son, takes up the Father's
cause. Jesus does not have his own personal agenda or
program. His task is to carry out his Father's program,
the establishment of the Kingdom.
Jesus Christ is King: King of the Universe, King of
the Kingdom. Jesus called upon the Father to initiate the
Kingdom. Jesus in the name of the Father gives a start to
the Kingdom in history. The Kingdom is brought about by
what Jesus does. From Christ's use of his presence and
power, a fellowship arises (especially with the poor),
which brings about reconciliation of unrealized persons
("sinners"). "Thy Kingdom come •
• on earth as in
heaven." The Kingdom is the Triune God's final plan for
men/women. The plan will be fully implemented, come into
existence, in the next life. God penetrates and is
present in this Kingdom of God forever. His Son is King
of this heavenly society.
11.

Universe in Development

The whole universe is in process of development. The
world is in process of becoming (socialization), for the
universe has not yet been perfected. The world is moving
"beyond" this present tangible order of created beings.
The whole created universe -- the Christian Social Vision
universe -- is groaning through and through in constant
pangs of childbirth. The Triune God draws man and society
toward a complete fulfillment. Through the course of
time, creative, co-creative, and continuing creative
action go on, moving the entire CSV onward/upward into
eternity. All creation has a thrust that moves onward and
upward to the final destiny.
"Le Milieu Divin," the whole cosmic picture vision,
the plan of God, must be won back for and with God, says
Teilhard de Chardin. Creation still retains the hope of
being freed and developed. "Creation retains the hope
that in the end the whole of created life will be rescued
from the tyranny of change and decay . • • at the present
time all created life groans in one great act of giving
birth" [Cf. Rom. 8: 21-22). All the elements of the entire
universe are moving (developing/evolving) toward a total
good (destiny).
Positively within the universe is the divine urge,
a basic urge of generosity and development implanted in
the human person, as well as in the cosmic universe. The
universe is becoming, engaged in its self-realization.
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Within the universe exists sheer potentiality for final
achievement of success (St. Thomas Aquinas). catholic
Social Vision develops and evolves over time, becoming
more and more an image of God.
All created beings (human or non-human) are created
to praise, reverence, and serve the three divine persons
and by this means reach the Kingdom. All creatures, and
all created societies, are each for the other, to help
each attain the purpose of their creation. Essentially,
(by their natures) they depend upon one another. This
constitutes the God/World (cosmic universe). All the
inclinations/drives of all beings at every moment con
tribute to the building of the Kingdom of God, now and
for eternity. Pierre Teilhard de Chardin speaks of this
notion as an ongoing "hymn of the universe."
The whole universe, through its co-creator, is
united as it moves through evolution to its final end.
All beings further the universe goals. Even free will
persons can only temporarily impede the universe's motion
toward its goal of existence -- life.
To conclude, Dempsey I s scholarly attainments are
preserved in his writings for all to see. His four main
economic ideas will be treated in depth in the remaining
chapters of this book:
Chapter
Chapter
Chapter.
Chapter

Four
Five
Six
Seven

Economic Synthesis
The Just Price
Interest and Usury
The Functional Wage

In his 20 active years· he published 60 articles and 12
books. The above chapters should prove helpful for an
understanding in some depth of B.W. Dempsey's principal
contr'ibutions. Notwithstanding, the chapters are no
substitutions for reading his ground-breaking books and
articles themselves -- Interest and Usury, The Frontier
Wage, and articles on just Price (cf. Bibliography).

PART II
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ECONOMIC SYNTHESIS
I:. 'l'HB BRBAKDO'lflf OP BCOIIOXI:C ORDER

Whether or not B.W. Dempsey had a set of unifying
principles running through his socio-economic writings
is certainly not clear to the casual reader. Possibly,
such a unique synthesis of thought could elude even
some who make a closer scrutiny and study of his works.
Always the analyst, seldom a conscious synthesizer,
B.W. Dempsey himself saw "unity" in the accomplishment
of his purpose. He considered unity as an effect of
order [F,55) and approvingly quoted the traditional
definition of order: "Unity arising from the apt ar
rangement of a plurality of objects." He considered
that his writings were a unified whole. Reviewers of
his works, friends, and critics were apt to criticize
what they considered a "lack of unity." Dr. Stephen
Worland neatly expresses this common criticism in his
review of B.W. Dempsey's The Functional Economy: "the
author [B.W. Dempsey) cites st. Thomas and Aristotle on
the evils of excessive unity and he gives ample heed to
their warning. 111 In all fairness, Dr. Worlund, in his
most excellent review of The Functional Economy, goes
on to point out that 11 though not apparent to the casual
observer, an underlying theme persists throughout the
book and provides unity among diversity. 112 Since The
Functional Economy is a collection of B.W. Dempsey's
writings and essays over a twenty-five year period,3
the unity must come from a unity within B.W. Dempsey's
thought; certainly, such organization is not apparent
in the arrangement and make-up of the book.
1
Review of Social Economy, Vol. XVII, No. 2 (Sep
tember, 1959), p. 174.
2

Ibid., p. 174.

As B. w. Dempsey incorporated much of his period
ical writings and almost all of his thought into The
Functional Economy, only on occasion will it be necessary
to refer to his many articles written for periodicals.
This does not hold true for books or chapters written for
books.
3
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Although B.W. Dempsey would have been "pleased"
that this unity was seen by so able a reviewer of his
work (and that unity or underlying theme certainly
exists}, he himself places the "unity" that he confi
dently assumes and asserts in his writings on an en
tirely different basis. Always suspicious and critical
of a "social progress" that was based on an apparent
"solution" of social problems without a full and cons
cious knowledge of their underlying principles, B.W.
Dempsey would be quick to deny that a proper orienta
tion, that sound practice, could exist without sound
theory, that any long-run social progress could be
achieved unless the principles were known and applied.
He saw unity in his writings because his writings never
deviated from his one purpose of stating and making
clear the principles needed for a solution of a social
problem. Quoting from the preface of The Functional
Economy:
There is a unity in the chapters that follow;
the same principles are brought to bear on
diverse problems. The principles are the
same, and the radical basis of the conclusion
is therefore the same. However, there is
diversity in the problems attacked, in the
level of abstraction, therefore, also diver
sity in the immediacy of practical applica
tion and in the degree of scientific appara
tus appropriate for different problems and
different audiences. The underlying unity,
however, justifies the presentation of these
pages as one book [F,V].
No single work by B.W. Dempsey contains a complete
synthesis of his economic and social thought. He never
saw the need to present such a synthesis. His purpose
was professedly the "improvement of the economic com
munity." His interest, purpose, unity were elsewhere.
He, himself, would have a certain suspicion of making
such a synthesis as diverting him from his true purpose
and maximum good with the possible assumption of making
the mistake of Socrates, "of thinking that the maximum
good lay in the maximum unity" [F,V]. Nevertheless,
B.W. Dempsey did possess such a synthesis of thought,
even though it is not explicitly found in his writings.
This not only becomes apparent from an examination of
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the consistency of his writings, but their effective
ness, the reception they received, create the presump
tion that he followed a rather definite system in his
economic thinking.
In any presentation of B.W. Dempsey's writing, in
order to present the unique synthesis of his thought,
cognizance must be taken of his own realistic approach.
Always realistic in his approach, he blueprints no
ideal order, but begins his endeavors by examining
systematically the forces and facts present in every
real working economy. With this groundwork accomplish
ed, he is ready to "project the ideal situation," but
only with "intelligent adherence to the enlightened
teachings of the Church and constant awareness of the
lesson that history can achieve, against the background
of historic and existing economic communities" [F,V).
A.

The Guild Systea

Certain facts are apparent to B.W. Dempsey. The
guild system, an institutional structure sound in prin
ciple, has been wiped out. No principle of organization
has taken its place. The state, as a result, is
"overwhelmed with tasks for which it is not yet equip
ped" [F,284]. Present economic communities are bereft
of a true principle of organization. This ensuing
disorganization is due to certain causes. He analyzes
the conditions and causes. To understand his thought,
it is necessary at this juncture to sketch these ideas
in more detail.
With the breakdown and destruction of the "guild
system as a method of economic control," the "means of
improvement of the economic community" came to an end.
To this very day the guilds have not been replaced, and
until their principles are again in economic society,
there can be no true economic community. B.W. Dempsey
evaluates well their place and importance:
Light and shadow are well-blended in the
guild scene. But associations were economi
cally efficient. They [the guilds) did raise
the volume of regular production of useful
goods and they distributed the increased
product equitably, at least within the sys
tem. The principle of their organization is
sound. Living and growing as it did when it
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extended from merchant to craftsman, it had
unlimited possibilities. But when lower
grades in the community were excluded from
enjoying the same type of status as that
possessed by those already organized, the
guilds belied their own vital principle,
withered, and were destroyed. The void that
their ultimate extinction left has never been
filled, and the complete absence of a common
way of life among moderns makes it a fair
question whether or not there is a sufficient
substratum of natural virtue to enable people
to get together on an associational basis to
fill that void. The guilds were possible
because there was a prevailing pattern of
social thought that no one questioned, and
that could be used as a foundation for social
action. Today, far from agreeing upon the
nature of man and his destiny, the schools
are at loggerheads over the preambles of
philosophy. Yet if we cannot find some reas
onable principle for common action, it is
still true that "all the crafts will be des
troyed" and the "community will not be main
tained" [F,103-104).
"Some reasonable principle for common action" -- a
sound socio-economic organization -- is necessary if
the economic community is to improve and minister to
the well-being of man. Proper principles again dis
covered and applied to a modern scene is a basic need.
"It will not be denied that the ideas and ideals of men
have force in the shaping of their history and institu
tions" [F,95).
B.

Causes of Disorder

"Disorder is the essential note of our society"
[F,105). "Our contemporary society seems to be almost
unique among the societies of which we have any accur
ate historical records in that it is concerned with an
almost universal revolution" [F,105). B.W. Dempsey then
indicates the extent of this universal revolution:
But in our generation, revolution and the
dissatisfied attitude that makes possible the
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spread of revolutionary ideas are not limited
to the forms of political organization. Every
social institution is under fire and the
whole question of the nature of man, the
number, the quality and origin of his rights,
if any, and the social institutions best
suited to such a man, family, civil communi
ties, industrial organization, are all called
into question at the same time. It is thought
we could say that previous generations dealt
with social questions whereas our generation
is concerned with the social question [F,105106].
In the course of his life, B.W. Dempsey touched upon
all the above-mentioned. We need not pause to consider
some of these, e.g., nature of man, rights, etc, as his
treatment does not differ from sound "traditional phil
osophy." His genius and contribution are directed in a
different direction.
With characteristic boldness, B.W. Dempsey does
not hesitate to delineate the causes of what he calls
the "complete disorganization" of society. "This com
plete disorganization," he asserts, "is the result of
five revolutions which, despite origins in the past,
have in our generation converged in their damaging
effect" [F,106]. Immediately, B.W. Dempsey states why
it is important to set out these five revolutionary
causes of the disorder beyond their complete disorgani
zational effect upon society. "To understand these
revolutions," he says, "is not only useful in apprais
ing the society in which we live, but such understand
ing is also indispensable in order to know what is
necessary for its rehabilitation and what methods will
succeed in achieving that rehabilitation" [F,106].
Always, his objective is the "improvement of the econo
mic community." Briefly, this study will now indicate
what B.W. Dempsey considered was the chief damaging
effect that each of the five revolutions had upon the
economic community, resulting in society's "disorder"
and "complete disorganization."
1.
The Protestant Reformation [F,106-107) • . •
is "the first of these revolutions." The result is
that the great mass who today call themselves Chris
tians are "without any genuine knowledge of Christian
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teaching." The practical significance of this in the
economic world is that we have been living on a Chris
tian momentum that is gradually running out. B.W. Demp
sey expresses it with economic succinctness by saying
that "we have been living on our religious capital and
we are rapidly approaching a genuine religious bank
ruptcy" [F,107). Practically, this leaves many "who
recognize no law external to themselves" whatever in
"control" of our economic community.
2.
The commercial Revolution "completely reori
ented the commerce of the world." Yet "the significant
fact" that B.W. Dempsey points to "is that this greatly
expanded and constantly expanding market was developed
without any acceptance on the part of the traders of
any common doctrine of just conduct in economies"
[F,108). This is in contrast to the "medieval economic
social organization," which B.W. Dempsey points out
"did quite a creditable job in governing such local
markets for the common good." Hence, whatever the
economic gains, the commercial expansion meant a social
and moral loss to the common good. The commercial
movement "expanded our economic universe making avail
able a greater and greater quantity and variety of
goods," but, as B.W. Dempsey significantly says, "with
out progress in the development of the government of
these markets for the benefit of all human beings"
( F, 108) • "Thus,'' a·.W. Dempsey concludes, "the remote
foundations of the great expansion of modern times were
laid without consistent principle commonly held to
direct that expansion" [F,109).
3.
The Industrial Revolution, as Arnold Toynbee
summarized in his study,4 "is the substitution of com
petition for the medieval regulation which has previ
ously controlled the production and distribution of
wealth" [F,110). B.W. Dempsey quotes this definition
approvingly, but not without qualification: "To be
perfectly accurate," maintains B.W. Dempsey, "this
expression should say 'competition alone"' [F,273).
Continuing, our author states the implications of this
4
F,110; Arnold J. Toynbee, Lectures on the Industri
al Revolution of the Eighteenth Century, Popular Address
es and Other Fragments, (London: Longmans, 1908}.
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"rectified" definition. While not coming to the defense
of the "degenerate guilds," he does emphasize that the
"important thing is that these institutions were
replaced by a principle that pretended to be an automa
tic and complete regulator of the economy" [F,111]. An
explanation of the extension of this principle was
clearly expressed by B.W. Dempsey: "Competition was
regarded as automatic in the sense that it not only
regulated markets that had been already organized but
that it organized them perfectly in the first place. It
was regarded as complete in the sense that no antece
dent, supplementary, or auxiliary principle was needed
to effect the most economic distribution of available
resources" [F,111].
"Competition, although a useful principle, is a
secondary and incomplete one." B.W. Dempsey quotes the
above from Quadragesimo Anno as a source of authorita
tive criticism of free competition, a principle regard
ed as automatic, incomplete, and primary.
Free competition, however, though within
certain limits just and productive of good
results, cannot be the ruling principle of
the economic work; this has been abundantly
proved by the consequences that have followed
from the free rein given to these dangerous
individualistic ideals [F,222]. 5

"Competition must operate within a given framework,"
B.W. Dempsey concludes, "as all persons have an obli
gation in social justice to see that the terms of com
petition are actually such as to promote the common
good and are kept constantly amended in changing cir
cumstances with the end in view" [F,111].
Admittedly, "the removal of outmoded regulation"
by the so-called "Industrial Revolution" released pro
ductive resources. But B.W. Dempsey is more interested
in the "incalculable hardship on human beings" imposed
by the "reliance on an incomplete and inadequate prin
ciple of economic organization." Characteristically,
he concludes his treatment of "Industrial Revolution"
by pointing out how it "left economic society without a
solid constitution within which to conduct a competiQuadragesimo Anno, paragraph 88.

5
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tive business firmly directed to the common good" [F,112).

,.
The Revolution in •inane• came about when new
bank borrowing practices resulted in an expansion of
money. Today, it is common economic knowledge "that
banks do add to the effective money supply" [F,114). No
one claims any longer that the individual bank acting
alone can "create" money supply; all agree that the
same bank acting as part of the banking system can and
does do so. This relatively modern banking phenomenon
had far-reaching results. B.W. Dempsey emphasizes two
of these effects of money or credit creation that can
add to "disorder" and "disorganization" of the economic
community.
The first important effect is that such a revolu
tion in finance "has enormously increased the power of
governments" [F,114), for government has now a source
of borrowing at negligible cost money that enables it
"to spend sums which may cause important changes in the
economy and to do this without consulting the taxpayer"
[F,114). To consult a taxpayer in the creation of mod
ern (paper) money is not necessary because the cost is
so negligible. To produce any other good, labor, capi
tal, and so on, all cost items must go into their sup
ply. In the chapter called "Price of Money" in his book
Interest and Usury, B.W. Dempsey significantly observes
that "the supply of real capital is limited by purely
physical conditions, while the supply of money is, in
theory, unlimited and eyen in practice is held only
with fairly elastic boundaries. "In other words," he
says, "there is one element in the price system where
'P' (price) has no relation to 'q' (quantity); when
persons desire money with which to control present
resources, the increasing marginal utility of money in
hand is not reflected in any increase in the price of
the "product" [I,107).
Banks, the creators of money, must be firmly regu
lated, much more so than producers of steel, flour,
autos, and so on. The primary reason for control is
that banks' activities affect the money supply and
therefore the economy's health. B.W. Dempsey warns of
the danger inherent in modern money creation. "The
supply and demand for goods for any purpose, hoarding
included, have objective restrictions; but when the
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demand for money can determine the supply, then any
movement of prices is possible" [I,30].
s.
The Political (l'rench) Revolution "created a
society which was not only an actual break with the
past but a break based on the principle that whatever
was ancient, medieval, or Christian was bad and was to
be got rid of merely because it was ancient, medieval
or Christian" [F,116]. Long ago in a classic manner
Edmund Burke exposed the weakness and disruption of the
French Revolution. Referring to France, he says:
• • • you had all these advantages in your
ancient states; but you chose to act as if
you had never been molded into civil society;
and had everything to begin anew. You began
ill, because you began by despising
everything that belonged to you. You ?ot up
your trade without a capital [F,117].
B.W. Dempsey was fond of quoting this passage and other
passages from Edmund Burke's Reflections on the French
Revolution. The French Revolution's "example" and "new
doctrines" disrupted numerous economic communities. As
a practical result of the French Revolution -- with its
insistence that groups intermediate between the state
and the individual must, for the sake of "quality," be
abolished -- the two extremes of liberalism and
socialism arose.
c.

Class conflict

With the absence of sound social organization and
the substitution of either extreme liberalism or soc
ialism came two unfortunate results: unrestrained class
conflict on the one hand, and, as an ill-advised an
tidote to the first, depersonalized bureaucratic stat
ism. B.W. Dempsey spent much time and effort in writ
ings, lectures, and speeches castigating these twin
evils. Time and again he hit at the "erroneous••
Ricardo-inspired notion that class conflict is unavoid
able [Cf. F,8; 59; 143.-144; 208; 242; 208]; the follow
ing statement is typical:
6

Edmund Burke, op.cit., pp. 23, 33-34.
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The acceptance of class conflict not merely
as a fact but as a valid principle has been,
if not actually universal in American indus
trial society, at least very common indeed.
This one erroneous idea, common to both li
beralism and socialism, has been accepted as
a settled and established point of departure
in disputes by labor and business alike, and
by the congress and the courts which viewed
the industrial world in which these factions
live, interpreted it, legislated for it, and
made decisions concerning it (F,144].
He reserved his sharpest criticism for the socialist
theory of class conflict:
But it is one thing to admit the opposition
of particular interest as a fact in various
concrete circumstances and another thing to
accept permanent opposition of one particular
set of economic interests as the determining
factor in all economic history and in all
current economic relationships. Class strug
gles as a fact come and go, causing more or
less harm and distress as they go. The class
struggle as the eternal and decisive prin
ciple of economic life has neither historical
nor analytical foundation. The community of
interest of "capital" and "labor" in produc
tion on-the-job has more reality than this
putative class struggle [F,154].
His constant emphasis on the disordering effect of
class conflict stemmed from his conviction that "before
anything can be done to release the powerful forces of
which that cooperation can be the source, labor and
business must both discard their Ricardian-Marxian bi
focal spectacles and look at the facts as they are in
themselves, not as theory has made them" [F,146]. "Be
neath the superficial and induced conflict," B.W. Demp
sey always saw lying the "reality of productive cooper
ation." His basic class lesson was always that "class
conflict is neither necessary nor inevitable." This is
where all reform and economic community must begin.
Unless the truth about the fallacy of class conflict is
realized, cooperation is impossible. Without social
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cooperation, no real economic community is possible.
"However real particular conflicts may have been in the
past, however widespread and deep-seated false theories
may have rendered them today, the class conflict is
neither necessary nor inevitable" [F,146]. "Before
anything positive can be accomplished the road must be
cleared by the abolition of class conflict, and this is
the first obligation of the state and of every good
citizen" [F,284).
D.

Principle of Sul>sidiarity

The Guild System as "institutional structure sound
in principle had been wiped out." With the absence of
an internal principle of order necessary for a sound
social organization, the state is forced to"substitute"
and as a result is "overwhelmed with tasks for which it
is not equipped" [F,284]. "This is a violation of the
principle of subsidiarity," asserts B.W. Dempsey, and
adds, "recovery depends upon its observance." As
should be expected, B.W. Dempsey made much of this
principle. An examination of his writings seems to show
no original research; he seemingly was content to rely
for the analysis and importance of the principle of
subsidiarity on the authoritative pronouncements of
Pius XI; on the interpretation and explanation of this
principle given by Oswald von Nell-Bruning; and on
quotations from st. Thomas Aquinas showing the underly
ing reasons for the necessity of observance of this
principle. Here is one brief excerpt from a much longer
passage quoted by B.W. Dempsey in The Functional Econ
omy:
According to the principle of subsidiarity
the state is entitled to as much legislative
power as it needs for its task as supreme
guarantor of common good, that common good to
which it had to supply as one of its essen
tial contributions, the necessary uniformity
of law and the inviolable security of inter-
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nal peace. No more legislative power, but no
less either, is due to the state [F,119].7
"Violation of the principle," B.W. Dempsey adds, "had
robbed men of perfective activity and especially of
that peculiarly perfective activity, the acceptance of
responsibility in [their] work-a-day relations and
decisions" [F,284]. Building upon this argument, he
quotes from St. Thomas. "To preserve the perfections of
things governed and not to diminish them is a proper
function of government" . • • "This optimum in any
government is that things governed be provided for
according to their own capacity, for in this does the
justice of a government consist. If men were prevented
by the governor of a community from carrying on their
own functions, this would be contrary to the principle
of human government, unless perchance it be done
occasionally for a brief time in some emergency. 118
"Since things governed are by government to be led on
to perfection, government is the better precisely to
the degree that greater perfection is communicated by
the one governing to those governed. It is a greater
perfection that a thing should be good in itself and
also be a cause of good in others, than it should be
good only in itself. 11 9
A government, B.W. Dempsey would insist, which
interferes with the free functioning of a human per
sonality, stunts the development of that personality.
As one man may not use another namely as a means to an
end, so neither can the state. A government which takes
over for its citizens functions which they can ade
quately perform for themselves forces them to a less
virtuous life. B.W. Dempsey gives several examples
showing this loss of virtue due to violations of the
principle of subsidiarity. "They will be less prudent
or less provident, less resourceful. They are lesser
men than they could have been." To govern a thing is
7
0. von Nell-Bruening, s. J., "The vocational Order
and Monopoly," Review of Social Economy, vol. IX, no. 2
(September, 1951), p. 98.

St. Thomas Aquinas.
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to direct it to its end. When a state violates the
principle of subsidiarity, it directs its citizens to
its own end, not to the proper end of the citizen,
which is his fullest possible development as a person.
This is the complete reversal of the function of gov
ernment. "Subsidiarity," observes B.W. Dempsey, "has
been given classic expression by Pius XI:"
As history abundantly proves, it is true that
on account of changed conditions many things
which were done by small associations in
former times cannot be done now save by large
associations. Still, that most weighty prin
ciple, which cannot be set aside or changed,
remains fixed and unshaken in social philoso
phy: just as it is gravely wrong to take from
individuals what they can accomplish by their
own initiative and industry and give it to
the community, so also it is an injustice and
at the same time a grave evil and disturbance
of right order to assign to greater and high
er associations what lesser and subordinate
organizations can do. For every social ac
tivity ought of its very nature to furnish
help to the members of the bodfc social, and
never destroy and absorb them. 0
B.W. Dempsey considered it obvious and beyond
argument that "modern states have violated the prin
ciple of subsidiarity in a wholesale manner by rushing
into the gap left by the failure to develop economic
justice when these relations outgrew the form of the
household economy." Then, more precisely, he indicates
that the "nature of the failure is that the political
state imposed political justice upon economic communi
ties, instead of calling upon economic agents to use
their prudence as an intellectual and moral virtue to
find and apply means of extending the principles of
economic justice from the household to the firm and
industry." Of course, this failure in order through
subsidiarity principle violation could not help but be
"heightened by the injection into a real problem of the
10

Encyclical:

Quadragesismo Anno, paragraph 79.
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synthetic theory of universal and inevitable class
conflict."
II. PRINCIPLES OP SOCIAL ORDER

B.W. Dempsey's conception of an ordered economic
community is, of course, largely an interpretation of
Pope Pius's XI's plan for a social order. At every
point he made a conscientious effort in his interpreta
tion and application to keep faithful to the spirit of
the entire body of papal teaching. Always, he drew a
delicate but clear line of demarcation between the
doctrinal teaching of the Church and his own economic
analysis.
A.

Organic order

Only after a sufficient delineation of the nega
tive elements of class struggle, unregulated competi
tion, and the false relation of the modern state to
society does B.W. Dempsey turn to positive elements
that make up a "good society" or "economic community."
B.W. Dempsey would never regret the length of his repe
titious treatment on class conflict, for he considered
the "abolition of class conflict" as "the essential
condition to the restoration of social order." He knew
in his emphasis that he was "thinking with the Church."
His own reference for this emphasis harks back to the
encyclical Quadragesimo Anno, paragraphs 81�83; 112114. Certain salient excerpts from these passages duti
fully illustrate the need for this emphasis:
81.
Now this is the primary duty of the
state and of all good citizens: to abolish
conflict between classes with divergent in
terests, and thus foster and promote harmony
between the various ranks of society.
82.
The aim of social legislation must
therefore be the re-establishment of voca
tional groups. Society today still remains in
a strained and therefore unstable and uncer
tain state, being founded on classes with
contradictory interests and hence opposed to
each other, and consequently prone to enmity
and strife.
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83 • • • • demand and supply of labor divides
men in the labor market into two classes, as
into two camps, and the bargaining between
these parties transforms this labor market
into an arena where the two armies are
engaged in combat. To this grave disorder,
which is leading society to ruin, a remedy
must evidently be applied as speedily as
possible.
B.W. Dempsey did treat improvement in utilization,
distribution and administration of property with due
concern. He considered them "important aids" in remov
ing causes of class conflict. But if there is to be
order instead of disorder, harmony must replace class
struggle. The necessary condition, not the cause, of a
just social order is the elimination of class conflict.
Ranging over the entire social field, B.W. Dempsey
wrote, among other topics, on the just wage and just
distribution of wealth. These he would insist lead us
to the "threshold" of a sound economic community. He
reiterated papal doctrine when he stated that there
"should be access by all to property in its twofold
personal and social function, a fair distribution of
income and just wages." Respect is demanded for the
"fundamental right possessed by every man to use the
goods of this world," respect for human labor, care for
function of capital in the development of society and
of persons.
Nothing of this is accidental. Nothing can be left
out of account. All will help the economic community to
the "threshold" of order. But "order" of itself does
not consist of the necessary condition, social order;
the elimination of class conflict; or the threshold
through necessary activities treated above. "Order" in
society is the dynamic principle of all these tasks.
His long treatment of the guilds in their "limited
local activities" was not to advocate their return.
Forthrightly, he states that "there is little for us to
learn directly from the guilds" [F,279). He is sharply
critical of the fact that they "never functioned effec
tively beyond a local market" and that their fame or
infamy comes "through their faults and limitations"
rather than their virtues. Then he clearly pinpoints
their importance. "The only thing that the guilds have
to offer modern industry and commerce is a functional
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principle of organization both within an industry and
in the relation of industry to the state and to other
industries. There is a great need of a revival of the
functional principle, and if the functional principle
were successfully applied to modern industry, it would
take a smart medieval guildsman to recognize that the
same principle was at work under the greatly changed
conditions" [F,279].
With the disappearance of the guilds, an internal
principle of organization or order was lost. The In
dustrial Revolution had no principle of organization.
It held, in effect, that "natural economic forces" not
only regulated existing markets, but constituted mar
kets where none existed" [F,314]. Thus "markets were
left to establish themselves." The result was a vast
gap in social organization. our economy became "theor
etically rudderless" [F,329]. Thus, concern for the
well-being of the person -- for his material welfare
and, more importantly, for his need as a person to
exercise responsibility and to control his own destiny
-- requires that functiona� groups, similar in prin
ciple to medieval guilds, be re-introduced into the
social structure.
"Order is what we are seeking in the economic
field" [F,366]. This order will come through discovery
and felicitous application of principles to the exist
ing economic community. "Order presumes some end toward
which things are -ordered." Social order is the "ar
rangement" of human persons in a "variety of social
institutions organically linked together" [F,367].
Social life is organic� according to B.W. Dempsey, if
social life develops from an internal principle and
feeds and grows on what is around it [F,307]. A social
life attempted to be brought about by extrinsic prin
ciples or external forces will have no vitality, no
real life. A truly human social order must be personal
and social at one and the same time. To have a sound
economic community, the growth must come from within.
Then only can institutions grounded in personal respon
sibility which are necessary at all levels of society
be established. Today's society needs to bring back to
life intermediate bodies which would be free associa
tions with regard to the state -- although they will
have to be recognized by it -- and free also in their
internal affairs.

77
Human society, in a certain sense, necessarily
forms a social and organic body. In accordance with
Papal doctrine, B.W. Dempsey gives constant emphasis to
"a truly organic body" [F,207].
An organism has a true internal directive
principle. Economic life has been organized
in modern society on the mechanistic prin
ciples of Liberalism supposedly leading to an
equilibrium of mechanical forces offsetting
each other. At the opposite extreme, national
socialistic societies have been organized
with economic society held together only by
an extrinsic bond. Neither of these brings
into existence a "truly social and organic
body • • • economic society must have an
intrinsic principle" [F,207].

Hence, B.W. Dempsey considered social order a unity,
one group ordered to a common end. Society is one, not
with the unity of a physical (biological) organism or
of a substance, but with the unity of free and rational
agents intending one end and working together for the
attainment of that end. The unity of society is gov
erned by an inner (intrinsic) principle, that is, by
the common end of mutual supplementation. To his pur
pose, B.W. Dempsey quotes from the Reorganization of
Social Economy: "as in the living organism, it is im
possible to provide for the good of the whole unless
each single part and each individual member is given
what it needs for the exercise of its proper functions,
so it is impossible to care for the social organism and
the good of society as a unit unless each single part
and each individual member -- that is to say, each
individual man in the dignity of the human personality
-- is supplied with all that is necessary for the exer
cise of his social functions."11

11 Cf. F,220 quoting from o. von Nell-Bruening, s.
J., Reorganization of Social Economy, B. w. Dempsey,
(Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Company, 1937), pp. 219220.
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B.

110 Blueprint

B.W. Dempsey never looked upon the "vocational
order" as a plan or blueprint which could be applied in
the same manner to all countries and conditions, but
rather as a presentation of certain principles that
should serve as a foundation for "the re-organization
of the social order. Associations of human beings,
however basic and natural their principles, cannot and
should not be blueprinted like machines" [F,305].
Again, "to project the detailed form of economic in
stitutions is idle fancy" [F,322].
His presentation of a sound economic community
begins with the present institutional arrangements. "No
matter where we are we must start from where we are."
With Edmund Burke, he thought that the French Revolu
tion's total rejection of the past had done untold
damage to society. "You [France] might have repaired
those walls; you miiht have built on those old founda
tions" [Cf. F,116). 2 "Institutions should be studied
as they are, and the relevant moral concepts must be
studied as they can be applied to these institutions as
they are." At no time did he consider it desirable to
tear down a sound building just because the roof was in
bad repair.
c.

Natural community

The present social order is never completely bad.
Always, there are good elements present. In existence
behind and beyond the opposition of classes was the
idea of a natural community. In his search not for a
blueprint but for principles that could be applied to
any existing institution for the ordering and "improv
ing of an economic community," he was quick to point
out that the "naturalness of economic community is not
only a principle, but it is a social principle"
[F,305). He was fond of saying that "man does not be
come something entirely different when he goes to work"
[F,305). "There exist in the United States genuine
functional communities, large groups of people who have
Edmund Burke, Reflections on the French Revolu
ed. E. Rays (New York: Everyman•s Library, E. P.
Dutton and Company, 1910), pp. 23, 33-34.
12

tion,
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a common interest, a common task, a common purpose.
These persons, regardless of location, form a function
al community quite as real and almost as important as
the civil municipality" [F,320-331]. "Functional as
sociation is the first principle of human organization
in economic life, as in all other life" [F,319].
Everyone recognizes that close and enduring as
sociation is the first principle of organization in
civil and domestic order. Moving into the economic
order, B.W. Dempsey points out that, analogously, the
11 man who goes to work is the same citizen and husband."
This analogy seems to require that the "first principle
of economic life be association rather than competi
tion" [F,293]. Men in society should be "united accord
ing to what they do and contribute, namely, their func
tion" [F,304]. "Economic community begins with the
physically co-operating members of the producing unit.
These people live and work together, constantly com
municate, and share knowledge, experience, and the
results of their joint effort. They genuinely have
something in common (the basis of community), and with
in this working unit, self-government of the economic
community must begin" [F,320).
His contribution in this part of social thought,
therefore, came from the development of the proposition
or thesis in Quadragesimo Anno, paragraph 83, namely,
that "nature induces those who practice the same trade
or profession [to] combine into orders." These autono
mous groups are necessary for a stable and healthy
economy. In support of this thesis, B.W. Dempsey pre
sented historical considerations -- historical and
statistical data in support of the co-natural character
of the economic municipality: analytical considerations
drawn from man's social nature -- towns are natural to
society, integral to social well-being; an argument by
analogy with domestic and civil society; and many argu
ments from many divergent authorities who, having ex
perience of modern societies, drew the conclusion of
the usefulness of functional organizations.13 His own
conclusion: "the order, the autonomous economic com
munity as municipality, is natural." Society must be
13 Cf. Chapter 15, "The Basis of Functional Com
munities," and Chapter 16, "Growth in Functional or
ganization," in The Functional Economy.
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"united according to what they [men] do and contribute,
namely their function" [F,304].
D.

Justice

The "first principle of organization of markets
and self-regulation of industry" is the virtue of jus
tice.14 Justice is traditionally defined as the vir14Justice -- a stable and constant inclination, that
is, a virtue which prompts each to render to another that
which is his due.
A.
Particular Justice
1.
Commutative Justice -- Man to Man Relation
Called commutative after its major part, which
concerns contracts of exchange.
It also
concerns anything which may be due to another,
for example, property lost through theft or
damage, or anything else which can be ap
It exists between two
praised at a price.
mutually independent equal determinate indi
viduals (usually human persons but may be
corporations or states).
The virtue which
prompts a man ( in exchange transactions) to
render to another that which is his due in
strict �quality.
Common Justice
B.
Distributive Justice -- Relation of Organized
1.
Community to Individual Member
The virtue of distributive justice resides in
the executive. The virtue which prompts the
administrator of any community to render to
each member of that community that which is
his according to a proportionate equality.
2.
Contributive or General Justice -- Relation of
Man to Unorganized, Imperfectly organized, or
Disorganized Community
a.
Legal Justice -- Relation of Man to Orga
nized Community (usually of citizen to
state)
The virtue which prompts a member of any
community to render to the community that
which is theirs as defined by positive
ordinances.
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tue, or constant and stable habit, to render to each
person that which is his due, and being a virtue, it
resides properly and primarily in morally free persons
[F,218]. "And it is as habits, that is, a bent by which
acts are performed readily and easily, that virtues
affect social order" [F,218].

1.
Bxchanga Justice. Briefly, s.w. Dempsey dis
cusses justice as it touches upon the economic communi
ty. The "forms of justice" he calls "the pillars in the
structure of Scholastic social thought" [1,133]. "The
central action," he says, "that is to be governed by
the virtue of justice is the transaction of exchange
between two persons. In this case, we speak of commuta
tive or exchange justice and that virtue governs all
contracts of exchange, explicit or implicit, such as
purchase and sale, hiring or renting, leasing, loaning,
and the like, and the restoration or respecting of the
economic goods of another, independently of contract"
[F,218] • 15
"The attainment of equality in exchange is the
work of commutative justice" [1,135). Much of the trea
tises on justice and right is concerned with determin
ing what things are equal, and this obviously involves
a theory of value, price, and money" [1,135]. Molina is
approvingly quoted by B.W. Dempsey when he says that
"commutative justice consists in equality as to value
between price and object" [Cf. I,135 quoting Molina,
365:10].
b.

[F,222]
15Justice

Contributive Justice -- Relation of Man
to Unorganized, Imperfectly organized, or
Disorganized Community
The virtue which prompts a member of any
community to render to the community that
which is theirs as defined by the demands
of the common good.

in relation to exchange will be taken up
in a separate heading.
B. W. Dempsey, realizing the
importance of understanding just price and its corollary,
interest and usury, devoted much of his writings to this
general topic.
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Exchange is fundamental to human society: it
is natural in the sense that it so obviously
meets human needs that intelligence will seek
it out and use it. Exchange is a natural
necessity to human nature in order that soci
ety move on that level which is consonant
with man's obvious aptitude and exigency. As
man freely but inevitably builds a society
around him ("inasmuch as no man is sufficient
unto himself") so within that society man
will inevitably exchange, not from any inter
nal or external compulsion but from a direct
rational grasp of his own human nature in
relation to a concrete practical situation.
In such transactions in which men communicate
in social life, it is "in accord with right
reason," and therefore "natural" and "just,"
that the exchange be at an equality. Both
parties need the social framework within
which they operate. Each needs the goods of
the other. Each wishes and intends to get the
full value of what goods he has to offer.
Neither has the right to subordinate the
other to his purposes. Commutative justice
will see that this value is received, all of
it, but not more [I,136].
As B.W. Dempsey.recalls, "the principle of Thomas
Aquinas is accepted by all" [I,136]. Exchange thus
arises from man's personal needs, but from a personal
need that is not distinct from his need for society.
2.
Distributive Justice "Distributive justice
is of wide economic application, and may not be lost
sight of in regulation of the public economy" [I,134].
Distributive justice applies to the executive, and
obliges him to secure for each member of his community
his due and proportionate share of both the advantages
(e.g. subsidies) and the burdens (e.g. obligation to
pay taxes) which are involved in the conduct of the
community. Thus, the agent or "distributor" of the
goods of the community apportions those things which
belong to the community to individual members who are
parts of that community. "A very simple case of dis
tributive justice," B.W. Dempsey opines, "is the pro
gressive income tax" (F,219].
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Nothing belongs to an individual as exclusively
his; all that belongs to him is a share in something
common to everyone. Good practical judgment, "an exer
cise of prudence," is needed to decide what personal
considerations are morally relevant to a given case.
11 The equality of distributive justice is of a special
kind: unequal things are given to unequal people. Com
pensations by means of punishments and reward would not
be just, if all rewards and all punishments were
equal. 1116
Determining what is the due (the right) of any one
person can only be effected from the position and view
point of the "executive" -- the one responsible for the
common weal -- for the very reason that a due and fit
ting share in the common good is involved. In exchange
(commutative) justice, the obligation is paid; in dis
tributive justice the obligation is allotted. In ex
change justice, a purely numerical, quantitative equal
ity is to be effected, the object alone being consider
ed; in distributive justice, a proportional equality,
which deems that the executive who administers the
common good consider both the object (goods) and sub
ject (persons) of the obligation [Cf.F,219]. "Distri
butive justice does not allow the burden to fall un
evenly" [I,134]. Thus, B.W. Dempsey concludes, "distri
butive justice must be a primary consideration in de
termining economic policy insofar as that falls to
public authority in the promotion of the common good
. • • the studious pursuit of it will be no small aid
in furthering the common prosperity" [I,135).
While commutative (exchange) justice and distribu
tive justice are "both essential and requisite," they
are by themselves "insufficient" [F,240). At this junc
ture, B.W. Dempsey soberly reminds us of the "needless
poverty of our (American] economic philosophy." "We
are told," says B.W. Dempsey, "that we are confronted
with a basic, fundamental, and inevitable choice that
must be made -- either free markets or government regu
lation. Admittedly, so-called liberalism "placed its
reliance on exchange justice alone; socialism "features
St. Thomas Aquinas, contra Gent. 3: 42; B. W.
Dempsey also refers to s.T. I-II, q. 96, art. 3, ad. 3
um. In The Functional Economy, cf. 217-223; 239-240;
315-317. In Interest and Usury, cf. 133-138; 213-220.
16
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distributive justice exclusively." Clearly, B.W. Demp
sey shows that he recognizes that "competition and
state regulation are both useful principles of economic
government. But he denies that the choice between free
market or government regulation is a "basic, fundamen
tal and inevitable choice." Both competition and state
regulation are "useful" and "indispensable," but both
together are inadequate. They are "secondary princi
ples" only [F,239].
3.

contri�utive Justice

Besides exchange and distributive justice, there
is contributive justice, which is "absolutely neces
sary." B.W. Dempsey develops this at length:
Besides commutative, exchange justice
and distributive justice, both essential and
requisite but insufficient, contributive
justice is absolutely necessary. Distributive
justice administered by the state attempts to
regulate economic society from without. Ex
change justice operates from within, but it
concerns only the actions of individuals.
Economic society, however, is a fact; it ex
ists and is real, independently of civil
society, though operating within civil socie
ty. Man i,s normally a member of many communi
ties -- the family, the town, the province,
the club, the church. To each of these com
munities he owes a debt of justice, called by
Fr. Pesch, very aptly, contributive justice.
·These things no one denies. But in economic
life we follow a very false and costly doc
trine of opposition of interests. The worker
recognizes the economic community in his
union; the employer recognizes the same in
his trades association. But both are blind to
the community that exists in their industry
as a whole -- a real community to which both
parties taken singly owe a debt in social,
contributive justice, and both parties taken
together owe a debt to all other industries
that receive their product and whose product
they receive.
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This is the fact of economic community
which is not recognized • • • All the persons
who work at any level in a given industry
have something in common that is no less
real, and perhaps more important, than the
geographical proximity of political communi
ties. Steel-town and motor-town and textile
town are communities as actual as Pittsburgh,
Detroit, or Lowell. These communities are in
need of order, just as truly as their politi
cal municipal counterparts. The principle of
contributive social justice furnishes the
basis for a genuine direction of economic
life, for a town-meeting organization of the
communities within the economy. Economic life
is in need of direction just as political
life is in need of government, not to hamper,
repress, or regiment, but to create and main
tain conditions within which constructive
forces can operate {F,240].
All three justices (exchange, distributive, con
tributive) do work together to bring about a sound
economic community. All human actions (including acts
of exchange, contributive and distributive justice)
[Cf. F,369] promote the common good. "Each individual
is to contribute to the community those circumstances,
conditions and opportunities that are necessary for his
personal development (distributive justice), and
through the process of exchange (exchange justice)
those goods that are necessary to the same end"
[F,220].

Quick to realize that the virtue of social justice
has "the primary positive role in the restoration of
social order," B.W. Dempsey, as usual, built his anal
ysis on Church doctrine. Closely paralleling the en
cyclical, as always, he considered his function was to
highlight, to elucidate, and when possible to develop,
but never to depart from the Church's "official social
writings." "The climax of the central action of the
encyclical is reached in paragraph 88," said B.W. Demp
sey, in referring to Quadragesimo Anno; and this sec
tion, which is on social justice, "may therefore be
taken as the very core of the doctrine of the encycli
cal" {F,382]. B.W. Dempsey never tired of quoting and
commenting on this salient passage. He was very quick
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to appreciate the importance of this significant para
graph, always giving it just emphasis. In another
place, he reiterated the "reason for the importance and
his emphasis" when he said that "the whole point of the
encyclical on the 'Restoration of the Social Order•
[his translation of the encyclical's title] was to make
the Christian world very acutely conscious of the vir
tue of contributive (social) justice" [F,212]. Not only
did he accept the importance of social justice from
authoritative sources, but he himself had a deeper
realization than most of how "social justice rules the
whole of economic reality and fixes the responsibility
on all to see that our social institutions reflect
social reality" [F,237].
Not stopping at mere assertion and quotation, B.W.
Dempsey constantly hammered away at the need for social
justice. "Social justice," he says, "is the dynamic
virtue of economic society" [F,383]. Then he sets out
in three steps why this "dynamic virtue" is necessary
to bring about the "sanity and right order" to be found
"restored in industrial communities" [F,383). In the
first instance, social justice can be considered "the
guardian of efficiency; it supposes that I have some
thing to contribute." Secondly, social justice is the
"guardian of economic institutions within which ex
change takes place and contributions are made." Third
ly, elimination of conscious conflict is a "necessary
condition of a social order," but it will only be elim
inated through.social justice, the "antidote for class
conflict," because it is "the unifying principle of the
functional municipalities" [F,383). Clearly, B.W. Demp
sey recognized the virtue of social justice as the
"primary" principle, though he readily recognized that
"it was not the exclusive regulative principle of econ
omic life" [F,217).
Scattered throughout his many writings are iso
lated passages concerning social justice and its "rela
tionship to the social order." While in no one place
does he give his complete thought on this virtue, his
thinking seems abundantly clear (Cf. F,222]. Distin
guishing between two "kinds" of contributive justice,
he refers only briefly to legal justice: "the relation
of the member of an organized community which has es
tablished reasonable ordinances for the common good."
In a single sentence and example, he dispatches legal
justice. "Legal justice," he says, "is the sort of
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virtue that the citizen or member of any other communi
ty practices when he observes those ordinances which
have been established for the common good, such as
driving on the right side of the street, stopping for
traffic lights, or disposing of garbage or other wastes
in such a way as not to endanger the health of the
community" [F,219]. Then he passes on to the all-im
portant second "kind" of contributive justice -- social
justice. Ordinarily, when he uses the term "contribu
tive justice" in his writings, he means "social jus
tice." When he does not, he explicitly nominates it
each time as legal justice [Cf. F,165; 22; 319].
While legal justice may rule in a fully organized
society, society is necessary for man "before it is so
organized, when it is badly organized or administered,
and when it is disorganized" [F,219]. B.W. Dempsey
continues in the same vein, saying that "man has need
of the community; the community, badly as man needs it,
has nothing to contribute to the individual member
except what had been contributed by himself and others
like him" [F,219]. He sees a "kind of proportion be
tween the contribution that the individual makes to the
community and that the community makes to the individu
al, even though the community may seem to contribute to
the individual more than the individual contributes to
the community. B.W. Dempsey places his dependence on
the following statement of Pius XI: "it is of the very
essence of social justice to demand from each individu
al all that is necessary for the common good." Obvi
ously struck by the vigor of this sentence, B.W. Demp
sey calls attention to Pius XI's use of "essence,"
"demand," "each," and "all" in the space of this one
brief sentence. Commenting further on the Pope's
statement, he says that "each individual is to contri
bute to the community of which he is a member all that
is necessary for the common good," and adds that each
is to receive from the community "those circumstances,
conditions, and opportunities that are necessary for
his personal development" [F,22O]. "Nevertheless," B.W.
Dempsey concludes, " in a practical way, the support of
the community is absolutely indispensable to the in
dividual and the individuals as a group are obviously
necessary to the community" [F,220].
Ever alert to official Church doctrine, B.W. Demp
sey calls attention to the fact that social justice is
referred to explicitly, or fairly explicitly, about
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fifteen times in the encyclical Quadragesimo Anno [F,371). But the fullest and most carefully worded state
ment, B.W. Dempsey matter-of-factly mentions, occurs
"in the encyclical on 'Atheistic Communism'" [F,372).
As B.W. Dempsey quotes passage 51 from the encyclical
Atheistic Communism fully, so shall we:
51. In reality, besides commutative justice,
there is also social justice with its own set
of obligations, from which neither employers
nor workingmen can escape. Now it is of the
very essence of social justice to demand from
each individual all that is necessary for the
common good. But just as in the living or
ganism it is impossible to care for the so
cial organism, and the good of society as a
unit, unless each single part and each in
dividual member -- that is to say each in
dividual man in the dignity of his human
personality -- is supplied with all that is
necessary for the exercise of his social
functions. If social justice be satisfied,
the result will be an intense activity in
economic life as a whole, pursued in tran
quility and order. This activity will be
proof of the health of the social body, just
as the health of the human body is recognized
in the undisturbed regularity and perfect
efficiency of the whole organism.
The duty in social justice, therefore, falls upon
me as a person; the right is possessed by every person
who is a member of the same community that I belong to.
This is true "precisely, because he is a member" [F,372). "Whenever social institutions function badly,"
explains B.W. Dempsey, "so that the contribution of the
individual to the community in his ordinary activities
is not easy and practically certain, then the ever
present obligation of contributive justice (that is,
social justice) emerges and rests positively on an
individual member of the community" [F,372).
B.W. Dempsey calls attention to the analytical
incompleteness of contributive justice with its rights
and duties. In several places in his writings, he puts
himself to the task of remedying this "incompleteness."
In the end, in reference to the right of social jus-
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tice, he still must say, "we cannot as yet assign in
perfect and full detail all four factors involved in
any right -- the subject, title, matter and term. He
develops this point as follows: "just who each claimant
is and who each debtor is, and what is the extent of
the right or duty; these matters are not yet accurately
determined. The incomplete right is a reality that is
not to be set aside by reason of its incompleteness,
but which obliges man to complete it" [F,377].
B.W. Dempsey admits a difficulty that troubles
him, while attempting to "fill out and complete rights
and duties by specifying exactly what each one has a
right to and which each one owes" [F,377]. The diffi
culty is that the obligation of social justice does not
seem to fall upon the individual but upon the group.
"The obligation," B.W. Dempsey puzzles, "seems to fall
on a group, or at least will issue in futility unless
the group acts so that each and any individual can
disclaim the responsibility of 'doing anything about
it' unless the group acts" [F,377]. In one of his last
published articles, "The Range of Social Justice," he
briefly touches on this problem. Yet we are forced to
conclude with him that there is "need for sound work on
the virtue of social justice." B.W. Dempsey then turn
ed his own attention to other problems; he seemed to
think it sufficient, as with so many problems, not to
take upon himself the burden of solution, but to call
the attention of others to the problem.
B.

Economic Prudence

"The formulation of a sound theory of economic
prudence," B.W. Dempsey states categorically, "is one
of the acute problems of our generation" [F,318]. Pru
dence, of course, as the virtue of the practical man,
has not changed. But the problems to which the virtue
of prudence has to be applied have changed. The practi
cal man, as always, must select the "best means to
attain his end among the limited and circumscribed
resources available here and now" [F,318]. Also, the
practical man of prudence must still keep "a clear eye
ahead to foresee the results of his action" [F,319].
But the problems of economic prudence no longer revolve
merely around household problems. "To report today the
same facts that Aquinas included in his original dis
cussion," insists B.W. Dempsey in reference to today's
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broadened scope of economic prudence, "we must add the
firm and the industry to the household as an institu
tion or association lying midway between the individual
and the political state and subject to economic pru
dence."17
To assay the definition and work of economic pru
dence as depicted in the mind of B.W. Dempsey, it is
necessary to step back a pace and look at the work of
economics. B.W. Dempsey defines economics as "the al
location of scarce resources to selected ends" [F,9-11;
18]. It is fundamentally "a theory of choice among
available practiced alternatives." The very act of
prudence, according to st. Thomas, is "to choose
through an act of the will or of free decision" (In
Sent. I. q. I, a. 2, ad. 2 um.]. Thus the work of the
man of prudence would be the "selection of the best
means to execute a correct schedule of optima, practi
cal, rational conduct in the concrete. 1118
B.W. Dempsey depends upon St. Thomas Aquinas to
delineate economic prudence for him -- a concept so
important to his own task in socio-economic life. we go
to st. Thomas, as did B.W. Dempsey, for an understand
ing of the virtue of prudence. Upon st. Thomas's clear
conception, B.W. Dempsey carried on his own socio-econ
omic activities. His was a work of prudence, the ap
plication of "universal principles to particular con
clusions about things to do. 1119 For him economic
prudence meant striving for the "right plan of things
to do 1120 in order to restore the economic community to
soundness. He "considered those things which are remote
insofar as they are directed toward helping or hinder
ing those things which are to be done presently. 1121
In his own life, this virtue of economic prudence can
be epitomized in his economic resourcefulness, for he
1711
Prudence, Providence and Economic
Thought XXXV (Spring, 1960), p. 33.
18

Ibid., p. 22.

19S. T.,

II-II, q. 47, a. 6 •

20 s.T.,

I-II, q. 57, a. 4.

21S.T.,

II-II, q. 47, a. 4.

Decision,"
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was always "prompt and ready in thinking up ways of
finding means" to implement socio-economic order. His
was the habit which "manifested itself in the unlooked
for situation, finding what was fitting"22 on every
economic occasion. He stated this in one long sentence:
Prudence is the virtue of the provident
Christian who is not only clear in his own
mind about his ultimate end but who is also
well-balanced in the selection of means to
ends in the complex concrete affairs of daily
practical life so that he makes sound practi
cal judgments that lead to correct actions in
his practical affairs and these successes
minister to success of life as a whole.23
B.W. Dempsey possessed this virtue of economic
prudence in an eminent degree; he preached it as neces
sary for all men in economic life. Only if men possess
ed this habit of the "correct appraisal of things to be
done" in the economic order, would functional commit
tees again flourish as the order of the day. He con
sidered his own function as being that of the prudent
counselor. He considered himself as an intellectual
midwife at the birth of social economic institutions.
"Prudent Counselors," says B.W. Dempsey in stating his
own role, "may change the parties• states of mind; this
may help them to make a new start and to achieve what
they sought. But they (the parties involved) must
achieve it. So it is also in the economic community"
[F,318). Always his emphasis was on self-determination
and the necessity of organic growth of economic com
munities -- habits of economic prudence, justice, and
charity of men themselves with the economic community.
The Schoolmen and their modern heir, B.W. Dempsey,
would never have economics "become a geometry exer
cise." To them "it would always remain a series of
case studies in which general, accepted convictions are
applied to situations never far removed from particular
markets." "In this sense," opines B.W. Dempsey, "the
schoolmen were institutional economists." This he held
22
23

s.T., II-II, q. 49, a. 4.

Thought, ibid., p. 28.
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as true because "they applied their analysis to the
accepted ways of doing things and scrutinized human
exchange agreements in the light of their historical
origin and their meaning and content for the men who
used them" [1,146]. Undoubtedly, the Schoolmen (and
B.W. Dempsey also) were historians, traditionalists;
past and present institutions were analyzed sympatheti
cally, if critically. And as e.w. Dempsey significantly
adds in his own words, "they did not make their sub
jects fit their presuppositions" [I,146].
Functional groups, therefore, are necessary for
the restoration of a sound economic community. Certain
ly, economic prudence -- a virtue possessed by the men
within the economic community -- is required to be
present in the formation of these functional groups.
B.W. Dempsey, in full possession of this good habit of
economic prudence and acting as a prudent counselor,
thereupon made his own most significant contributions
of thought and influence in the analysis of particular
problems of just price, interest and usury. These are,
after all, the work of economic prudence.
CORCLUSXON

B.W. Dempsey approached problems realistically. He
blueprinted no ideal order, but examined instead the
forces and facts present in every working economy. Only
with this comp�eted was he ready to undertake the task
of the restoration of the economic community, and then
always with "intelligent adherence to the enlightened
teachings of the Church and constant awareness of the
lesson that history can achieve, against the background
of historic and existing economic communities."
The Guild system, an institutional structure sound
in principle, has been wiped out, and no adequate meth
od of economic control has replaced it. The result has
been the complete disorganization of the economic or
der. This disorganization arose from five causes, revo
lutions in religion, commerce, industry, finance and
politics. The dire result of these revolutions was not
only to hasten the demise of the guilds, but to bring
about the fact of class conflict, together with the
violation of the principle of subsidiarity.
The elimination of class conflict is a necessary
condition for sound social order. Without its removal,
no improvement can be expected in the life of the econ-
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omic community. The violation of the principle of sub
sidiarity has contributed greatly to socio-economic
disorganization; recovery depends upon its observance.
As a result, the state is overwhelmed with tasks for
which it is not equipped. Violation of the principle
has robbed men of that peculiar perfective activity,
the acceptance of responsibility in his work-a-day
relations and decisions.
The organic order of society consists of neither
simply the elimination of class conflict, nor the many
socio-economic "threshold" measures of this order. An
organic internal priciple of organization is needed to
restore the economic community. A sound economic com
munity cannot be blueprinted, but certain social prin
ciples to which it must conform can be stated, such as
the naturalness of community or functional association.
Society can be united according to what men do and
contribute, namely their function.
The virtue of justice is the first principle of
organization and self-regulation of economic communi
ties. These "forms" of justice -- exchange, distribu
tive, contributive -- are the very principles of the
social order. Although exchange and distributive jus
tice are essential and requisite, they are insuffi
cient. Most important is the principle of contributive
social justice which furnishes the very basis for a
genuine direction of economic life. Social justice is
the primary, though not the conclusive, regulative
principle of economic life. All three justices must
work together to bring about a sound economic communi
ty.
Unless the men daily participating in the economic
community possess the virtue of economic prudence, a
sound socio-economic order will not be achieved. This
virtue manifests itself in society in the clearness of
vision of men in the selection of means to ends in the
complex concrete affairs of daily practical economic
life, so that they make sound practical judgments that
lead to correct actions in practical economic affairs.
Only if men possess this habit of the correct appraisal
of things to be done in the economic community will
functional communities again flourish. Restoration of
sound economic communities will require among the prin
ciples of organization the virtues of economic justice
and economic prudence. To conclude in the words of s.w.
Dempsey:
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The need for sound work in the virtue of
social justice, and its almost unheard of
correlatives, social prudence, social temper
ance, and social fortitude, is so great that
nothing in social research seems more urgent
or more likely to speed the day when social
justice, known and understood, will be an
operative force in workaday decisions and
transactions of American life [F,391).

95

Chapter Pive
THE JUST PRICE

Whether or not within his framework of socio-economic
thought B. w. Dempsey made an outstanding recognized
contribution in the field of JUST PRICE.
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JUST PRICB
I.

TBB SCHOLASTIC UALYSIS 0� BXCHUGB
A.

Importance

B.W. Dempsey, S.J. spent his entire academic life
explaining, elucidating, and developing "scholastic
economics."1 Any real contribution of B.W. Dempsey must
be found in these endeavors. Scholastic analysis of
exchange is the cornerstone of scholastic economics. The
theory of exchange value has always been the vital common
notion that clarified the very fundamental process of
economics. "The problem of value must always hold the
pivotal position, as the chief tool of analysis in any
pure theory that works with rational schema. 11 22
Competent economists both ancient and modern have
consistently made exchange value (pure theory) central to
their economic analysis. The Scholastic economists and
B.W. Dempsey were no exception. Value and exchange theory
clearly was their primary concern. B.W. Dempsey consid
ered that "the nucleus of the economic study of the medi
eval moralist was the contract of exchange" (I, 13 O] •
Scholastic wage, profit, and interest doctrines are based
and founded on their value treatments.3
B.W. Dempsey explicitly touches upon the central
position of exchange value or just price as follows:
From the doctrine on private property • •
and from the doctrine on the organic nature of
society and its functional organization, the
doctrine of just price follows as a ready
corollary. If the face of the earth remains in
a radical sense the patrimony of all men, and
if, in their efforts to reduce the face of the
earth to their service, men work co-operativeCf. list of B.

1

w.

Dempsey's writings -- Appendix.

Joseph A. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 588.
2

3
Arthur Monroe, Monetary Theory Before Adam Smith
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1923), p.
20.
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ly like the highly interdependent organs of a
body, then obviously the exchange of what is
produced under these circumstances must be
made [F,99].
Exchange is looked upon as the foundation of the related
problems of money, just price and usury:
Exchange is the principal instrument by which
goods privately owned still minister to the
common good, as they must do if they are to
fulfill their basic ordination. With exchange
comes the introduction of money, with money,
the question of price, and just price specif
ically. With the question of just price comes
the question of the just price of money, that
is, of usury [F,392].
As can be clearly seen, B.W. Dempsey not only considered
price analysis the basis of any economic contribution but
considered just price as the basis of his treatment of
interest and usury, which has long been considered
authoritative. Nor is there any doubt from the foregoing
that B.W. Dempsey looked upon his own endeavors as an
attempt to develop and explain the economic ideas of the
Scholastics. Just price must be regarded as an integral
part of the discourse.
B.

Debt Owed

Gradually, it is being recognized that modern
economics owes the Scholastic period a great debt.
B.W. Dempsey early recognized, acknowledged, and wrote to
bring others to the realization of this debt. certainly,
his efforts in this regard have not been in vain. Joseph
Schumpeter in his monumental work, History of Economic
Analysis, positively affirms that "modern economics stems
from the Scholastic writers."4 It seems fairly obvious
that B.W. Dempsey influenced this above forthright and
influential statement, as Schumpeter refers to him by
name several times within this same chapter.
4
Joseph Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 113.
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• • . Professor Dempsey's book (B.W. Dempsey,
1943 chs. VI-VIII) con
tains a full exposition of their economics:
this book combines to a degree that is quite
exceptional, thorough familiarity with schol
astic thought and with economic theory, so
that the interested reader may be referred to
it with confidence.5
Interest and Usury,

The academic respect of Joseph Schumpeter for his former
student and protege shows itself in such characteristic
statements as that "considerations of space, however,
make it impossible to present a more satisfactory one [on
usury than that] which the interested reader will find in
Professor Dempsey I s book.6 Just as Schumpeter states,
concerning B.W. Dempsey's Interest and Usury, that "this
book is an important contribution to the history of
economic thought, 11 7 so we must conclude that B.W. Demp
sey made a unique contribution to a realization of the
place of Scholastic thought in modern economic analysis.
Whatever the reason for an earlier lack of this
acknowledgment, the fact is that full acknowledgment was
lacking and long overdue. Among the authors who have
themselves done much to bring about a realization of
modern economics I relation and debt to Scholastic writers
has been Dr. Raymond de Roover. He indicates the system
atic ignoring by professional economics of the Scholastic
economic contribution:
The real foundation of price theory in gener
al, and of monopoly in particular, should,
however, not be sought among the Greeks and
the Romans, but in the learned treatises,
which the Doctors of the Scholastic school
devoted to the important subject of social
ethics. Unfortunately, these writings have
been systematically ignored by professional
economists. It is true that current textbooks
5Ibid.,

p.

Ibid., p.

6

96.

104.

7
Bernard w. Dempsey, S.J., Interest and Usury, p.
VII1 Introduction by Joseph Schumpeter.
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on the history of economic thought mention the
price theories of Thomas Aquinas and the
monetary theories of Oresme, but from there
they jump to the mercantilists, entirely
overlooking Aquinas was the founder of a
school and that his doctrines were further
elaborated and refined by his followers.8
Since the above was written (1951) there has been much
advance in Scholastic appreciation. B.W. Dempsey was
foremost in remedying this lack of appreciation. The in
fluence of his writings in bringing about a deeper
realization cannot but be deemed a great contribution.
To fully understand B.W. Dempsey's task and con
tribution to the integration of Scholastic and modern
economics, it must be remembered that the Scholastic
doctors did not approach economic problems in the same
way as we do today. Their terminology, method, philoso
phical and social background, their very problems, were
specifically different. A modern scholar, without being
steeped in this terminology method, historical, philos
ophical and social background, may be easily lead astray.
Plain economic thoughts are frequently couched in
language unfamiliar to the modern reader. The omission of
a topic does not necessarily infer ignorance. To comment
on another's treatise -- as St. Thomas did, for example,
on Aristotle's Ethics -- does not necessarily mean that
one completely agrees -- or disagrees either -- with what
he says.
Therefore, to fully understand and have real insight
into Scholastic economic writings, it is not enough to
know someone's economic writings. One must also know
some:thing about his purpose in writing, his philosophical
and institutional framework, and, of course, the social
environment of the period. In the course of Scholastic
economic writings, only the philosophical framework
remained substantially the same; the institutional
framework and social environment radically changed over
this long Scholastic period. In all this B.W. Dempsey was
most skilled. His own Scholastic background furnished the
basis for his own contributions.
8
Raymond de Roover, "Monopoly Theory Prior to Adam
Smith," Quarterly Journal oL Economics, LXV, November,
1951, p.493.
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Scholastic economics enjoyed the unquestioned
superiority of being an integral part of a coherent
philosophical synthesis. Economics was not regarded as an
independent but as a dependent discipline ruled by
justice and grounded on exchange. The purpose of the
Scholastics was to determine the rules of justice in
order to govern social relations for the general welfare
(common good) [I,113). While economics was only inciden
tal in the universal scheme of beings, it can be referred
to as a discipline because it did embody a consistent
doctrine of economic relations, but dependent on the laws
of justice.
The Scholastics appreciated the economic place of
that touchstone principle of scarcity. Without the
economic problem of scarcity, they were fully aware that
there would be no necessity for exchange -- goods could
be had freely and in unlimited quantities.9 still, they
subordinated economics to their treatment of justice.
Justice ought to preside over the exchange of scarce
goods. Justice is their first consideration. But it
cannot be forgotten -- and the disciplined minds of the
Scholastics would be the first to realize -- that while
economic order depends primarily on justice, this implies
a thorough understanding and a proper use of economic
analysis. For example, an analysis of just price requires
both an analysis of justice and price •
. • • [A)Schoolman•s economics always remained
a by-product, however important, of his first
concern, exchange justice. A joint product
would perhaps be the better expression. They
would have been little interested in economics
that achieves autonomy at the expense of
vitality; but they were willing to devote much
thought and investigation to an economics that
was practically co-extensive with the field of
right and justice [I,145).
Admittedly, the Scholastics were primarily inter
ested in setting up ethical norms or standards rather
than in influencing public policy. To reiterate, the
Scholastics were interested in determining the rules of
9
St. Thomas Aquinas, s. T., II-II, q. 77, a. 3, C;
commentary in Ethics, Bk. V, Leet. 9.
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justice that ought to preside over the exchange and
distribution of scarce goods. This, too, then became the
preoccupation of B.W. Dempsey. If the purpose is to set
up standards, they hardly can be considered "Idealists"
in the sense of being impractical men. On the contrary,
some were important men in practical affairs in their
daily lives. They left the practical realization to
others because practical realization was not their
purpose in mind [I,124]. None of us can forget that all
policy must be built on sound theory or principle.

c.

Scholastic Period.

The Scholastic period not only includes the Middle
Ages [I,114] but the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries as
well, and the period definitely continues well into the
seventeenth century. schoolmen had more in common than
method and terminology: they had a common philosophical
heritage -- a common way of looking at and explaining the
universe. 10 In moral and social life their preoccupation
was with justice and the general welfare. Economics was
always subordinate and incidental to this treatment.
Thus, to consider Scholastic economics as medieval
doctrine is simply an error [I,115). 11 This study at no
time will use the word Medievalists in the sense of
Schoolmen. The term would then be too limiting and,
therefore, inaccurate. The Scholastic approach to
economic problems was distinctive whether it be that of
the middle ages or the sixteenth and seventeenth cen
turies. B. w. Dempsey in his writings fully recognized
this fact:
,Reputable economic historians will see no
incongruity in citing thirteen and seventeen
10 see Joseph A. Schumpeter, op.cit., pp. 107-115.
He presents Scholastic framework that looks upon "society
as a cosmos that is possessed of inherent logical
consistency" to show the basis of Scholastic economics
and the continuity of economic thought "that modern
economics stems from the Scholastic writers" (p. 113).
11 See
Raymond de Roover, Scholastic Economics:
Survival and Lasting Influence from the Sixteenth Century
to Adam Smith, pp. 187-188.
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century writers together for a proposition,
although the analytical context in which the
later writer speaks may have substantially
altered the significance of any language he
shares with the earlier authority [I,149].
The basic principle in all Scholastic economic treatment
is that, in any exchange transaction, justice demands an
equivalence between the goods exchanged, and that certain
determinable values must be determinable. In other words,
Scholastics regard "price" and the factors behind it as
the crux of the problem of obtaining justice in economic
society. The "primary concern is to determine, under a
given set of conditions, which exchanges were equitable
and therefore permissible, and which were not" [I,130].
The Scholastics proceeded from reason rather than
authority in the development of their thought. True,
frequently they quoted st. Thomas, but the quotations
presented his arguments, not merely his conclusions. In
Scholastic economics, presenting a position because st.
Thomas or Aristotle held it without giving the argument
for the position was inadmissible. "Evidence on authority
is, in principle, the weakest of arguments." What these
Scholastics heartily endorsed -- an approach of reason
rather than authority -- B.W. Dempsey faithfully followed
[I,116). 12
While st. Thomas Aquinas (1226-1274] founded his
school in the middle ages, his followers continued far
beyond this medieval period until well into the seven
teenth century. What St. Thomas and his numerous fol
lowers were primarily interested in, in those sections
that touched upon economics, were the rules of justice
governing social relations. Economics, as was said above,
was given only an incidental place in his universal
scheme of being. One would look in vain in st. Thomas,
therefore, for a full treatment of economics. But he did
lay down certain economic principles which remained for
his successors to comment upon, interpret, develop and
elaborate upon. Thus, to interpret st. Thomas without
taking into account the common opinion of his own
commentators would be faulty methodology. Yet this same
12
"Yet they (Molina, Lessius, Lugo] steadily adhered
to Thomas' opinion that evidence on authority is, in
principle, the weakest of valid argument . • • [I,116].
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host of commentators (i.e. saures, Molina, Soto, Lessius,
de Lugo, B.W. Dempsey, etc.) use St. Thomas Aquinas
always as their central core, thus making both comparison
and synthesis much easier.
st. Thomas• economic analysis enjoyed the distinc
tion of being an integral part of a coherent philosoph
ical synthesis. His economics formed a consistent body of
doctrine ruled by justice. st. Thomas' treatment of
economic questions, however, is not brought together in
one place, "but (is] scattered throughout the Summa
Theologiae and his other works. 1113 Much of st. Thomas'
treatment of economic questions is found in a commentary
on Aristotle's Ethics. st. Thomas, here, not only was
most painstaking in recording Aristotle's economic views
accurately -- even procuring new translations for his
purpose -- he also refined, developed or expanded these
views whenever he deemed it necessary. B.W. Dempsey
writes:
The discussion of fundamental economic ideas
in the writings of st. Thomas Aquinas, however
penetrating and acute, was at all times a by
product of some other activity. st. Thomas was
not an economist, and at no time was he con
cerned with the analysis of economic problems
for their own sake. Though he touches upon
many economic topics and touches them with
characteristic neatness and accuracy, he is
always primarily interested in some other
problem [F,164].
Analysis of economic topics can be found in many
parts of st. Thomas Aquinas' works, also. Sometimes st.
Thomas stops for a full treatment in connection with
justice or some other virtue or vice, sometimes only in
passing to round out his treatment. The general setting
for the treatment of exchange value falls explicitly
under justice in two places: in the Summa Theologiae, II
II, qq. 57-80, and in the Commentary on the Ethics of
Aristotle [Cf. F,166].
Arthur Monroe, Monetary Theory Before Adam Smith
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1923), p.
18.
13
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B.W. Dempsey's analysis of exchange value is based
chiefly on the Summa Theologiae, the foundation not only
of his own treatment but of most, if not all, of the
subsequent Scholastics. To found his analysis on was not
to limit himself to it. The Summa Theologiae, as its
title infers, is a summary, a compendium, and although
complete, it still remains an epitome. Fuller treatment
on some points will be found in the Commentary on the
Ethics. Later Scholastics in their commentaries, that is,
commentaries on the Summa Theologiae, will find occasion
to elaborate and develop St. Thomas Aquinas' basic
doctrine on exchange value [Cf. F,167]. In this stream of
thought B.W. Dempsey immersed himself completely.
This section, therefore, is designedly concerned
with the problem of value. Nothing in the economic
writings of Aristotle and the Scholastic doctors was more
fundamental than the dependence on the principle that, in
an exchange transaction, justice demands an equivalence
between the goods exchanged. The Scholastics regarded
"price" as the crux of the problem of obtaining justice
in the economic order. The study of usury, wages,
profits, etc. is then but a corollary of the main problem
of exchange.14 Scholastics overemphasized the usury
problem -- an application of exchange -- and today's
writers have given usury more than enough attention, not
absolutely but relative to the problem of exchange.
A grave shortcoming of the medieval as well as
the later Schoolman is their overemphasis of
the usury question. The space devoted to it in
scholastic treatises has given the mistaken
impression that it was regarded as all impor
tant.15

14"Toward one point the analytical enquiries in this
book converge. Behind the circular disputes about wages,
profit, interest, and credit, the fundamental problem of
economic justice must be attacked exactly where the
historical studies indicate it to be, in the Just Price."
See V. A. Demont, editor, The Just Price (London:
Student Christian Movement Press, 1930), p. 149.
15See Raymond de Roover, Monopoly Theory Prior to
Adam Smith, Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXV (Novem
ber, 1951), pp. 496.
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The Schoolman considered equity in distribu
tion and exchange as the central problem in
economics. The usury question was a side
issue, but concern with it was allowed to
crowd out nearly everything else.16

Usury is a very important corollary of exchanges,
but only one. B.W. Dempsey recognized both the importance
of usury analysis and its subordination to exchange
analysis.
II.

THB PROBLEM OJ' BQUIVALENCB IR BXCBARGB

"The nucleus of the economic study of the medieval
moralist was the contract of exchange. Exchange was taken
in a somewhat wider sense than good usage would approve
today, signifying in general any burdensome contract"
[I,130]. The task that the Schoolmen and
B.W. Dempsey, their modern counterpart, set themselves
(and hence our task in this section) was "to determine
under a given set of conditions, which exchanges were
equitable and therefore permissible and which were not"
[I,130]. The basic procedure involved not only a theory
of law, of equity and justice, but also a theory of
economic value. Contracts of exchange were not conceived
as taking place in a vacuum but in a market, community or
province [I,130]. Thus, our purpose and procedure has
been clearly ·set out for us by B.W. Dempsey and the
Scholastics. With an understanding of the contract of
exchange and its rela'bionship to law, equity and justice,
we can proceed to the solution of the problem of the
necessity and determination of equivalence in exchange.
The'endeavor of B.W. Dempsey was to add to Scholastic
thought. Being perfectly sure that Scholastic doctrine in
most instances accumulates rather than changes, any con
tribution of B.W. Dempsey was in the nature of an
addition rather than a departure. we would look in vain
for a complete treatment of some of these topics -- he
will be perfectly content to rest on St. Thomas and
Scholastic traditional doctrine [F,V]; at the same time,
we would search in vain for any departure from this
doctrine. He was perfectly in accord. His was a constant
search and development of principles that could be
16

Ibid., p. 167.
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applied to a wide diversity of economic problems.
In this section, we shall deal with B.W. Dempsey,
the social philosopher, as he tackles the problem of the
necessity of equivalence in exchange: why is equivalence
necessary in all just exchange? In the next section, we
shall deal with B.W. Dempsey, the academic economist, as
he tackles the problem of the determination of equiva
lence in exchange: How is the just price determined?
A.

contract of Bxchange

It is important in understanding B.W. Dempsey I s
development of the problem of equivalence to begin where
he begins, with the contract of exchange. His own
treatment of contract of exchange as a right [I,130] is
brief; he almost entirely falls back upon traditional
philosophy. Referring back to st. Thomas and the Schol
astic tradition with B.W. Dempsey, we are aware that as
soon as a person is brought into contact with other
persons (as happens in every natural human life), his
external actions are coincided to relate him in a special
moral manner to these other persons. All the problems of
moral good and evil arising from a person's associations
with other persons are problems within the field of
justice or charity. This places us in the sphere of
social mobility. The notion of social mobility immediate
ly calls to mind that of social justice, and justice in
turn evokes the notion of right [F,415]. Right (jus)
demands what is just (justum), and to understand this
contract of exchange and the ramifications, we must
exercise the various forms of right.
B.

Analysis of a Right

Justice (justitia = rightness) literally means
rightness. Obviously, justice is derived from the Latin
word jus (jus = right), which means right (Cf. F,164;
415). But right is the name of a relation. A relation
occurs when one being is connected (associated/related)
with another being in some specific way. Relation is
treated (by st. Thomas) as one of nine accidental cate
gories of being. One primary relation is that of
equality • 17
11

st. Thomas Aquinas, s. T., II-II, q. 57, a. 1, c.
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To recapitulate, in reverse order (a'priori):
1)

Relation

2)

Equality Right
Rightness -

3)

4)

is among the 9 accidental cate
gories of being
is one primary relation
is the name of a relation
is another name for justice

1)
Two persons may establish a relation (carry on
an external operation/a deal/be associated/connected)
with one another.
2)
Now, in this deal (external operation/associ
ation/relation/connection) a certain equality between the
goods or service to be transferred (exchanged= commuta
tio or permutatio) between two persons must be estab
lished (e.g. exchange the commodity of wine for an equal
amount of the commodity of money).

3)
When equality is observed in the transfer or
exchange, the (buying-selling) contract is right (jus or
justum). so the contract is objectively right when one
good has been exchanged for another good of a certain
equal value (equi-valence). "Justice in exchange is
presumed when each party receives as much as he gives and
gives as much as he receives" [1,138). If the goods
exchanged were not done so to bring about a certain
equality, the. situation (contract) needs to be righted
[F,403).

Briefly, for the moment, justice is a habitual
4)
willing to do what is right in regard to contracts (ex
changes) with another person or persons. Justice (moral
rightness) is the habit enabling one person to give each
and every other person his own right (jus) [Cf. F,164165].
A right is a relation. Every relation such as right
involves "four factors -- the subject, title, matter and
term" [F,377).
1)
claim.

Title -:- the reason or foundation for the

Subject -- the person (e.g. individual-person,
2)
society, corporation, government) who has the claim.
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3)
Matter -- what one has a claim to (e.g. income
in the form of exchange value or price of services: in
the form of wages, interest, rent, profits, etc.).
4)
Term -- person bound to respect the claim. For
instance, an employer is bound to respect an employee's
right to wages. Money is exchanged for services "involv
ing an exchange contract" [F,204].
1)

Title

2)

Subject
Matter
Term

3)

c.

4)

work done entitles an equival
ence
a person (employee)
to wages
from another person (employer)

Blem.ants of a Right

1)
Subject (A)
a person (seller) who has a
subjective right to equality of payment; has a debt
(debtum) or duty to render full value in the exchange.

2)
Term (B) -- another person (buyer) who has a
subjective right that A fulfill his duty as a seller by
an exchange of equivalence; has a duty (debitum) to pay
for his purchase on the basis of objective equality -
give full (equal) value for the good of A in the exchange
transactions.
When A sells to B -- the exchange is
objectively right when there is an objective equality
namely, that goods exchanged are of equal value.
Thus, A and B have a debt (duty):
A
B

to fulfill as a seller by giving full value.
to fulfill as a buyer by paying for his pur
chase on the basis of objective equality.

In this way, objective equality or right is maintain
ed.is

In any transaction between two persons (the buyer
seller relationship) the question of the equality of the
value of the goods exchanged arises. For example, if a
seller values and lists a watch at $70.00, and the buyer
18

S.T., II-II, q. 57, a. 1. c.
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values the watch so that he is willing to pay this price,
the transfer or exchange can be made in equality -- a
bargain is concluded at this price (exchange value). "The
result of the process," states B.W. Dempsey, "is an
increase in total utility all round" [F,54).
Where such equality is observed, the buying-selling
contract is right. This objective denotation is the
primary meaning of right. So the exchange or transaction
is objectively right when one thing is equal to another
thing. The moral claim to this objective rightness or
equality on the part of one of the parties is called a
subjective right.
3)
Matter -- economic goods or services which have
the capacity to satisfy a human want (e.g. money for a
bus ride).
4)
Subject-term -- the two "persons" must actually
exchange goods (ad personam exteriorem) of equivalence,
not just will it. (A exchanges his good for good of
B).1e
Justice has to do with objective moral rightness -- an
external quality must be established, involving at least
two persons (e.g. A & B).
5)
Subject-Matter -- (relation of a subject and
matter; or term and matter): Right comes before justice;
justice follows right. "If the act of justice is to give
each man his due, then the act of justice is preceded by
the act whereby some good became his due. 1120
, If a good is due to a man as his own, right to
manage goods precedes justice. One does not have a
responsibility to give another man his due unless he has
a right to this due (good). Thus, justice does not give
him the right to private management, but assumes and
protects the right.
What, then, is the precise relationship between
subject and matter? The subject must own in some sense
the good; otherwise, he has not the right to exchange it
18

20

S.T., II-II, q. 58, a. 10.

st. Thomas Aquinas, contra. sent. 2:28.
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for some other good -- he cannot pay his debts unless he
owns goods with which to pay them.
I own the good; I am its owner; I have the right of
ownership. Ownership is the exclusive right to manage
(possess, enjoy, dispose) a good as one's own. More
precisely, ownership is the relation that exists between
the person and a good. A good is anything that satisfies
a human want -- whether it be tangible as land or
intangible as an idea -- between which and myself there
is a unique relation. I can say it is proper to me, my
property; I own it. Thus, I can claim (have a right) to
others' obligation to respect it. Another person must
give to me its equivalent if he wishes to possess (own)
it. Since I own it, I have the right to exchange it for
some other good, or to refrain from doing so. Not only do
rights in general precede justice, but the right to
ownership makes the act of justice possible. Consequent
ly, st. Thomas, in his systematic treatment, takes up
rights, a particular right of ownership, before the
exchange contract and its justice.21
Man has the right to manage (possess/own) income for
the purpose of satisfying the basic needs and reasonable
wants of his nature because of his need and natural
endowment of intellect and will to make use of these
goods. All men, therefore, have the right to possess or
manage goods. Note that this right to manage is for the
sake of use [F,179]. The right to use (consume) goods
takes precedence over the right of their management
(possession) [F,176]. Possession is for the sake of use,
but use cannot be for the sake of possession. In other
words, management is for consumption: to satisfy the
needs and reasonable wants of all men. When other men are
in need or want, no man may use or keep more than he
needs.22 "Any positive treatment of ownership, 11 says
B.W. Dempsey, "proceeds from the radical fact of the
objective relationship between man's needs and capaci
ties, and the capacities of the natural resources of the
earth to satisfy those needs" [F,170].
6)
Title: Foundation of the Right to Exchange.
What is the foundation (title) for making this exchange?
S.T., II-II, q. 66.

21

�S.T., II-II, q. 66, a. 1. c.
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The title will be the very reason or foundation for the
exchange. In any exchange, the foundation is a certain
equality (equal-value or equivalence) of the matter
(goods) to be exchanged in the minds of the subject and
term (persons) involved. This equality is adequate for
establishing a relationship of right and therefore of
justice.
D.

Bzchange contract

A contract is an agreement, made between two or more
persons, which creates an obligation [I,130]. This
agreement is a manifestation of mutual assent by two or
more persons to one another. This agreement affects their
relations by means of a bargain concluded between them
consisting of an exchange of mutual promises or an
exchange of a promise of a performance (external
operation).
In the ordinary contract of exchange, the act of
consent (promissory agreement) is the initiating cause of
the exchange. As a result of this consent, the con
trasting parties do not stand to each other in the way
they did before their agreement. They are related to each
other in a new way. They are now united in their common
purpose of exchange for mutual benefit.23
What makes an exchange what it is is not what is
exchanged or the reason why the exchange is made; it is
the agreement itself -- the consent between the two
persons (subject and term) exchanging. The substance of
the exchange is the agreement (promise) itself. Thus it
must be in this promissory agreement that the ultimate
reason why a contract obliges must be found. The promise
between subject and term is an express agreement to carry
out the exchange into effect; a declaration (bargain)
which binds the persons who make it. It is the declara
tion of the bargain which gives to the person to whom it
is made a right to expect or claim a particular (proper)
good or service in exchange for his good so bargained
A contract is often defined as "a mutual agreement
generating an obligation in at least one of those
agreeing." The Scholastic Lessius defines a contract as
a "practical, external manifestation of one to another
generating an obligation from the consent of the parties
agreeing" [Cf. I,141].
23
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(declared).
That which is due, or the justice involved in the
exchange contract, pertains directly to the private
(proper/particular) good of the individual contractors
(bargainers) but it also concerns indirectly the common
good (public good/common welfare) of all the members of
the community. Hence, if the contract (exchange) is one
of equivalence, both exchange and contributive justice
enter.24
B.

Becessity of Bquivalence in Bxchange

Central to B.W. Dempsey's thought on just price is
that equivalence in exchange is necessary for the common
good. In numerous places in his writings he presents this
relationship of equivalence to the common good as a fact:
Exchange -- arises from man's personal needs,
but a personal need that is not distinct from
his need for society [F,136].

or:

Commutative justice, though concerned with
transactions between individuals, is not to be
regarded or interpreted individualisti-cally
[F,401].

again:
As property and business are matters of public
and social concern, so too, are contracts •
Contracts are freely entered into, without
compulsion, but they take place within the
framework of society [F,98).
24
"Si autem fraus deficit, tune de emptione et
veditione dupliciter loqui possumus. Uno mode, secondum
se, et secundum hoc emptio et venditio videtur esse
introducta pro communi utilitate utriusque: dum scilicet
unus indiget re alterius et e converso • • • Quod autem
pro communi utilitate est inductum, non debet esse magis
in gravamen unius quam al terius. Et ideo debet secundum
aequalitatem rei inter eos contractus institui." S.T.,

II-II, q. 15, 1, corpus.
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yet again;
The chief purpose of both civil and private
contracts is the common good [F,98).
finally;
Exchange is the principal instrument by which
goods privately owned still minister to the
common good, as they must do if they are to
fulfill their basic ordination [F,392).
Exchange relationships to the common good considered as
a fact by B.W. Dempsey was no mere assertion on his part,
but is central to his thought and ably buttressed with
reasons. To fully appreciate its importance, place and
significance, and the reasons for it, there must be a
development of this thought.
B.W. Dempsey begins his own thought development by
indicating that a man, "even before he is confronted with
an actual decision, must recognize his relation to God
and to his fellows." But recognition is not enough;
voluntary cooperation must follow. A man should be
"willing to cooperate in these self-subordinations that
are the means of achieving coordination to the supreme
unconditional end of all" [F,368). "Any other conduct or
frame of mind," he would consider irrational and not
truly human.
Then follows a key principle and social motivation
of his personal life. "Conversely, one who .is not willing
to 'put himself out' for others just has not in himself
the makings of a man" [F,368). "Men must in their
seemingly most personal actions as private individuals
act to promote the common good" [F,368). Falling back
upon Scholastic tradition, he recalls for us how the
"genuine practice of any virtue promotes the common
good." The reason for this is clear in his mind, since
"the common good of any society is promoted when the
society is composed of virtuous members" [F,369). The
"relation of the acts of individual persons to the common
good is more obvious, more direct, and more important,"
B.W. Dempsey then argues, "in what concerns the virtue of
justice" [F,369]. Now he is ready to turn to the exchange
contract. "In these acts of justice that find expression
in contracts, there is first the good which is common to
the buyer and seller," and if this is not so, concludes
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B.W. Dempsey, "the contract could not be entered into"
[F,369).
"Buying and selling were instituted for the common
good of both parties since each needs the product of the
other and vice versa • • • but what was introduced for
the common utility ought not to bear harder on one party
than on the other and, therefore, the contract between
them should rest upon an equality of thing to thing.1125
Central to B.w. Dempsey's thought is the reliance he
places on this quotation and, of course, his inter
pretation of this "key" passage. The important words are
common good (common utility) which in two separate works,
in almost identical words, he analyzes as having a
"twofold meaning" [F,234; I,138].
1)
2)

For the mutual advantage of both parties.
For the advantage of the whole community.

The first is abundantly clear. Briefly, the mutual and
reciprocal advantage of both parties would be preserved
by "maintaining equality of values in the exchange."
Secondly, exchange would be to the advantage of the whole
community, "if goods of various useful values are
exchanged in the community until their use values and
exchange values balance all around."
The "how" or
determination of this balancing of use and exchange
values will be treated more fully in the next section.
What is important to note at this juncture is that
B.W. Dempsey considered that this "balancing" is a means
to achieve the common good.
His reasoning continues as he argues that exchange
would not be to the fullest advantage of the community
unless the "division of property and the division of
labor" contribute to the common welfare or community
[F,234; I,138]. They must do so because both have the
"purpose of reducing the face of the earth to man's
greater service. How "the division of labor and the
division of resources serve the common good is by en
suring the "increased output made possible by increased

25

above.

St. Thomas, S.T., II-II, q. 77; quoted in F,369
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efficiency. 1126 B.w. Dempsey does not consider this even
a "paradox" -- that an II institution" which serves any
private individual advantage should have been introduced
for the common good. "The double aspect of exchange," he
says forcefully, "is the inevitable sequel of the double
aspect of the division of goods and the division of
labor" [I,137). He further explains that from the
"division of labor arise at once two radical consequenc
es: first, the complete interdependence of those special
izing; secondly, which is the more important for our
purposes, "the necessity of some process [that) will
assure that the resources so divided continue to minister
"To safeguard the latter, 11 he
to the common good. 11
thoughtfully adds, "is the function of just price"
[F,402).
Immediately preceding his death, in a paper deliv
ered at Harvard University and subsequently published in
Thought magazine, he demonstrates a refinement and
deepening of thought on this matter. In his later years
he steeped himself in St. Thomas, drawing upon him
extensively, so the following passage should come as no
surprise:
In discussing the division of labor and the
division of resources we pointed out that both
served the common good by the increased output
made possible by increased efficiency. This
generated an increased interdependence which
required · that men cooperate in stable ex
change. This is the most important instance of
a basic principle. Material goods are not
increased by being shared: the more there is
for A, the less there is for B. Knowledge and
love, the objects of the intellect and will,
are increased and in no way diminished by
being shared. The increased output in the two
divisions is due fundamentally to the improved
knowledge gained by specialization. The im
proved exchanges are due to social coopera
tion, an expression of that natural love man
has for another and of that civil amity, or
agreeable conduct said by st. Thomas to be
"Prudence, Providence and Economic Decision, 11 B.
W. Dempsey, S.J., Thought, XXV (Spring, 1960), p. 32.
26
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natural to man and due to others by a kind of
debt of natural honesty." Increase in know
ledge and love is the basis of all improvement
in the common good, i.e., of all social and
economic progress.27
Earlier, in a brief note literally inserted in
(March, 1955) under the heading of a "Small
Note on the Common Good, 11 he had first expounded this
vein of thought as indicated by the above quotation. The
kernel of this "small note" and considerable contribution
lies in the following two paragraphs quoted from B.W.
Dempsey in their entirety:
Social Order

The increase in productivity is a good which
is common to all parties of the two divisions
[of labor and resources). The increased prod
uction is a good which is common to all. But
the degree to which the goods are common
depends also upon the degree to which love has
been increased with knowledge. In the economic
order, therefore, the common good is promoted
when the institutions of the division of labor
and the division of resources are so designed
and administered as to increase knowledge and
love.
Social justice obliges all to contribute
to the efficient design and function of these
institutions that knowledge and love may be
increased.28
They are proper goods, eminently my own. But through ex
change or sharing, they are pre-eminently capable of
being common [F,390]. We can only conclude with B.W.
Dempsey that, though exchange transactions be "between
individuals, they are individuals who are members of a
community, who are using goods that, though privately
owned, are destined nevertheless to serve the whole
community. These goods are reduced to the common service
in part through the institution of exchange" [F,401-402).
27 Ibid,

p. 32.

Social Order,

28

Vol. 5 (March, 1955), p. 120.
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B.W. Dempsey gives credit to the Scholastics for
seeing that "when goods are exchanged, the value which
they have in exchange is, like the right of property,
private and personal, but not only or exclusively private
and personal." Furthermore, he tells us that "justice
and equity, virtues of social human beings, ru;i.e the
acquisition and possession of goods of any subsequent
trading of goods so acquired and possessed. This must
always be borne in mind," concludes B.W. Dempsey, "if we
are to grasp exchange as the Scholastics saw it, with any
genuine insight into their meaning" [I,133).
B.W. Dempsey, of course, can hardly be said to have
discovered the relationship between exchange and contri
butive (social) justice. In fact, he gives this credit to
St. Thomas; namely, that injustice in exchange harms the
common good, since injustice inhibits social cooperation
in specialization and exchange; "without justice • • •
there will be no exchange of goods" [F,400 ff.]. In these
pages, we find B.W. Dempsey at his best as he clarifies
and further substantiates St. Thomas' argument by
arguing, "that an accurate price system • • • is a common
good," and that exchange justice is necessary to such a
price system [F,388]. His conclusion, therefore, is that
in at least this sense, exchange justice is "one with"
contributive justice. St. Thomas also argues, and is
quoted by B.W. Dempsey [F,406], that the community
suffers from unjust exchange since injustice in exchange
would "destroy the crafts." B.W. Dempsey interprets this
to mean that unjust exchange, by putting some members of
the community out of business, deprives the community of
their services and also deprives other segments of the
economy of a market for their product. Perhaps the first
reference to just exchange and its effect upon the common
good appears in Aristotle's Ethics; B.W. Dempsey quotes
st. Thomas' commentary on this pertinent passage in
relation to the price of wages:
The crafts would be destroyed if he who pro
duces some manufactured article would suffer,
i.e. would not receive for that manufactured
product just as much as he has produced. So
the products of one worker must be measured
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together with that of another to the end that
exchange be just [F,403].29

In commenting on this passage, B.W. Dempsey asserts
that the crafts would be destroyed because "the worker
who does not receive a fair return for his efforts would
perforce cease to produce (he would be producing at a
loss), and the community would be deprived of his service
and product." Then, too, he who had apparently benefited
by the exchange would, however, have lost buyers, "for
the underpaid craft would be unable to buy his product,
and his craft in turn would suffer" [F,403). B.W. Dempsey
implies that this above "simple statement" calls for "a
whole theory of functional general equilibrium prices."
Johannes Messner uses a similar argument to show a
connection between injustices in private exchanges and
the general welfare. 0 A common argument, implied by
B.W. Dempsey in his treatment on private property [F,164
ff.], is that exchange justice is necessary on the
assumption that injustice in exchange, like slander,
breaks down the very foundation of society: mutual trust
in exchange, that is, "peace and good order."
In conclusion, the words of B.W. Dempsey given as
part of a summary to a chapter in The Functional Economy
can profitably be quoted:
Justice requires exchanges at just
prices, because men are part of a comm.unity
which is designed to serve the common good of
all and in which the parts, insofar as they
are human persons, are not subordinated one to
another, but are functionally coordinated. If
goods are not exchanged at just prices, howev
er, he who does not receive the just value of
his work or product is to that extent the
slave of the other. Justice is not maintained
nor the common good promoted.

Aristotle, Commentary on the Ethics, Bk. V, Lesson

29

8.

Johannes Messner, Social Ethics (St. Louis:
Herder Book co., 1949), p. 751.
30
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If just prices are frequently not paid, the
economic order is completely disrupted and
"the crafts would be destroyed." An economic
imbalance is produced, which prevents one
group of buyers of their product [F,405-406].
III. DBTBRIIIDTIOB OF BQUIVALBBCB IB BXCBUGB

B.W. Dempsey, the economist, had a certain approach
to economic problems that conditioned his treatment of
economic value. He himself spoke of these principles and
foundations that conditioned his thought on concrete
economic problems as the "terms of economic discourse"
[F,18].

A.

The Terms of Economic Discourse [F,18 ff.]

"The object of economic analysis has well been
defined as the study of the allocation of available
resources among alternative uses." In this bold manner,
B.W. Dempsey approaches economics and the tasks directly
before him: equivalence in exchange. To study exchange it
is necessary to do what B.W. Dempsey did in his own
treatment, to place exchange in its proper setting of
economic principles. To him economics is "a means of
dealing economically with economic data that we may know
Economic
which of desired optima are attainable."31
activity, like all human activity, is a means to the
perfection of man. All members of society have wants and
the corresponding right to fulfill these wants. Since all
have the same nature and end, and since the resources of
the earth are intended to serve the needs or wants of all
men,,the end of economic activity is the welfare of each
and all members of the whole society. In various places
and under different headings, B.W. Dempsey expresses this
thought (F,18; 51; 95-97; 99, etc.]. A somewhat similar
thought occurs expressed in these words, admittedly drawn
from st. Thomas [C.G. 3:76], but applied to the economic
sphere by B.W. Dempsey:
Under the design of Divine Providence non
rational beings on the face of the earth find
their perfection in serving rational creaPrudence, Providence and Economic Decision, p. 21.
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tures. Because they are rational, men par
ticipate in divine providence, not merely
passively and necessarily, as by obeying the
law of gravity, but actively and freely by an
intelligent application of non-rational things
to man's own use in achieving the personal
perfection which is the design of Providence
for man. The use of non-rational things in
their subordination to human use is the first
step in the exercise of human providence [Cf.
F, 56-57] • 32

Here he relates the human economy to the Divine Economy.
Economics has been defined by B.W. Dempsey "as the
allocation of scarce resources to selected ends."
FUndamentally it follows that if there were sufficient
resources to comfortably meet all human wants, there
would be no economic problem, no economic activity, no
need for exchange, no economics. Ample resources for all
means no want for any. Without wants or "needs" exchange
need never arise. B.W. Dempsey states this well:
Evidently there could be no economic
problem if man had no material needs or,
having needs, if the means of supplying them
lay always at hand in inexhaustible supply, to
be acquired without effort.
An economic problem arises only because
man has many wants, limited resources to meet
them, and because effort is required in order
to make even these limited resources serve his
needs. It is necessary, therefore, for men to
economize, that is, to use their available
resources, both personal and material, in the
best possible way. This limitation requires
decisions between the cost and return involved
in all the possible things man can do in
bringing the economic process to its term,
namely, provision for wants, the satisfying of
man's needs in the most efficient fashion
[F,20].

32

Ibid., p. 22.
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No society has ever had an economic system with
sufficient resources to produce all the goods that would
be needed to satisfy everyone. Wants have been and remain
greater than the resources available for the satisfaction
of these wants. "In its broadest aspect the prime
economic problem of the individual and of society is that
of utilizing comparatively scarce resources in such a way
as to yield maximum satisfaction" [F, p. 26]. This
principle of scarcity is the most basic and universal
principle in economics. It is the motivating principle
from which all economic activity arises. There would be
no need for economics, and hence no need for the economic
activity of exchange, if economic resources were not
scarce.
Economics starts with the common observation that
there is a basic inequality between men•s wants and the
material and cultural goods available for the satisfac
tion of these wants. Men are so constituted that they
want a great many goods and services. Man has many needs,
but his wants, outstripping his elemental needs, are
capable of almost indefinite expansion. B.W. Dempsey,
following the Scholastics, correctly diagnosed the
economic problem as one of scarcity:
In their (Scholastics') opinion, economics was
a branch of ethics which determined the rules
of justice that ought to preside over the
distribution and the exchange of scarce goods.
It is obvious that there would be no need for
distribution or . exchange if goods could be
obtained without effort in unlimited quanti
ties. 33
The economic problem, therefore, is essentially a
problem arising from the necessity of choice -- choice of
the manner in which limited resources with alternative
uses are disposed of in the market at a price. For this
reason, economics is really a theory of choice because it
explores the possible choices [F,26], the possible
results of such choices (decisions) [F,29] and their
relative desirability on economic grounds [F,34]: Cf.
F,344]. It is, in Aristotelian terminology, the problem
of the husbandry of resources [F,2: 393]. Those are the
Ibid., p. 24.
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acts which, more or less regularly, give rise to offers
and demands for goods and services and to exchange
transactions. st. Thomas' s pure economics (oeconomia,
household management) is based on and follows Aristotle I s
order of treatment. As Schumpeter states, 34 St. Thomas
found in Aristotle all he wished to say in his pure
economics, refers to him and accepts his formulations.
What is relevant for our purposes, namely, just price,
the price that assures the equivalence of exchange
justice, is based on Aristotle. B.W. Dempsey's develop
ment, therefore, follows Aristotle as much as st. Thomas
Aquinas:
Aristotle based his economic analysis squarely
upon wants and their satisfactions. Starting
from
the
economy
of
self-sufficient
households, he then introduced division of
labor, barter ( direct exchange], and as a
means of overcoming the difficulties of direct
barter, money ( indirect exchange] .••35
Goods, the counterpart of wants, are the means of
want-satisfaction [F,18]. A good is anything an indivi
dual regards as capable of satisfying his want. An
economic good is everything which possesses significance
for individual choice. What is there about a good that
gives it the power to satisfy wants? A good possesses
the power of utility, the capacity of want satisfaction.
"Goods and services that have capacity to satisfy human
needs are said to possess utility" [F,20]. An individual
with an unsatisfied need or want sees a good that he
thinks is capable of satisfying the want which he has.
Thus, utility expresses a (rational) relationship between
a subject and object from the point of view of the
problem of want-satisfaction. Utility is the rational
relation between the goods (objects) and individual
(subject). Utility represents in some way an individual's
estimate -- a subjective and relative evaluation -- of
the satisfaction which he derives or expects (antici
pates) to derive from a good (for desire and satisfaction
need not correspond).
34

Joseph Schumpeter, op. cit., p. 93.
Ibid. I p.

35

60.
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Utility ignores the inherent qualities of goods
(though, admittedly, it is on them, on "goods as a
foundation, 11 that ability to satisfy wants depends). The
utility or usefulness of a good, therefore, is not
something intrinsic to it. Scholastics are abundantly
clear on the point that individual estimates are personal
and intensive, that "the capacity of goods to satisfy
human wants does not depend upon their natures, but upon
their usefulness for human needs" [F,397].
As St. Augustine says (De Civitate Dei, Bk.
XI, ch. 16), the price of things does not
depend on the dignity of their nature, since
at times, a horse fetches a higher price than
a slave, but it depends on their usefulness to
man" [F,397).

Goods are not appraised according to the
dignity of their natures, otherwise a mouse,
which is an animal and sentient, would be of
greater price than a pearl, which is inani
mate. Prices are placed on things according to
the degree that men need them for their use
[F,397].

Yet, utility, being a relation, has a certain relation to
its subject, the individual: his needs; and a certain
relation to the object, the goods: capacity to satisfy
wants. "Gold and silver are dear not only on account of
utility of vessels which are made from these metals • •
• but also on account of the dignity and purity of their
substance. 1136
·Following st. Thomas, B.W. Dempsey explicitly points
out a number of ways in which a good may have enhanced
utility. Utility may increase due to a change in place,
by transporting and handling; due to a change of time, by
storing; due to improvement, by working on a (raw) good;
or by risk. For instance, a shoemaker who takes raw
material and works on it, improves it, enhances the
utility of the material, and is therefore entitled to put
a higher value on his finished product.
For this (buy and sell later at a higher

st. Thomas Aquinas, S.T., II-II, q. 77, a. 2.

36

125

price) can be done lawfully, either because he
had improved the good in some manner, or
because the price had changed with a change of
place or time, or because of the risk he takes
in transporting the good from one place to
another or even in having it transported for
him.37
These listings of st. Thomas nearly correspond to
modern categories of utility forms, such as form, place,
time, service utility. The very purpose of production is
to enhance the utility of goods. Goods as produced or
enhanced can be exchanged. Utility of a good is a factor
in exchange value because of labor, risk, change of time
and place, etc.; the price can change (ceteris paribus)
and, as we shall see logically follows, remain just.
Thus, a price that varies may still be a just price.
A certain measure of grain may command a higher
price than a pair of shoes because the grain satisfies a
greater need. Obviously, the grain possessed a greater
utility than the shoes. But the grain might not have
commanded a higher price than the pair of shoes if the
grain was plentiful and the shoes relatively scarce. A
good commands a price not only because of its utility or
usefulness but also because of its relative scarcity.
Utility is the relation between the good and the need
(want) of the individual and the quantity of good
available, or, briefly, between wants and resources. Both
factors -- utility and scarcity -- are necessary to
determine a price. St. Thomas and the other Scholastics
were well aware of this fact. B.W. Dempsey expresses this
very neatly in one short paragraph:
Production may be said to generate from util
ities; distributive, time and place utilities
and exchange, proprietary utilities, that is,
the benefit that accrues to an owner from the
possession and control of that bundle of
utilities, which represents the maximum
available for his present and future needs
with his present income (F,52].
The last paragraph quoted from B.W. Dempsey is more than
37

Ibid., S.T., ll-ll, 77, a. 4, ad. 2.
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a clear succinct statement of utility generation, but is
also a statement of current treatment of the subject. In
none of the leading present day authors is proprietary
(ownership) utility so masterfully and clearly handled.
Certainly, B.W. Dempsey at this juncture adds to the body
of economic knowledge. Elsewhere he again alludes to
proprietary utility:
Exchange is of a wholly different [from pro
duction and distribution) order. When improved
real property is sold, an oil well or a dairy
farm, there may be no change in form or loca
tion and yet an important economic fact has
taken place. The function of exchange is most
obvious in markets that are physically visi
ble, such as the fruit and vegetable markets
that still flourish in some centers in the
early morning hours: similarly at fairs and
auctions. Here commodities, literally, as the
expression goes, "change hands." There is no
change in form: there need be no change in
location -- specialists are exchanging their
surpluses, which are to them directly quite
useless, for money with which to buy, from
others' surpluses, the things they need. An
increase of total utility all around is the
result of th_e process [ F, 54) •
Individuals have unlimited wants in relation to the
limited goods available. The relation of scarcity is an
objective fact. There are not sufficient goods available
to satisfy all wants. Individuals see usefulness or
utility in these goods available. This relation of
utility is something subjective considered by individuals
as capable of providing satisfaction. While the individu
al may anticipate certain utility or satisfaction from a
good, the satisfaction may not eventuate. Price determi
nation requires an understanding of both the subjective
and objective factors.
B.

Economic Order

When different things are arranged so as to achieve
some purpose, they can be said to be organized, or order
has been put into them. The arrangements any community
makes so that men are united while resources are divided
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for the purpose of lessening that gap between wants and
resources is the economic order or system of that
community [F,366; 67).
Order inevitably enters economic life. Production,
distribution, exchange must be unified in order to
achieve their purpose of provision for reasonable wants.
As st. Thomas states, "several cannot be the cause of
unity or concord except insofar as they are united, 1138
. • • and "it belongs to providence to order things to an
end. 1139 Some economic order therefore is essential and
always present. In this regard, B.W. Dempsey states:
Men enter economic activity to provide for
their wants, exercising personal human provi
dence. To achieve this end, men associate in
their economic activity, chiefly through
division of labor and division of resources.
These activities then are subjected to gov
ernment of some sort in order that provision
for wants may be achieved. Government is the
execution of providence, and providence is the
design of order to an end. "In a provider two
things may be regarded, the premeditation of
the order and the institution of the premedi
tated order in the things which fail within
the providence. 11 This is what persons mean
when they refer to the economic system of a
nation [F,56-57).
An economic system has an entity of its own; just as
the family or political order is something more than a
sum of individuals, so too is economic order. Its
perfection consists of conditions and advantages set up
in such an optimum manner that the members can satisfy
their needs for economic goods (proper goods) resulting
in the utmost utility for each. Thus, the attainment of
a maximum social income is but an indication that the
economic system is achieving its due perfection or
adequately obtaining its end or purpose. The utility
generated by such a system is to be enjoyed by the
individual who composes the system. Just as in Scholastic
38
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political theory, according to the principle of subsidi
arity, benefits and advantages accrue ultimately to the
persons composing the political society. Optimum (effi
cient) allocation of resources is necessary for maximum
social income. This optimum allocation with its resulting
maximum social income and maximum utility to individuals
comes only through a structure of exchanges, all of which
are just -- equivalence in the contractual agreements.

c.

Bxohange Ari•••

When some goods are present in such quantity that
some wants can be satisfied to a very low degree of
intensity, while other goods are so scarce that they
diminish the intensity of wants very slightly, the
individual will endeavor to exchange the abundance of the
one good in order to diminish the scarcity of the other.
Thus, social cooperation can take the form of actors
performing different functions but with the proximate
purpose 11 of exchanging the surpluses arising from the
specialization" of functions [F,21). Exchange arises when
persons in close proximity possess surpluses of different
commodities.
The first exchange began in those goods which
nature furnishes for the needs of human life
because som� person may have more of these and
another less, as one may have more wine,
another much bread. Therefore, it was proper
that they should exchange, and exchange takes
place up to the point where each has what suf
fices for him" [F,396).
This surplus arises either because some wants have been
satisfied to a very low degree or intensity, or because
in order to create a "surplus," utility was added to
already scarce goods through specialization. This prod
uctive activity created or enhanced the utility of goods,
and so exchange, that subsequent production and special
ization, arises [I,136].
As St. Thomas says so well, men specialize and
exchange in order to fulfill their needs:
Exchange can take place between any commodi
ties. But the first exchange arises in those
goods that serve the necessities of human
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life. one man had more of
that and another more of
this, as some may have wine
vice versa. Whence it is
should exchange.

this and less of
that and less of
and less bread and
proper that they

When a larger community, village or city has
developed, some men may be in contact with
everyone in the community and yet have no one
with whom to exchange. Others, separated from
the community, may be in need of many com
modities. Thus among those resources that have
been divided, exchange must develop so that
one receives from another whatever that other
had and in return furnished that which he had.
This practice prevails even among certain
barbarous nations who are without the use of
money and who exchange no more than what
serves life itself thus giving and receiving
wine, grain and the like.
For the welfare of human society,
many things are necessary: diverse
offices are done better and more
expeditiously by diverse persons
than by men singly.40

D.

The Act of Exchange

When two individuals meet for exchange, they must
have goods to be exchanged, that is, have surplus goods
to exchange for others [F,52]. The individuals for a
commutation must see a different utility in some
good -- their relation to any specific good must dif
fer. 0 In other words,· each must possess a good which
the other desires or sees as useful (possessing utility).
The ratio of their utilities for the two goods is
different for each. Both by the Scholastics and a modern
economist, such as B.W. Dempsey, the term often used
instead of ratio of exchange is value or exchange value.
40
st. Thomas, Commentary on the Poli tics,
Lesson 7.

41

Bk. I,

st. Thomas, S.T., II-II, 77, l, resp. and ad. 3 m.
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The act of exchange, because it provides a bridge for two
individuals' subjective evaluations, brings about a
certain qualification (or objectivity) of utilities. The
subjective valuations which had been treated at least by
Classical economists was referred to as value-in-use to
distinguish it from exchange-value. For example, the
value of a good (wine) is the amount of any other good
(cheese) for which a unit of it is exchanged. The
reduction of the physical world to man's utility, this
"obtaining, increasing and maintaining the perfection of
things governed," is achieved by a two-fold division. 42
The first is the well-known division of labor, "so
rightly extolled by all economists," says B.W. Dempsey,
"for its promotion of efficiency. 1143 Relying upon st.
Thomas as his common source, he quotes:
Though there is in man a natural
inclination to gather together the
necessities of life • • • it is not
becoming that anybody whatever
should be occupied in this task.
Among the bees everybody is busy at
some function, certain ones collect
honey, certain ones build the homes
of wax, but the king-bees are not
busied in these tasks. So must it be
among men; because many things are
necessary for human life which one
man alone cannot supply for himself,
it is necessary that different
things be done by different people,
that some be farmers, some raise
cattle, some build buildings and so
of other things. 44
Parallel to this division of labor is the division
of resources serving the same end of "obtaining, in
creasing and maintaining the perfection" of things for
man's use. By this two-fold natural division "man effiPrudence, Providence and Economic Decision, p. 22.
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ciently reduces the face of the earth to its proper
providential place." From these divisions, indicates
B.W. Dempsey, arises a "pervasive interdependence." The
surpluses which are made possible by the efficiencies
occasioned by this two-fold specialization require that
men provide institutional arrangements for stable and
equitable exchange. "From these stable and equitable
exchanges arise communities, organic of economic interde
pendence" (F,319]. Broadening his scope, B.W. Dempsey
parallels and more profoundly expresses the above
thoughts, saying that "man draws from the earth its
providential powers, and dumb things fulfill the designs
of providence by serving rational men who efficiently use
the non-rational as scarce means45 to fulfill the ends
of providence, Divine and human."
Although the term exchange value seems to be falling
into disuse -- simply value today -- we shall retain it
for our peculiar purposes of distinguishing it from
subjective valuations (value-in-use), and from price.
Then, too, it is more indicative of our central problem
of explaining equivalence in Scholastic exchange.
In numerous places, B.W. Dempsey indicated that he
followed modern price theory. An exchange consists for A
and B of both a demand and supply; A demands Y and is
willing to supply X; B demands X and is willing to supply
Y. Without at this time embarking on the monetary aspect,
the transaction can be described as a simple purchase and
sale. A's demand for Y is his willingness to purchase a
certain quantity of Y at a certain ratio (value) in
exchange for supply x. B's supply of Y is his willingness
to sell a certain quantity of Y at a certain ratio
(value) in exchange demanding a certain quantity of x.
As soon as three goods are exchanged, the achieve
ment of an equivalence becomes more difficult. But
exchange is made possible by being made indirect.

Because men are rational, subordinated to the same
end by the same providence, men are coordinate to each
other. Thus
B. W. Dempsey would never consider using another man
simply and solely as a means to an end (Cf. I-II, q. 100,
a. 8, ad. 2 m). "It is always wrong for one man to use
another merely as a means to an end" [F,367).
45
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Example:

(A = wine
(B = cheese
(C = bread

A does not want cheese for its own sake, but he may
nevertheless exchange his wine for cheese, since he knows
that he can exchange the cheese for bread which he really
wants. In the example, cheese plays the role of a medium
of exchange, that is, facilitates the exchange of wine
and bread between A and c. It is acquired by A not for
its own sake, but for the sake of what can be bought with
it. No difference in theory arises when we enlarge the
circle of exchange by including more people and more
goods, by including goods of various disparate utilities
(e.g. shoes and houses) [F,394).
The name of money is given to a good which habitu
ally acts as the medium of exchange. As the circle of
exchange grows (market widens), as more and more people
with different scales of preference (different utilities
for goods) more dependence is placed on money as a medium
of exchange [F,395).
In spite of the immeasurability of utility, there is
a certain "quantification" of subjective evaluations.
Quantitative expression obtains when the need arises to
decide upon the worthwhileness of exchange. For instance,
A sees utility in his wine and in his neighbor's cheese
too. He judges the relative merits -- the utility of the
wine and cheese in his own mind -- "quantifies" his
subjective evaluations, with the result that he is ready
to enter into exchange transactions.
The difficulties of giving such quantitative ex
pression to his scale of subjective valuations (prefer
ence/utilities) are vastly increased when they are
problems any individual must, in reality, face. Such an
individual has a complex structure of a large number of
wants; he desires to achieve maximum satisfaction; and to
obtain this total utility (maximum satisfaction) he will
have to rearrange (substitute) his varied goods by means
of exchange with a large number of different people. But
if there is a generally accepted exchange medium -- money
-- he will be able to express his willingness to exchange
in terms of money. The same will hold true for all other
'individuals. They, too, will refer their exchangeable
goods to the common monetary denominator, and the
monetary evaluations of each can be compared with those
of the other.
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This is nothing new. B.W. Dempsey depended upon it
in his analysis; he did not see the need to explain in
detail. In any exchange act there is a transformation of
subjective valuations into objective quantitative
expression. This is made more easy, not different, when
exchange is indirect, especially when it is habitually
monetary exchange. When exchange does take place -- the
ratios having been reconciled -- it will be an exchange
of equi-valence, of exchange justice [F,395].
When actual exchange of goods takes place by the
parties, the equivalence, in the opinion of B.W. Dempsey,
benefits exchange justice, not distributive or a "datur
tertium, 11 sometimes called "economic justice. 1146 Nei
ther Aristotle nor St. Thomas had any difficulty in
assigning the transaction to exchange justice whenever
the two (or more) goods were comparable [F,400 fn.; 401).
Reciprocity47 (contrapassum) refers to the propor
tion (secundum proportionabilitatem) between the dif
ferent values of the· goods exchanged. Contrapassum or
reciprocity, therefore, is a requirement of proportion
ality necessary for all justice. Just reciprocity is a
proportional exchange of goods according to an equality
of value.
All justice requires equality. Buying-selling
requires a strict (arithmetic/proportional) equality. The
difficulty stated in question form is: how can this
equality in exchange be achieved with goods of unequal
value? The classic presentation of this difficulty of
trying to equate goods of unequal value is found in
Aristotle's Nicomachaen Ethics and st. Thomas' Commentary
on this passage.
To quote Aristotle:
Now proportionate return is secured by cross
conjunction. Let A be a builder, B a shoe
maker, C a house, D shoes.
46
Cf. John w. Baldwin, The Medieval Theories of the
Just Price (Philadelphia, The American Philosophical
Society, July 1959), p. 73-74.

47
"the idea of contrapassum (translated:
"retaliation, 11 but in most economic contexts probably
better translated "reciprocity") [F,399).
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Builder
A
C

House

Shoemaker
B
D

Shoes

The builder, then, must get from the shoemaker
the latter's work, and must himself give him
in return his own. If, first of all, there is
proportionate equality of goods, and then
reciprocal action takes place, the result we
mention will be effected.

st. Thomas, in his commentary on the above-quoted pas
sage, explains what is effected:
When the builder receives from the shoemaker
the latter's product, shoes namely, he must in
return give his own product. If, first of all,
equality is arrived at according to proportion
-- so that so many shoes on the one hand are
set against one house than the shoemaker does
in one pair of shoes -- then contrapassum is
established so that there is reciprocity, as
it is called, the builder receiving many shoes
equal to o,ne house and the shoemaker, one
house • •. •

Aristotle continues:

If not, the bargain is not equal, and does not
hold; for there is nothing to prevent the work
of one being better than that of the other:
they must therefore be equated. 48

once they have been equated -- so many shoes have the
value of one house -- simple exchange can take place.49
48

St. Thomas, commentary on Ethics, Bk.V, Lesson a.

4
9Modern economists, such as B. w. Dempsey, would
indicate that in exchange the tendency is to establish
that ratio at which the relative marginal utilities are
equal for the potential exchanges. In monetary exchange,
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Money equates goods whose value can be made com
parable. "Money, then, acting as a measure, makes goods
commensurate and equates them; for neither would there
have been association if there were not exchange, nor
exchange if there were not equality, nor equality if
there were not commensurability.50 Money is a commodity,
can be employed in a simple exchange. What is just is
what is simply equal in this kind of commutation. 51
• • • what was introduced for the common
utility ought not to bear harder on one party
than on the other, and therefore the contract
between them should rest upon an equality of
thing to thing. The quantity of a good which
comes into human use is measured by the price
given, for which purpose money was invented.52

and Aristotle:

For it is not two doctors that associate for
exchange, but a doctor and a farmer, or in
general people who are different and unequal;
but these must be equated. This is why all
things that are exchanged must be somehow
comparable. It is for this end that money had
been introduced, and it becomes in a sense an
intermediate. 53

Non-comparable goods cannot be exchanged in strict
equivalence. If two or more "goods" are not in a true
sense comparable, exchange justice which requires strict
such a tendency will persist and be generalized. In
indirect exchange, a uniform exchange ratio will be
arrived at, under given conditions, expressed in money;
it would in turn express the relative marginal utilities
for all the buyers and sellers.
50

Arist. Bk. V, Lesson 8.

51

S.T., II-II, q. 61, 4. c; q. 78, 4. c. et ad. 2 m.

52Ibid.,

q.

11.

1. c.

Arist., Bk. V, Lesson 8.

53
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equivalence is impossible. some other proportional
equality brings about that which is due, "equates" the
goods. Let Aristotle and St. Thomas express this thought:
• • • for in many cases reciprocity and rec
tificatory (exchange) justice are not in
accord, e.g. (1) if an official has inflicted
a wound, he should not be wounded in return,
and if some one has wounded an official, he
ought not to be wounded only, but punished in
addition.54
St. Thomas further elucidates:
• • • in exchange justice the equality of
goods in principally considered. But in
friendships based on utility the principal
consideration is of utility, and so recompense
ought to be according to the utility derived;
however, in buying, according to the equality
of the goods.55
B.W. Dempsey was well aware of the above problem. The
texts of Aristotle and St. Thomas quoted above he, too,
reproduced but did not explain. There seems to be a
certain puzzlement in his writing on these topics. For
instance, the distinction between comparable and non
comparable goods as a help to the understanding of
certain quotations, such as:
. • • for neither would there have been as
sociation if there were not exchange, nor
exchange if there were not equality, nor
equality if there were not commensurability.56
On this note we rest the matter.

54 Ibid,

B.V, Lesson 8.

S.T., II-II, q.77, 1, 3 m.

55

Arist., Bk. V., Lesson 8.

56
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B.

Just Price

"Goods endowed with utility for human needs and
possessed in surplus by persons wishing to exchange are
appraised in money at a price" [F,399). So far in this
dissertation, there has been a deliberate avoidance of
the term price. This suited our purpose and would have
suited B.W. Dempsey's for, as he would have character
istically remarked, "the treatment was not ready for it."
The price of a good is the number of units of money which
is given in exchange for one unit of the good [F,396).
Thus, the just exchange value of a good in terms of money
is the just price. But this, in turn, involves the
solution of a more fundamental problem, namely, how the
value of a commodity is determined [I,138-139). With a
multiplicity of buyers and sellers who are in communica
tion with one another, a uniform price will be estab
lished at which all exchanges, at any certain time, will
take place. With the aid of money, disparate subjective
valuations -- for example, between a house and a shoe -
can be reconciled [F,34-35). Assuming that buyers-sellers
are free to act as they choose, can contract (agree) with
one another freely, that is, they are in contact (commu
nication) with one another, there must be the physical
possibility of exchange. There must be knowledge on the
part of the buyers-sellers of the actions of others.
Modern economists, such as B.W. Dempsey, would refer to
the above as buyers and sellers in "perfectly competitive
market conditions."
Thus, it is in the market that
industrial subjective evaluations are transformed into
the objective prices.57
1.
Common Evaluations: How are individual subjective evaluations transformed into the objective market
price? How is the just price arrived at? This value in
an exchange, which in commutative justice must be an
57
Modern economists would point out that the market
for any individual good performs the function of estab
lishing equilibrium between all the subjective evalua
tions of that good. This equilibrium will be reached
when the marginal utility of the good in relation to that
of other goods is the same for all who possess it, and
when it is higher for those who have the good than for
those who have not.
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equality, is the result not of a special valuation of the
individual, but of the valuation of the whole community
(secundum communem aestimationem). Thus, the just price
is based neither on a value supposedly inherent in the
object, "nor upon an individual I s estimation, but is
rather 'the expression of the estimate of the community
on the value of a good offered in a market that is
genuinely fair, open, and without fraud'" [F,100].
The just price found in the market is to an in
dividual buyer or seller an objective price independent
of his own needs, wants, or utility he sees in the good.
While there is a powerful subjective element in estimat
ing the just price, the just price is independent of any
subjective judgments. This seeming contradiction or
paradox by which a price, depended upon and determined
subjectively by all, becomes subjective and independent
of each, needs further explanation. Many difficulties
have arisen and surrounded Scholastic just price doctrine
because of the confusion that this simple paradox
engendered. B.W. Dempsey clears up this common confusion
{I,149-151].
common evaluation establishes the just price. The
fact is incontrovertible that the just price discovered
in the market place depends not upon individual evalua
tion, but upon common evaluation. For example, an in
dividual may be in possession of an article of which he
has no need, sees no utility, does not want (i.e. medi
cine), and yet be pleasantly surprised to discover that
the article can justly command a price at the market. It
may be his (personal) subjective valuation that the
article is without utility, but not so the common es
timate or evaluation. "The just price, however, is not
determined to a precise point but consists in a certain
estimate."58 The common estimate or evaluation is the
resultant of a large number of subjective judgments of
the utility "seen" in the good. This estimation, while
considered to be subjective in origin, has an objective
basis insofar as the subject evaluation in the last
analysis must take into consideration the active physical
qualities of the good to be bought or sold. Notwithstand
ing its subjectivity or origin, in practice the price or
exchange value of the good is wholly objective for an
individual. B.W. Dempsey was always perfectly clear on
58

St. Thomas, S.T., II-II, q.77, 1.c.
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this point. In numerous places he quoted st. Thomas,
Lessius, Molina, and de Lugo, to show how Scholastic
writers themselves effected reconciliation. He was in
constant amazement that modern writers failed to recon
cile these subjective and objective elements. "The
inability to reconcile these apparently contradictory
points of view, namely that there is a powerful subjec
tive element in our evaluations, and yet that it is a
just price which is independent of any subjective judg
ments," says B.W. Dempsey wonderingly, "seems to be the
reason why modern writers of ability and authority are
led to make statements concerning the Scholastics' price
and value theory which are at variance with the truth to
the point of being bizarre" [F,418). In a clear analogy
B.W. Dempsey shows the reconciliation:
• the resultant of a large number of
personal judgments, the community estimate,
though partly subjective in origin and partly
objective, insofar as it is based on a con
sideration of the actual physical qualities of
the object for sale, is for me in practice
wholly objective. The matter is analogous to a
political election: my vote may have gone to
Mr. Douglas; the community estimate went for
Mr. Lincoln; though my subjective choice could
have been one of the factors determining the
election, the ultimate outcome, Mr. Lincoln's
presidency, is for me a wholly objective
consideration. Similarly, my estimate of the
worth of an object to me will be one of the
factors determining the community's estimate
which will determine the just price. Yet, that
just price, resultant of many objective and
subjective forces, once determined, is for me
a wholly objective fact.
B.W. Dempsey, in conclusion, has this further comment to
make:
Whatever may be the value of a com
munity to an individual for his
personal use, the values which are
to be equated in exchange are those
set up by common evaluation. This
and not the special evaluation of
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the individual, is the ruling one in
exchange [I,138).
Clearly, the just price is to be determined by the common
estimate of the buyers and sellers present in a market.
In this way, the price will neither exceed nor fall short
of the value of the goods and service. This is the just
price. Nowhere, beyond in the above, does St. Thomas
state precisely how the value of a good is to be ascer
tained. Certain factors are enumerated and referred to in
his treatment -- utility, scarcity and abundance, cost of
production -- that enter into the common estimate. What
the precise relationship of those constituent elements in
price formation are he does not deem to treat. such
treatment was left to modern Scholastics such as B.W.
Dempsey.
2.
Karlr:et con4itions: 59 The Scholastics assumed
that the market would be composed of a large number of
buyers and sellers who could not exert any individual but
only collective influence over price formation. The price
is independent of individual buyer's or seller's action
in the sense that each individual will regard the price
as given and adjust his actions accordingly. This
follows, notwithstanding the fact that the actions (sub
jective evaluations) of all buyers and sellers bring
about a certain price (objective exchange value), from
the assumptions·that all the buyers and sellers are in
communication with one another and that none of them
controls a large proportion of the demand and supply
[F,426).

This commonly derived price of the market does not
cause hardship to the buyer. He need not buy, if the
price is higher than the utility (his subjective ap
praisal); he may buy, even if the price (common objective
appraisal) is lower than his personal appraisal. Nor does
a price arrived at by common appraisal of all cause
hardship to the seller, since he need not sell, if he
judges the price too low; he may sell, if he judges the
price higher than he considers the good is worth. The
private knowledge of some individuals does not change the
common opinion and valuation. This remains even if the
9This section endeavors to collate and summarize
material in F,396-406; F,420-430; I,130-140; F,148-160.
5
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buyer or seller thinks the price imprudently low or high,
or he has advance knowledge of a change in supply or
price. This is common Scholastic knowledge. B.W. Dempsey
collates and orders, but does not further this doctrine
[I,149-151].
Since exchange is intended for the common utility of
both the buyer and seller,60 as was seen in the last
section, the just price should correspond (be equivalent)
to the exchange value of the good, and not to the utility
of the good for the buyer. The buyer will not buy unless
his subjective valuation of the good (utility he consid
ers to be in the good) is equal or greater, in turn,
unless he values the useful commodity of money he
receives in exchange for his good as high or higher than
the market price [F,399]. The seller can take the price
which he discovers in the market,61 even though he
values the good at less. Since he is selling at a present
and not a future price, he can assume that the market
price is the just price, even though he knows that the
advent of subsequent sellers will depress the price
[I,229; F,393].
When there is no known price, the buyer and seller
must arrive at a price by a sort of estimate. Some
latitude is allowed for error in either direction. Still,
the seller cannot ask more than he thinks the good is
worth -- utility of the good -- allowing for a reasonable
profit. At no time is the seller allowed to take advan
tage of the buyer. Caveat Emptor is a fallacious princi
ple. Nor, for that matter, is the buyer permitted to take
advantage of the seller. "The need of the buyer is not
something that the seller has for sale and, therefore, he
may not charge for it" [F,398] • 62
We have already seen that a good could be sold at a
higher price if its utility was enhanced. This could come
about through greater labor effort to produce the
good, 63 through improvement of the article, or through
considerable risks to transport it from place to place.
�S.T., II-II, q.77, a.1.
Ibid., q. 77, a. 3.

61

Ibid., q. 77, a. 1. c.

62
63

St. Th., II-II, q. 77, a. 4, ad. 2; a. 3 and 4.
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Also, a good might sell for more if it became more scarce
-- there are fewer rather than more sellers. In the
present {short-run), the Scholastics assuming a certain
good already supplied with a certain utility, the
exchange-value (price) would be determined by utility and
scarcity (demand and supply). In the hie et nunc {short
run), the Scholastics, therefore, would maintain that
price was determined by demand and supply in the market.
An excess of demand over supply raises the price; an
excess of supply over demand lowers it. The price which
is determined by demand and supply is the just price.
This price closely corresponds to the market price
of the Classical school. In Classical analysis, the price
which is determined by demand and supply is the market
price; while the cost-determined equilibrium price, to
which there exists a long-run tendency, is the natural
price. The market price is sometimes higher and sometimes
lower than the natural price. Scholastic thinking, too,
seems to approximate this market price of the short-run
based on utility and scarcity, and the natural price of
the long-run based on cost of production. But this is
implicitly, not explicitly expressed by Scholastics.
The modern competitive price and the Classical
natural price, in the opinion of B.W. Dempsey, are more
or-less the same as the just price of Scholastic analy
sis; the level to which the price of a good tends "in the
long-run" in modern analysis is what the Classical
economists simply call competition. But there are
differences.
In the perfect competition of modern theory, usually
perfect foresight, and hence no risk, is assumed. The
Scholastics, being much closer to the practical order of
the.daily market, did not assume perfect foresight and
hence risk was important as a determinant of exchange
value (price). Also, because of the lack of perfect
foresight and hence the presence of risk, the Scholastics
more readily thought of the common estimate (just price)
as more variable. Even if monopolistic elements could be
excluded from the market, the Scholastics, because of
this risk, would at times fall back on legal price fixing
and the judgment of a good man to achieve a just price.
Thus, while the Scholastic just price does approximate
the modern competitive price, it should not be identified
with such.
Nor should Scholastic just price and Classical
market price (in the short-run) and natural price (in the
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long-run} be looked upon as more than close approx
imations. There was a world of difference in their
economic philosophy. The Scholastics did not expect an
invisible hand or laissez faire policy to automatically
achieve a competitively free market. Their economic
philosophy called for cooperation of individuals to work
for this common good of a free market according to the
principle of subsidiarity. At times, to keep a market
free from the unwanted influence of either the buyers or
sellers, even legal price-fixing might be necessary. B.W.
Dempsey clearly states this philosophical difference:
The chief difference between Schol
astic just price and Classical nat
ural price is that the liberals
believed their deistic Providence
fair
markets
constituted
automatically through the magic of
competition, no matter how hard man
tried to make them unfair. The
guildsmen believed that men were the
sons of Adam as well as of God and
that the accomplishment of the de
signs of Providence required the
sedulous application of human reason
as well as cooperation with divine
grace [F,100].
3.

coat of Production:

The value of things exchanged and the price
expressing this value are subject to all the
circumstances of time, place and supply that
modern economists recognize. The basis of
value and its ultimate common denominator is
utility, that is•, human need; but, once there
has been established the demand based on human
need, the principal determinant of value will
be outlay and expense, especially labor cost
[F,405].

Justification for placing emphasis on cost of production
is more understandable for the Scholastics than the
Classical economists. Considering the fairly stable
economy of the Scholastic period under conditions of
legal and guild regulation in a relatively static econ-
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omy, there is more justification for Scholastics em
phasizing cost of production as a price determinant than
for the Classicists. Still, at no time did the Scholas
tics teach that costs of production (e.g. labor costs)
were the sole determinants of price [F,427-428). Some
times the Scholastics seemed to emphasize the necessity
of knowing cost, neglecting somewhat for the moment
demand considerations in the description of price
determination. This only occurs when a long-run not a
short-run situation is under consideration. This neglect
of demand considerations in the description of the level
to which price tends in the long run would be justified
only in the event of constant costs for the industry. In
an economy (e.g. Medieval economy) that is fairly static
and the supply being fairly static, the costs would tend
to be fairly constant.
By constant costs for the industry, modern econom
ists refer to horizontal industry -- cost curves showing
identical unit costs and identical supply price for all
conceivable rates of output. Under constant cost condi
tions, a change in demand would change industry output,
not price. But with sloping industry cost curves and thus
sloping industry supply curves (e.g. modern economies)
unit costs would depend on output. The cost at the margin
would then depend on how much is produced, and this in
turn on demand. The price is determined by the intersec
tion of demand and supply, because in a competitive
market the price-is the device by which demand and supply
become equated with each other. But only if the supply
curve is horizontal (constant costs) does cost alone
determine the price. If the supply curve is not horizon
tal, the relevant marginal industry cost and the price
depend on where demand intersects with supply. They
depend on demand as well as on supply.
While the Scholastics recognized costs as contri
buting to price formation, at no time did they exclude
demand considerations. Emphasis on one or the other is
not exclusion of either. Here we indicate emphasis, not
an attempt to force the Scholastics into a mold or false
dichotomy of contrasting price determination by demand
and supply (in the short-run) with price determination by
cost (in the long-run). Surely this is a false division.
Behind supply there are cost considerations in the short
run as well as in the long-run, although cost functions
differently in the short-run (some costs are fixed) than
in the long-run (all costs are variable) [Cf.I,151-54).
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Moreover, demand necessarily enters into the de
termination of exchange value (price) in both the short
and the long run, unless consistent costs prevail in
dustry-wide. Modern economic analysis holds that in both
the short and long-run, demand and supply determines
exchange value (price) , and that the relationship between
cost and supply and the role of demand will be different
in the short run from what obtains in the long-run. The
Scholastics made no clear explicit distinction between
the short and long run; B.W. Dempsey did. However, they
did recognize that costs were present under both "condi
tions." By their emphasis, they did realize that costs
had a different relationship to demand and supply in the
"long-run. 11 There was no further explanation of this
difference. Such a formal theory was not needed for their
purposes of explaining the just price. Of course, there
was awareness that something must be known about demand
(or some equivalent of it) as well as about cost to iden
tify price. But this part of the problem was not treated
to our modern satisfaction, or to B.W. Dempsey's, in any
phase of the Scholastic period:
We must be content to say of the late medieval
moralist that his theory of economic value
allows weight to all the principal objective
and subjective factors of cost and utility and
that price formation on the subjective-objec
tive market analysis was well understood but
had not yet been fully fused into a system
[I,154).
It is beyond doubt that B.W. Dempsey recognized
costs as an important factor in price formation. It is
hard to see in his reference to certain Scholastics "how
one can . . • appeal to the cost principle as an element
in the estimation of the common price and still deny it
some place in the theory of value" [I,153). In his
perusal of the Scholastics, B.W. Dempsey gives Lessius
the most credit for "coming closest to an integrated
statement" on cost:
One may charge a higher price by reason of
labor and expense which one has undergone in
getting, transporting, and storing goods; that
is, if goods have not a price set for them. If
they have, then the merchant can take account
of extraordinary expenses in the setting of
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the price at the time when it is first fixed,
as we see in the case of goods brought through
dangerous places where there is need of mili
tary escort against freebooters. But his is
not to be understood of expenses incurred by
reason of misfortune or imprudence. The case
is different if goods already have their own
price at which they are generally sold; then
the merchant is bound to sell at that price or
to keep the goods • • . But in arriving at a
price of this kind account has already been
taken of the expenses which are ordinarily and
unusually incurred. But if the merchant's
expenses have been greater, that is his hard
luck, and the common price may not be in
creased for that reason, just as it need not
be decreased even if he had no expense at all.
This is the merchant's situation; just as he
can make a profit if he has small expenses, so
he can lose if his expenses are very large or
extraordinary.
B.W. Dempsey considered that cost was not sufficiently
integrated in the analysis of Scholastics (not that he
himself joined them in this inadequacy). He deplored that
an integrated price theory had not emerged from Scholas
tic economic thought. "If Molina had been a little less
severe with scotus," asserts B.W. Dempsey, "the latter's
cost theory, plus the ideas on income of Alburtus Magnus
with which Scotus was_perfectly familiar, could have been
made into a rounded system. Had these ideas been refined
by employing the superior knowledge of the later writers
on •the actual price-forming factors in the market, a
complete system of social equilibrium could have been
developed" [I,154).
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Ill'l'EREST .um USURY
I.

THB PROBLBK 01' Ill'l'EREST
A.

Antecedents of Interest Analysis

Undoubtedly, B.W. Dempsey achieved his finest piece
of scholarly work in his research and disserta-tion
writing on interest and usury. With the leisure that he
never again had purely for research and original scholarship, here he made his finest contribution to
economic thought. Highest praise came from scholars in
this most difficult economic field, concerning both his
competence in modern interest theory and in medieval
usury analysis. His scholarly competence lies not only
1)

in his recognized analysis of modern -- Wick
sell 1 -- Fisher2 -- Schumpeter3 -- theories of
interest;

2)

in his painstaking research to accurately
rediscover Scholastic doctrine:

3)

in the comparison he then makes between the
moderns and medievals, especially Lugo-Molina
Lessius; 4

4)

but, finally, above all, in his own peculiar
synthesis of interest analysis.

As is usual in his thought, his own interest doctrine is
evident throughout his writings. In no one place does he
formally present his own complete thought on this
subject.
B.W. Dempsey• s doctoral dissertation,
titled
Interest and Usury, was almost at once chosen for
1
Wicksell I, 7-40; also Mises, I, 48 ff.; Hayek, I,
50 ff.
2

Fisher, I, 74 ff.

3

Schumpeter, I, 63-74; also Keynes, I, 96 ff.

4

Lugo-Molina-Lessius, I, pp. 130-185 incl.
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publication by the American Council of Public Affairs.
Later it was translated into several languages. Recently,
this same treatise which had become a standard work in
the field has again been reprinted. Joseph Schumpeter,
the distinguished writer of the introduction to Interest
and Usury was unstinting in his praise:
He [B.W. Dempsey] worked out what really
amounts to a treatise on modern interest
theory before presenting his interpretation of
that of the Schoolmen. This treatise, covering
almost half of the pages of his book, has in
fact a value of its own quite independent of
the comparison that follows it [I,VIII].
Joseph Schumpeter remained steadfast in his opinion
written before the Second World War, with the result of
recently again recommending Interest and usury as a book
that "combines to a degree that is quite exceptional,
thorough familiarity with Scholastic thought and with
economic theory, so that the interested reader may be
referred to it with confidence." 5 Nor was he chary in
his plaudits for B.W. Dempsey's "rich doctrinal develop
ment" and "satisfactory" treatment of Scholastic doc
trine.6 Another well-known economist, Dr. Joseph Solter
er, writing in the American Economic Review7 , recognized
"Father Dempsey as a scholar pompetent in the field of
economics as well as Scholastic philosophy." Furthermore,
he comments on his scholarly courage of entering "the
twilight zone between ethics and economics.by way of com
paring interest theories of selected Scholastics with
those of the eminent moderns in this field." Working from
his.lifetime premise that sound economic policy must be
right and just, B.W. Dempsey toiled to reconcile these
two approaches, one modern, one medieval. Pointing out
that the purpose of the "medieval writer" was to scan the
facts, "to see what, given such and such conditions, was
right and just" in comparison with that of the "modern
Joseph Shumpeter, History of Economic Analysis, pp.
95-96.
5

Ibid. 1 p. 104.

6

Vol. 34, 1944; p. 143.

7
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writer" who looks at the facts "to see what will be sound
policy," B.W. Dempsey was fully confident that there was
no incompatibility between them. Not that he did not
think this involved 11 a difference in emphasis that is
quite important" [I, 1]. Keenly aware but not deterred
that the "Schoolman" late and early stressed his pre
occupation with justice and equity" in contrast to the
"current academic decorum [which] frowns upon an urgent
concern with what ought to be rather than what is." His
own motivation for his thorough study of the "best" of
the medieval and modern interest and usury theorists can
be succinctly expressed in his own words, "that zeal for
social reform must be based upon a good working knowledge
of the system to be reformed if the zeal is to be
effective" [F,49].
Ably he defends his "representative samples" of late
medieval usury analysis
Lugo-Molina-Lessius
carefully chosen by him for his own exposition of medi
eval usury doctrine.8 While never denying the appro
priateness of the above three as "representative" of
medieval usury analysis, he himself was content in later
writings to depend almost completely on st. Thomas Aquinas.9
8

Interest and Usury, pp. 114-129.

8
Cf. His analysis of St. Th. II-II, q.78 in The
Functional Economy, pp. 408-411; the writing of articles
entitled: "Property Rights" and "Money Price and Credit"
[Vol. iii, Summa Theologiae, St. Thomas Aquinas (New
York: Benzinger, 3 vols, 1948] afforded B. w. Dempsey an
opportunity to make a more profound study of st. Thomas
Aquinas. His "rediscovery" made him of the opinion that
st. Thomas Aquinas furnished a "complete but compressed
treatment of social principles" and that later scholastic
authors added by way of application but little principle.
A clue to his early preoccupation (before 1948) with
later Scholastics rather than st. Thomas Aquinas, is
indicated by his warning to users of the Summa Theologi
ae:
"the treatment is, therefore, complete but com
pressed; radical principles, laid down with the greatest
economy of expression, must be read with care lest the
brevity lead us to believe that the subjects treated are
not important." Furthermore, "it would be impossible,
therefore, as well as idle, to attempt to follow st.
Thomas' thought in the Summa without using those other
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In modern interest theory, after ample analysis of
the chief moderns, 10 he fell back upon Wicksell-Fisher
Schumpeter, regarding "the writings of these three. • . as
the foundation of a distinctively modern theory of
interest and prices" [I,187). As B.W. Dempsey himself
expresses it, the "author of this study has sought in the
case of each writer to indicate those principles which
are at once most basic and most characteristic. 11 Thought
fully, he adds, "this prevents the presentation of a
detailed theory."
Even a cursory reading and study of B.W. Dempsey's
writings on interest and usury, makes it abundantly clear
that he possesses in his own mind a comprehensive
integrated interest doctrine. Following his own dictum as
a directive that "order is unity in variety, not unifor
mity" 11, in no place does B. W. Dempsey spel 1 out his
complete and systematized thought on interest and usury.
In this section, it is our task to orderly reproduce his
thought in substance, though not in detail. In this way
can be demonstrated not only the contribution of his
peculiar synthesis of interest and usury doctrine, but
that contribution of his in the form of a unique analysis
and comparison that he made of medieval and modern
analysis before development of his own recognized
original contributions.
B.

Foundations of Interest Analysis

B.W. Dempsey began his study of interest, as he
seemingly did every major problem in econoi:nics, from "the
central role of choice in the economic process." For him
the prime economic problem of the individual and society
is �hat of "utilizing comparatively scarce resources in
such a way as to yield maximum satisfaction" [ F,26) .
Sketching the commonplace in his background for interest

writings of his, chiefly the Commentaries on the Ethics
and the Politics, to which he so freely refers [Cf.,
F,166).
1°For example, B. W.
Dempsey devotes one entire
chapter [I,88 ff.] to John Maynard Keynes' interest
theories.

Social Order, Vol. 5, April, 1955, p. 159.
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treatment, he indicates that in facing this problem of
choice, "man, more or less consciously, ranges his
multiple wants into an order of importance. In so doing,
he is guided on the side of cost by two correlative
principles, the absolute or real cost involved, and the
relative or opportunity cost" [F,27). Thus, men who have
practically unlimited needs are confronted with a limited
quantity of resources, both human and material, with
which to satisfy their needs. Man is, therefore, under
the "necessity of arranging both his needs and resources
on a scale of desirability in making the best combination
that he can" [F,29].
Combining the theory of choice with the notion of
capital, B.W. Dempsey is in a position to illustrate
saving as a cost as an important foundation for the
understanding of his interest analysis. "Capital,"
according to B.W. Dempsey, involves two things: "First,
saving, at least in the sense of some curtailment of
consumption or leisure, and secondly, the fabrication of
tools or instruments into its more efficient form." He
adds that, at least in the beginning of this process,
"some expenditure of time" is involved (F,24-25].
Following Schumpeter in his classic Theory of
Economic Development, B.W. Dempsey traces this out within
the circular flow of incomes. Within this circular flow,
choice is not, therefore, only between two courses of
current consumption, that is, to spend more on clothes
and less on food, but also between present and future
consumption, that is, to spend less now in order to spend
more then. The choice becomes whether to spend (consume)
or not-spend (save). The very problem of saving (not
spending) is the making of the decision "as to how much
of my income I will enjoy now, and how much of the
enjoyment I will postpone" [F,29]. Evidently, a person or
a community that consumed all of its resources, that is,
saved nothing, would be a very poor community. Thus, the
advantages of capital, that is, "saved-up and worked-on
resources" [F,196], are so compellingly obvious that all,
even the most primitive people, do some saving.
When income in the form of money is considered " the
process, though obscured, is fundamentally the same." For
a community to spend all its income on current consump
tion will not raise the standard of living, as "the
resources of the community will be wholly devoted to the
production of consumer goods which, because of the lack
of capital equipment and the resulting low level of
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efficiency and the big demand, will be high in price"
[F,30].
The economic status of the individual in organized
society today is largely determined by his command over
purchasing power, that is, over this income flow. Such
command is acquired by rendering services -- 11 labor
service or the ability to organize and direct business
activity" -- for which wages and salaries are the reward.
Those who own land may work it or lease it and thus
derive an income, a flow of purchasing power, from the
rental. Those who have accumulated wealth by saving or by
inheritance may either themselves employ it at a profit,
or may lend it out to others at interest for productive
purposes. Obviously, interest is a value phenomenon and
an element in price. Not only the services rendered by
labor, enterprise and land, but by capital, are primary
sources of purchasing power for their owners in the form
of wages, profits, rent and interest.

c.

Xntereat Within the Circular Plow

Before considering the phenomenon of interest in
detail, it would be well to see how B.W. Dempsey, again
following Schumpeter, included interest's place in the
circular flow. Private property is now to be coupled with
the theory of choice, capital and saving as cost.
If entr�preneurs were in a position to com
mandeer the producers' goods which they need
to carry their ,new plans into effect, there
would still be entrepreneur's profit but no
part of it would have to be paid out by them
as interest. Nor would there be any motive for
them to consider part of it as interest on the
capital they expend. 12
Interest must be paid because the entrepreneur
must call in the capitalist to help him remove
the obstacle which private property in means
of production, or the right to dispose freely

Joseph Schumpeter, op.cit., p. 177.
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of one I s
[I,69] • 13

services,

puts

in

their

way"

If an entrepreneur has control over the "balances"
through saving with which to acquire commodities and
services, he may buy these commodities and services and
if they prove productive gain a profit. But if an entr
epreneur has no right over specific purchasing power due
to it being in possession (the private property) of
another or others, he removes this obstacle by becoming
a borrower at a price. The price paid by the entrepreneur
(borrower) for "a social permit to acquire commodities
and services without having previously fulfilled the
condition which in the institutional pattern of capital
ism is normally set on the issue of such a social permit"
is called interest [I,71]. Interest, therefore, is a
payment for balances with which to acquire commodities
and services, not for the commodities and services that
may be bought with the balances. "Goods are bought and
sold; money is lent and borrowed" [I,74]. These commodi
ties and services themselves do not give interest, but
give rent and wages. Understandably, now, is the follow
ing quotation from B.W. Dempsey in reference to the
"missing capitalist."
In a communistic society interest does not
exist, for the reason that the agent for which
interest is paid simply would not exist in a
communistic community. Though wages and rents
as such would not be paid in a communistic
economy, the services of land and labor would
still be present; but not so with interest"
[I,69].
B.W. Dempsey makes this Schumpeterian approach his own
when he states positively that a cost-reducing innovation
is "a source of true profits, and the profits are a
source from which interest can be paid" [F,160]. Follow
ing Schumpeter, under the more severe conditions of the
circular flow, "profits" go to the entrepreneur, with
interest acting as a tax on those profits. In a socialist
economy, the entrepreneurial state may achieve in a sense
a "profit" if the commodities and services over which it
13Joseph

Schumpeter, op. cit., p. 181.
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has control are productive. Since the state is already
the "capitalist, 11 there is no "tax on profits;" the
capitalist agent is not separate but already the state,
and so no separate agent exists who needs to be paid for
the "right" or "title" or "social permit" to his property
in the form on interest. Thus, there can be no interest
in the socialist state. B.W. Dempsey does not follow
Wicksell, who in his theoretical apparatus admits the
possibility of the entrepreneurs holding interest gains
in the form of goods. B.W. Dempsey follows Schumpeter, so
that with the assistance of capital equipment, innova
tional acts of the entrepreneur result in "profits," with
interest acting as a tax on those profits [cf., I,87
n.62], providing the entrepreneur (borrower) and capital
ist agent (lender) are functionally separate. Economists
realize that some price must be put on the use of capital
goods in order to ration them, whether the. initial price
paid be referred to as "profits" or "interest." Entrepre
neurs use capital goods and from them hope to gain a
profit. If part of this profit must be paid to another
who owns the capital equipment, B.W. Dempsey, following
Schumpeter, designates this "tax on profits" as interest.
D.

The Analysis of Interest

B.W. Dempsey examined the economic process (and in
doing so made what is tantamount to an exposition of the
economic process) in both its components and in the
sequence of its operations. His treatment of the economic
process in its operations -- production, distribution,
exchange, consumption -- although traditional, in a short
space contains a surprising number of keen insights that
could be associated with a keen professional economist
(one who has the habit of his science in an eminent
degree) ; yet, as it is not germane to our Eresent
purposes, it is being mentioned only in passing. 4

Cf. F, 51 ff. for fuller treatment of the opera
tions of the economic process.
14
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In a static economy: In its components, the
1.
economic process is conceived by B.W. Dempsey 15 as
unfolding in an isolated, contained or unchanging com
munity "where private property prevails and a system of
economic organization has been developed with a division
of labor and free competition" [F,354). In this economy
everyone lives in each economic period (cycle) on goods
produced in the preceding period.
s.w. Dempsey points out that "the market possibilities16
of the community are known by experience to all producers
and annual production moves in a well-defined customary
round" [I, 63] . If this whole income-output-income of the
community is assumed to occur annually and that with each
"resuming round the fruit of the employment of permanent
sources of productive powers seeks to reach the same
consumer, 11 a complete circular flow results. Having drawn
this above treatment directly from Joseph Schumpeter,
s.w. Dempsey succinctly completes the round through the
following salient quotation: "the sellers of all commodi
ties appear again as buyers in sufficient measure to
acquire those goods which will maintain their consumption
and their product! ve equipment in the next economic
period at the level so far allowed and vice versa"
[F,354-355; I,63).v
In such an unchanging circular flow of economic
activity, the economy of itself would evoke nothing new
because, as experience shows, there would be "no impulse
to spontaneous change on purely economic grounds" [I,64] •
Reflecting upon such a static economy, B.W. Dempsey
After critical appraisal [cf. r, 63 ff.] B. w.
Dempsey's treatment as discovered in various of his
writings follows very closely his former mentor, Joseph
Schumpeter. To see the full extent of this dependence,
consult Joseph A. Schumpeter, Theory of Economic Devel
opment. B. w. Dempsey perused the first German edition,
1911.
15

In F,354 it reads market "responsibilities," but
from his treatment elsewhere this surely should read
"possibilities" not "responsibilities."
16

1 7Joseph

A. Schumpeter, Theory of Economic Devel
opment (Harvard University Press, 1936), p. a (First
German Edition, 1911).
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further contended that "net profit (strictly so-called)
cannot exist, for the reason that alternative opportuni
ties of investment being non-existent, all relevant
knowledge of the customary methods of production is
available and common to all producers, and therefore, in
general, no surplus above the value of producers' goods
can be attained because all sources of surplus are
exhausted in competitive pricing (F,355].
Nor can, of course, that "tax on profit" -- interest
-- exist. Costs can be considered not only as opportuni
ties foregone, but as the sum total of expenses. If costs
are treated as the sum-total of expenses, then "total
price for all genuine actual expenses (the personal
services of the business man and the rents on property he
owns included) must always equal the receipts obtained
for the products" [F,355].
In an economy whose normal course flourishes
year in and year out through familiar, well
worn channels, what grounds can there be for
systematic undervaluation of means of produc
tion as compared with products?. Competition
on the one hand and imputation on the other
must annihilate any surplus of receipts over
outlays, any excess of the value of the prod
uct over the value of the services of the land
and labor involved in it.18
Thus, the economy in this theoretically perfect form
operates with no profit, not, that is, without results,
but without any income or surplus not imputable and
imputed to the primary factors of production.
· At this juncture, we follow B.W. Dempsey in his
paraphrasing of an important paragraph from Joseph
Schumpeter•s work.19 No given sum can possibly obtain a
larger sum in an economy that "perfectly follows the
circular flow long enough for the market to be adjusted
to perfect equilibrium" (F,355,356]. No matter how any
hundred monetary units worth of resources (including
management) are employed within the commonly known and
Joseph Schumpeter, Theory of Economic Development,
p. 160, (quoted in I,64].
18

19

Ibid., p. 190.
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customary possibilities, "you can obtain from them no
receipts greater than exactly one hundred units."
You may apply any hundred monetary units to
whichever of the existing possibilities of
production you wish, but you will always
receive for the resulting product no more -
possibly less, however
than a hundred
monetary units.
continuing, B.W. Dempsey concludes that this is "pre
cisely" the essential characteristic of the equilibrium
position; it represents the "best" combination -- under
the given conditions the widest sense -- of the produc
tive forces.
In this static economy -- an economy without deve
lopment of new products, organization, or sources of
supply20 -- the services of the factors of production,
such as land and labor, available with the hundred mone
tary units would yield a product not more than a hundred
monetary units. This would hold true even when these
services were applied to the most lucrative production in
the economy. Now, B.W. Dempsey is ready to draw some
important conclusions concerning interest in a static
economy, "an economy without development."
B.w. Dempsey defines money capital as: "a sum of
means of payment which is available at any moment for
transfer to entrepreneurs to enable them to gain control
over concrete goods" [I,66]. But from his definition he
persuasively argues that in an economy without develop
ment there is no "capital" in the sense he uses here21
and then his all important conclusion: since there is no
capital in a static economy, "there is no interest in the
sense of a permanent income, constantly present in the
economy, obtainable for the use of loan funds" [I,66].
Since there can be no loan in such an economy which
will "positively and permanently enrich both borrower and
lender, 11 there can be no true interest in such an
20 cf.

F,356.

cf. F,24-25, 193; W,113-115, 119, 245; on the
nature of capital: also Chapter IV, "The Functional
Wage," for a more extensive treatment.
21
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economy. The attempt to demand such a return is altogeth
er impossible.

2.
In a Dynaaic Bconomy: Wishing to be perfectly
clear, B.W. Dempsey categorically states that, while "the
static economy knows no productive interest, this is not
the same thing as denying the existence of interest in a
modern economy" (F,359 J • "Interest, 11 he says, 11 is the
child of development, and only with developments can it
appear and endure." In an almost literary manner, B.W.
Dempsey sweeps us along his path of argument. "Into the
economic tranquility of the established circular flow
enters the entrepreneur with his development" [I,66).
This entrepreneur, analytically regarded by B.W. Dempsey
closely following Joseph Schumpeter, is a person of
highly specialized function." He is the innovator, the
spearhead of progress-- only this and nothing more. He is
not, as entrepreneur, possessed of resources or money
capital, but he possesses the big idea -- the new
economic combination which will enable his enterprise,
once launched, to break into the closed circular flow by
offering more for less and still be able to show a margin
of profit because of the cost-reducing superiority of the
innovation" (I,66). For this statement of the explanation
of interest, B.W. Dempsey does not take credit for
himself, but quotes with fullest approbation from
"Schumpeter' s brilliant essay, a truly entrepreneurial
feat in economic analysis" [F,360).
For the prices o_f the means of production were
not determined with regard to this employment,
but only with regard to the previous uses.
Here, then, the possession of a sum of money
is the means of obtaining a bigger sum. On
this account and to this extent, a present sum
will be normally valued more highly than a
future sum. Therefore, present sums of money - so to speak as potentially bigger sums -
will have a value premium which will also lead
to a price premium. And in this lies the
explanation o:t interest.22

Joseph Schumpeter, op. cit., p. 190 (italics in
the original); F,358; I,66-67].
22
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In close paraphrase, we follow B.W. Dempsey's
analysis of under what circumstances "a surplus is ipso
facto realized," and thus interest. The entrepreneur as
entrepreneur has no means of initiating his new depar
ture. Resources must be drawn from industry in general
and, thus, to divert them, the entrepreneur in a modern
economy must have resources to credit. If the following
three conditions are fulfilled, states B.W. Dempsey, the
new enterprise will show a place for itself in a new
equilibrium position. The three conditions are {F,67):
a) the price of the product must not fall in
the face of the new supply, or at least not
fall so far as to offset the net product
gained per worked;

b) the costs of the new combination must be
less than the cost of the resources dispensed
with, or less than the total revenue after
deduction for the possible drop in price;

c) the advance in price induced by the added
demand for raw materials must not, with the
passage of time, come to effect the margin
left by the first and second conditions.

Interest, therefore, may become "a permanent net income
flowing to a definite class or category of persons within
the economy. 11 Under dynamic conditions (conditions of
development), the economist must find for true interest
a source from which it flows -- some value exists from
which it is a drawn; a basis on which it may be imputed
to some type of contribution to production; and an
assurance of its continued existence as a distinct source
of income -- the cause of the endurance of the flow {Cf.
I,68-69).

II.

TD PROBLEM OJI' USURY
A.

Money Barren in Itself

With exchange comes the introduction of money,
with money, the question of price, and of just
price specifically. With the question of just
price comes the question of the just price of
money, that is, of usury {F,392).
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An exposition of B.W. Dempsey's views on value and
money insofar as they are pertinent to a discussion of
money must, of course, treat the question of the ster
ility or productivity of money. There is no question that
B.W. Dempsey considered money in itself barren or
sterile, nor does he base the sterility or unfruitfulness
of money "on a dictum of Aristotle. 11 "Though Aristotle is
a respected authority," he says, "I find no reference to
that dictum of his that money was a sterile thing"
[I,107]. B.W. Dempsey's own studies of the writings of
Wicksell-Fisher-Schumpeter, whom he "regarded as the
foundation of a distinctly modern theory of interest and
prices" [I,187], authoritatively told him that money in
itself was a barren thing. Summing up his findings, B.W.
Dempsey states unequivocally that "since 1890, when
writers of as great authority as Knut Wicksell have,
without blushing, again proclaimed the importance of the
fact that money of itself is unequivocally barren, there
is no need to explain or apologize for the alleged short
comings of Aristotle and Aquinas" [F,407). Yet his own
ultimate argument for the barrenness of money was from
reason and not "respected" authority. His own reasoning,
falling under contracts, was succinct, brief and through
illustration:
If I lend you a durable good, a tool, or a
draft horse, the ownership can be distin
guished from the user, and I can charge you
for the use while retaining the ownership. In
the case of goods that cease to exist with
their first use, bread, for example, or wine,
I cannot charge you for the use while retain
ing the ownership. I can sell you the wine,
but if I lend it to you, I can ask for nothing
more in return than the value of it. Money
evidently belonged in this second category,
being good for nothing but to be spent. There
fore, to charge a price for its use as dis
tinct from its ownership was an obvious viola
tion of justice [F,100].
There can be no question that money in itself was
considered unfruitful, but the phrase "in itself" which
B.W. Dempsey consistently italicized must be interpreted
very strictly. A loan of money may confer obvious
advantages, but "that advantage does not arise from the
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money itself, except insofar as it is subject to the
borrower's industry and the borrower's risks." For
example, a person who has stolen an article which is non
productive in itself, for instance, money, "may still be
entitled to any gain made by the possession, though bound
to return the article, or its equivalent value. 11 The
reason, B.W. Dempsey indicates, is that "things of this
sort are not productive in themselves but only insofar as
they are subject to the industry of the business man."
continuing, "money thus subject to the business man I s
activity and diligence undergoes a change in value
relative to money not so placed." Money, therefore, in
itself, is not a productive good; but, "as far as this
principle is concerned, the circumstances in which money
can be considered by and in itself may be very rare or
very frequent" [I,158].
B.

Kutuwa as Transfer of ownership

In B.W. Dempsey's later works, he more and more
showed a dependence upon st. Thomas. In st. Thomas• own
summary he found an adequate summary of his own views or
doctrine on usury. Particularly, he was "pleased" to
quote, analyze, sharply defend, and use as a summary of
his own views, the "central doctrine" found in one
article in the Summa Theologiae of st. Thomas.23 It
having become an integral part of B.W. Dempsey's thinking
on usury, we too shall quote the entire "corpus" of the
article for subsequent reference and useful purposes:
To take usury for money lent is unjust in
itself, because this is to.sell what does not
exist; and this evidently leads to inequality,
which is contrary to justice. In order to make
this evident, we must observe that there are
certain things whose use consists in their
consumption. Thus we consume wine when we use
it for drink, and we consume wheat when we use
it for food. Wherefore, in such like things
the use of the thing must not be reckoned
apart from the thing itself, and whoever is
granted the use of the thing is granted the
23
st. Thomas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, q.78, art.1,
ad corpus: F,407.
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thing itself; and for this reason to lend
things of this kind is to transfer the owner
ship. Accordingly, if a man wanted to sell
wine separately from the use of wine, he would
be selling the same thing twice, or he would
be selling what does not exist; he commits an
injustice who lends wine or wheat and asks for
double payment, viz., one, the return of the
thing in equal measure, the other the price of
the use which is called usury • • • Now money,
according to the Philosopher, was invented
chiefly for the purpose of exchange, and
consequently, the proper and principal use of
money is its consumption or alienation whereby
it is sunk in exchange. Hence it is by its
very nature unlawful to take payment for the
use of money lent, which payment is known as
usury.
A setting forth of usury analysis requires some
knowledge of the theory of value and just price. In usury
analysis our concern is with the contract of mutuum, the
justice of which depends upon the equality between the
thing given and the thing received. This is a value
problem, and the value problem has been already discussed
in treating the just price of goods. But as soon as we
depart from a simple direct sale for cash, the difficul
ties are identical with those of the usury problem, for
the anticipated or postponed payment is an implicit or
virtual loan.
Usury is gain from a loan of mutuum. 24 Hutuum is a
contract concerning the loan of an object under such
conditions that the title to the thing loaned passes to
the borrower. Frequently, B.W. Dempsey emphasizes that in
a loan of mutuum, the trans.fer of ownership is the
"decisive," the "significant," the "crucial point," the
"critical factor." The important characteristics of
mutuum are two: 1) that the ownership of the thing loaned
passes with the loan, and 2) that payment is made not by
Hutuum -- The delivery of an article (the quali
ties of which are fixed in number, weight, or measure)
with the intent that it immediately became the property
of the one recovering it with the obligation to restore
an article of like kind and quality [I,141).
24
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returning the identical article but one of the same kind
[I,143]. Such a loan was called a mutuum, because what
was mine (meum) became thine (tuum) ; that is, the
ownership was transferred [F,435). If the ownershiR was
not transferred, the loan was called a commodatum 5 and
the owner expected the return of the original article.
Thus, it differs in that the identical article is to be
returned. B.W. Dempsey expresses this clearly by illus
tration:
Now, some loans must be of the first types
(mutuum), as with wine and grain, and some
loans must be of the second type (commodatum),
as with this house on this lot, which has no
perfect substitute. But many goods can be the
object of either contract, depending on the
intent of the parties. Even money can be lent
on commodatum, and a charge be made for the
service. A man possessed of a fine coin col
lection could lend it out for an exhibition
and charge for its use and require the whole
thing to be returned, but money that is lent
to be spent must change owners, because, if it
is used at all, only the most unusual accident
would enable the borrower to return the origi
nal coins. Therefore, a loan of money is
normally made in such wise as to involve a
transfer of ownership, and if the money is the
property of the borrower, then the lender can
make no charge to the borrower for the use of
what has become the borrower's property
[F,408-409].

Many goods can be the subject of either a contract
of mutuum or accommodatum. Except for such novelties as
coin collections, money is an object of a loan of mutuum.
Under modern industrial conditions with men grading and
standardizing, many goods are identical, "constant in
number, weight and measure." With such standardized
goods, it is a matter of indifference whether the
Commodatum -- (loan of accommodation) -- the free
grant of something regarding its use alone for a definite
time [I,141).
25
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identical object lent or another standard unit be returned.
Money seems to be the most highly standardized of
all goods and, hence, the perfect example of the object
of a loan of mutuum; for, to all practical purposes,
money has value only in terms of being spent in the more
or less immediate future. "Money is the one commodity the
title to which most certainly is transferred on the
occasion of a loan and, therefore, a loan of money has
always been a contract of mutuum [F,436]. Again, "money
is the object par excellence of a loan of mutuu:m, for
with unimportant exceptions money cannot be loaned except
on mutuum and it enjoys the highest fungibility (stan
dardization)" [I,164].
B.W. Dempsey was always careful to note that the
fundamental consideration in a loan of mutuum is not the
fact that consumption goods are lent (for money cannot in
any sense be called a consumption good), but the fact of
the transfer of ownership. If an object is lent in such
a way that the borrower becomes the owner of the object
borrowed, then he cannot be charged for the use of
something which is his. This transfer of ownership is
obvious in the case of food and drink, and also in the
case of money, "for the use of money is the spending of
it. "26 This is less obvious, but equally true, in the
case of any standardized (fungible) good that can be lent
in such a way that the owner is indifferent as to whether
or not he received back the identical article lent, but
is satisfied if• he receives a perfect substitute. B.W.
Dempsey expresses this concretely through example:
When the important qualities of things are
fixed in number, weight, or measure, there is
no purpose in insisting upon the identical
object being returned, since such standardized
objects readily work, one in place of another.
This is obviously true of consumption goods,
but not exclusively. Two schools, for example,
might supplement each others' supply of fold
ing chairs by making gratuitous loans as
occasional need for each arose. If the folding
chairs in both schools were of the same stan
dard mold, there would be no purpose in exer
cising care to return the same chairs. The
st. Th., II-II, q.117, art. 4, ad corpus.
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loan would be of a standard fungible good but
not of a consumptive good, and the loan would
be a mutuum. And, during the loan, the lending
school would own no chairs but would have
claim on the borrowing school for the number
of chairs of the same condition as were bor
rowed [I,143).
Unquestionably, therefore, the loan would be one of
mutuum though the object of the loan would not be called
a consumption good.
c.

Role of Time in Kutuwa

While usury is contrary to the natural law demanding
equality in exchange, "it is usury only if it is received
for the mere loan" [I,165). A loan of money, considered
in itself or as a "mere loan, 11 is always a loan of mutuum
and, therefore, gain from a loan of money is usury. Thus,
the central axiom from which usury analysis sets forth is
that in a loan of mutuum the object borrowed must be
returned "to an equality"
-- to an equality of values. Does the passage of time
considered absolutely by itself alter the value of money
(some modern experts imply such) and so allow for
interest?. Does the passage of time remove money from
being a "mere loan, 11 considered in itself?. Certainly any
circumstance which does alter the value of money to the
lender or because of which he incurs a cost in the
occasion of the loan may found a title to compensation;
otherwise, the object borrowed would not be returned to
an equality of value.
The element of time is essential in a loan of
mutuum, B.W. Dempsey stresses, "otherwise a simple
exchange would result" [I,143]. A mutuum must be for some
period of time; otherwise it would be a meaningless
exchange of money for money under conditions in which the
exchange could serve no purpose. The passage of time, of
itself, is not the basis for interest. There is, in
general, no real continuous growth of value with the
passing of time as a primary and independent phenomenon,
quotes B.W. Dempsey from Joseph Schumpeter's Theory of
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Economic Development [I,186].27 Furthermore, opines B.W.
Dempsey, this is a proposition of which the Scholastics
(Molina-Lessius-Lugo) would "heartily approve." Certain
ly, B.W. Dempsey does:
That interest is a phenomenon arising among
economic objects and subjects precisely in
sofar as they are durable, that time is our
external expression and arbitrary measure of
this durability, does not necessarily involve
an alteration in such relations of those
enduring objects and subjects such as to yield
a net surplus over the values imputed directly
to the factors. Time may or may not be the
occasion of such a surplus; it is always a
condition, but per se never a cause. The
factors which operate in durable objects and
alter their relative values must be examined
in detail; they cannot be bunched under the
noncommittal head of "time" [I,187].
Time, therefore, has no autonomous role independent of
such forces as may require time in which to operate. B.W.
Dempsey is at his best as he clearly delineates the role
of time. "Forces which can produce a net value surplus,"
he sees, "must reside in durable agents or agents with
enduring effects." But, given that fact, the presence or
absence of a.value surplus or interest depends upon the
evaluation of those durable objects; "the mere fact of
duration is not an explanation of interest in any sense. 11
Turning to modern writers, B.W. Dempsey admits that they
consider that "interest is a phenomenon concerning the
duration of economic processes." He also points out that
these modern writers have reservations concerning the
inevitability of pure interest with the mere passage of
time. 11 B. W. Dempsey thinks this is a position which
coincides with that of the Scholastics, "who held that
there is no value surplus automatically generated in
durable objects by their continued duration" (I,197]. The
emergence of such a surplus is what requires explaining.
B.W. Dempsey made these points clear: 1) that usury
is gain from a loan of mutuum; 2) that usury is unjust
27
Joseph Schumpeter, Theory of Economic Development,
p. 171.
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because it is the extortion of a payment without any
equivalent value rendered; 3) that a loan of money in
itself is always a loan of mutuum and, therefore, gain
from a loan of money is usury; 4) that if there is a
value surplus, time may or may not be the occasion of
such a surplus; it is always a condition -- "condicio
sine qua non," but per se never a cause.
D.

Presence of Bztrinsic Titles

Even from earliest times the fact has been recog
nized that a loan of money may involve circumstances that
justify a payment over and above the amount lent, even
though the loan when considered strictly in itself is a
loan of mutuum. How can this be explained?
Whenever the risk was so great and so obvious, it
was acknowledged that there existed a title to a return,
a title extrinsic to the bare loan. Obviously extreme
risk imposes a cost on the lender, for which he deserves
compensation if the loan is to be made at all. Certainly
it is just or reasonable that any circumstance which
alters the value of money to the lender, or because of
which he incurs a cost on the occasion of the loan, may
found a title to compensation. "These titles were called
'extrinsic, 1 11 declares B.w. Dempsey, 11 as being something
apart from the money itself but yet involved in the loan
transaction when viewed concretely as a whole." Not that
they were extrinsic to the particular loan, "but since a
loan may be made in which these titles are absent, they
are extrinsic to the essential idea of a loan" [I,171).
Gain immediately arising as an obligation from a
bare loan of mutuum may not be taken; if taken, it is
usury. But other circumstances may exist, not essential
to the loan, yet concretely identified with it, which may
furnish a sound basis for a title to compensation. With
approbation, B.W. Dempsey quotes from a clear, succinct
passage of Lugo:
There are three chief titles which can cleanse
a mutuum from the stain of usury: emergent
loss, risk, and cessant gain; and these three
can be comprehended under one, emergent loss.
Risk and stoppage of gain are losses of a
sort, which, however, are usually distin
guished for the sake of clearness • • • Emer
gent loss, taken in a strict sense, is distin-
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guished from cessant gain by the fact that
emergent loss causes detriment to goods pos
sessed; but cessant gain causes a loss of
goods which you expect to possess but do not
[I,171). 28

Emergent loss (damnum emergens) is a loan arising to the
lender because of the loan; cessant gain (lucrum cessans)
is a gain which the lender has been making which stops or
does not materialize because of the loan. These two have
this in common, as implied in the above quotation from
Lugo, that they simply represent different forms of a
cost imposed upon a lender. Relating this in the Wick
sell-Fisher-Schumpeter manner to the circular flow, cost
would be the comparative loss from the income stream
caused by the substituting of one use of capital for
another. In turn, the return in the form of interest
would be comparative gain which accrues usually later,
caused by this same substitution of one use of capital
for another. The lender yields the values the money would
have furnished him if he had not loaned it, namely: some
direct cost to himself (business), and some opportunity
for gain relinquished for lack of funds [Cf. I,172-174].
Of course, either of these is a cost.
Usury is a gain from a loan of mutuum. But there may
exist an extrinsic title to compensation, that is, a
title extrinsic to the loan transaction considered in
itself. The .tit.le to the gain cannot be the loan of
mutuum, but a different fact also true at the same time
and occasion of the-loan; then money does have an ex
trinsic value. Extrinsic value gives extrinsic title to
compensation. "Coextensive with this fact of the exis
tertce of the circumstances that create extrinsic titles,
the yielding up of money on a loan imposes a cost on the
lender because he yields those other values along with
the value of the money considered in itself" [F,438).
As should be recalled from the treatment of just
price, a good must be sold at its common price unless
special circumstances give it a greater value to the
seller than it has in the common market. Though there is
a common price of money, a particular lender may have use
and need for the money, which will justify a charge for
the loss which the loan imposes upon him. Cost to the
28

Lugo, 25

70.
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lender in any form is the basic title of interest (Cf,
I,176-178]: it is the special circumstance which gives it
a greater value to the lender (seller). The extrinsic
value of money depends upon the general existence of
alternative investment opportunities, not on the avail
ability of those opportunities to one individual. When
these alternative investment opportunities involving a
cost to the lender become common as to be almost univer
sal, money itself, under these circumstances, now has an
extrinsic value. If money, due to its alternative
investment opportunities, does have extrinsic value,
lending of it will impose a cost on the lender. If money
loans in general do not impose costs on lenders, then
money takes on no extrinsic value and, therefore, there
being no extrinsic titles to interest on a money loan of
mutuum, there is no interest. To demand a return on the
loan itself without the presence of extrinsic titles is
usurious.
Returning to the circular flow, in a static economy
-- an economy without development -- money is, as a
general thing, relatively sterile. In medieval days, with
the prevalence of a handicraft (relatively static)
economy, the possession of a fund of money usually could
not be considered as "working capital. 11 The loan of
money, therefore, was a loan of mutuum without intrinsic
conditions, and so was actually the loan of a sterile
thing. In modern days, since it is a fact "that money may
always be readily exchanged for productive goods" that
causes it to be regarded as virtually productive. Hence,
extrinsic titles are now present and, therefore, "inter
est may always be taken on a loan of money, for it is no
longer, in canonical terminology, a mutuum, but a
locatio, 29 the hire of a useful thing" ( F,101 J • Certain
ly money in general in a modern (dynamic) economy will
have intrinsic value, hence extrinsic titles. It remains
for B.W. Dempsey to answer two questions: 1) How much
money has this extrinsic value: 2) and who has the title
to that value in a dynamic economy?. He adequately
answers both questions as one in a single short para
graph:
Locatio (hire or rent) -- a contract by which a
person or object is granted at a price for its use or
produce [I,141].
29
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Al though the existence of investment oppor
tunity depends upon the relation of available
resources to prevailing technological condi
tions, there will be no rate of interest, as a
distinct economic share, unless there is
saving; and it is clear that, if money has
intrinsic value because of dynamic conditions
in the economy, the funds that are available
for lending are funds that have been saved.
Therefore, the persons who have title to the
return from this extrinsic value are those
persons who have saved previously earned
resources [F,429).
III. THE PROBLEM OP INSTITUTIONAL USURY

A modern problem in which B.W. Dempsey is credited
with making an original contribution is that of the moral
aspects of credit. His study of the Scholastics on
interest and usury had given him a keen insight into the
moral aspects of "institutional usury," as he deigned to
call it. His unusual knowledge of the chief modern
writers on interest who viewed such as a problem from
economic policy placed him in an enviable position in
treating the economic aspects. No one denies that B.W.
Dempsey here has highlighted a problem and made a
contribution. ; some do, however, disagree with the nature
of his contribution of "solution." To fully understand
his "solution" entails a study of the reasons behind his
conclusions. Much of.the criticism of his·position arises
from too little appreciation of how he arrived at his
strong statement. Full censure, however, is not due these
critics -- much of B.W. Dempsey's basic reasoning was
left implicit or scattered profusely throughout his
copious writings. Our task, therefore, is to explain the
"morality of interest under conditions where money,
involving no cost of production and therefore no emergent
loss to the lender of first instance, can be called into
being in quantities indefinitely great by the state and
the banking system" [F,411).
Since bank credit was little developed in the
Scholastic period, though by no means unknown, and paper
money was scarcely used, little of the morality of this
problem can be directly gleaned from them. This does not
mean that their principles, which B.W. Dempsey made his
own and were briefly expressed above, do not fully apply
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to this relatively "modern" problem. Contemporarily, much
entrepreneurial activity has of course been financed by
created credit. Prescinding from the moral aspect for a
moment, created credit, as B.W. Dempsey admits, makes
life easier for the entrepreneur" and helps him "comman
deer control over resources at a lower price in the first
instance than would have been paid had savers received
the actual rate of interest prevailing before the
creation of the new credit" (F,360]. Obviously, he does
not consider such "convenience" as a moral justification.
As we have adequately considered, money in itself is
sterile, and a loan of money in itself, excluding any
extrinsic title, is usurious. "Money is the one commodity
the title to which most certainly is transferred on the
occasion of a loan and, therefore, a loan of money has
always been a contract of mutuum" [F,436]. "If money in
general does have extrinsic value, lending of it will in
general impose a cost on the lender; and, if loans in
general do not impose costs on lenders, then money will
have no intrinsic titles to interest on a loan of mutuum"
[F,439). Such a loan would be one of mutuum, a contract
binding in commutative justice and thereby demanding
restitution. Following Joseph Schumpeter,30 B.W. Dempsey
defines credit as "essentially the creation of purchasing
power for the purpose of transferring it to the entrepre
neur, but not simply the transfer of existing purchasing
power" [I,65; I,66) • "The essential function of credit,"
states B.W. Dempsey in another place, "is to implement a
new demand without simultaneously creating a new supply
of goods" (F,356-57].
A.

credit in the circular Flow3 1

The economic process is really one indivisible
whole. "Out of its great stream the classifying hand of
the investigator artificially extracts economic facts."
Yet there is no real understanding unless we see how
these facts (e.g. credit) fit into the whole. For B.W.
Dempsey, credit took on real meaning from its place and
function in the circular flow of economic life. Needless
to say, he was but following in the now familiar WickJoseph Schumpeter, op. cit., pp. 106 et seq.

30

31

Ibid., pp. 95-128.
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sell-Fisher-Schumpeter (particularly the last) tradition.
At this juncture, our study is not of the static economy
-- being by definition without interest, it poses no
problem. "The static economy knows no productive interest
[F,359]. In an economy without development there is no
"capital" in the sense here used, that is, "a sum of
means of payment which is available at any moment for
transfer to entrepreneurs to enable them to gain control
over concrete goods [F,357] • And since there is no
capital, there is no interest in the sense of a permanent
income, constantly present in the economy, obtainable for
the use of loan funds.
But if into this "serene and placid round of cus
tomary activities, development and credit enter," we have
a problem. "The person or persons in a position to
initiate this development into the established circular
flow are under the necessity of diverting resources from
their previous employments. In the theoretical construc
tion, this is done exclusively (and in real life to no
small degree) by means of credit." The essential function
of credit, as we have seen, is to implement a new demand
without simultaneously creating a new supply of goods. In
B.W. Dempsey's theoretical case, an alternative applica
tion of the system's productive resources can be achieved
only by a disturbance in the relative purchasing power of
individuals. "For in the circular flow, there would be no
idle stocks for the needs of the entrepreneur"
[F,357] • 32
The function of credit in the hands of entrepreneurs
"to disrupt the prevailing optimum disposition for their
new employment," but-who themselves possess no claim in
the goods moving in the circular flow. "Insofar as credit
is.created ad hoc for the entrepreneur and is not drawn
for the results from past productive services, 11 concludes
B.W. Dempsey, 11 it represents neither money nor goods from
the previous cycle of the circular flow" [F,357]:
Credit is essentially the creation of pur
chasing power for the purpose of transferring
it to the entrepreneur, but not simply the
transfer of existing purchasing power. Even
the fact that a credit creation may be "cov
ered" by some property owned by the entrepre32

Ibid., quoted from p. 96.
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neur does not "alter the nature of the pro
cess, which consists in creating a new demand
for, without simultaneously creating a new
supply of goods [F,357].

s.

credit from saving

Credit transactions fall into groups: 1) money which
is lent that has previously been saved, 2) money lent
that has not previously been saved. In the first group,
namely, money which is lent that has previously been
saved, a positive rate of interest may legitimately
emerge, as a cost is incurred in the withdrawal of incbme
from its destined use in order to substitute it in some
other use where it may yield a surplus. "Such a positive
rate of interest appears when and to the extent that
there is emergent loss to the lender" [I,197] • Such loans
of funds involve an antecedent sacrifice to the lender,
that is, loans made from funds which have been income in
the form of saving. Somebody has been given the means
(credit) of purchasing goods at the same time diminishing
the purchasing power of somebody else. such a "sacrifice"
or cost is the basis for extrinsic title and therefore
interest. B.W. Dempsey clearly held that "if money has
intrinsic value because of dynamic contributions in the
economy, the funds that are available for lending are
funds that have been saved" [F,439]. Therefore, persons
who have saved previously earned resources, under dynamic
conditions, have the title to the return from this
extrinsic value.
Certainly, B.W. Dempsey would consider that a source
of legitimate interest would exist in a dynamic economy,
under such conditions that the demand and supply of
savings are equal, all savings are invested, and there is
no investment which does not correspond to subtraction
from previous income, that is, to funds which previously
have been cost and which therefore have found their place
in the pricing system. In such cases, B.W. Dempsey would
say that Fisher would refer to the rate of return over
cost [I,187]: Wicksell to the rate of natural interest
(I, 2 2 O]: and the Scholastics to the average emergent loss
in the community [I,189]. Certainly, B.W. Dempsey admits
that these authors use terms that "express ideas with a
great deal in common" [I,186, 206].
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c.

credit Hot fro• savings

Credit transactions not based on saving involve,
therefore, no antecedent sacrifice, since no income is
withdrawn from its destined use in the circular flow in
order to substitute it in some other use where it may
yield a surplus. Since no cost emerges, no return or
interest is due. This form of credit gives somebody the
means of purchasing goods without at the same time
diminishing the purchasing power of somebody else. Money
not earned in production -- not saved -- has become
available for expenditure on products. With approbation,
B.W. Dempsey quotes the following from the eminent
economic authority, Joseph Schumpeter: 33
The distinction between normal and abnormal
credit is, however, important for us. Normal
credit creates claims to the social dividend,
which represent and may be thought of as
certifying services rendered and previous
delivery of existing goods. That kind of
credit which is designated by traditional
opinion as abnormal, also creates claims to
the social product, which, however, in the
absence of past productive services, could
only be described as certificates of future
services or of goods yet to be produced. Thus
there is a. fundamental difference between the
two categories, in their nature as well as in
their effects. Both serve the same purpose as
means of payment and are externally indistin
guishable. But the one embraces means of
payment to which there is a corresponding
contribution to the social product, the other
means of payment to which so far nothing
corresponds --- at least, no contribution to
the social product even though this deficiency
is often made up by other things [I,198].
B.W. Dempsey's outlook on such a process is simple
and clear. In such a case of loans not based on savings,
not only is there no antecedent emergent loss to the
33
Joseph Schumpeter, op.
footnote on same page.

cit.,

p.

101-102;

cf.
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lender, but there can be none. B.W. Dempsey's position on
this point was almost uncompromising, "unless," he
states, "we are dealing with a case of public authority
where impending calamity justified the invoking of the
ultimate limits of social authority for the common good"
[I,200-201). Money loans on the "part of persons and
institutions who have not saved, and, therefore, do not
have the extrinsic moral titles to compensation, are
loans of mutuum. "Whenever money is lent that has not
been previously saved, there is a gain from a loan of
mutuum for which no moral title exists [F,439). B.W.
Dempsey concludes his treatment with the following
proposition:
Loans of funds which involve an antecedent
sacrifice to the lender, other things being
equal, produce a different price complex and
disposition of resources from those which do
not so impose a sacrifice; that is, loans made
from funds which have been income affect the
price complex differently from those which,
not having been income, can involve no ante
cedent sacrifice [I,197-198).
B.W. Dempsey strongly defends the "utility" and the
"clarity" with which his above proposition holds "a
pivotal position in the theories of all." Summing up
previous analysis in Interest and Usury, he recalls that
"Wicksell, Mises and Hayek take strong positions for the
elimination of the possibility of loans involving no
antecedent sacrifice." "Schumpeter," he declared, "does
not commit himself specifically but seems to feel that up
to a point the good outweighs the evil" [I,199). He
continues in this vein with other noted authorities. But
for our purpose of showing that in no way did B.W.
Dempsey stand alone on the above proposition, the above
citations should be ample.
D.

usury Element in Inflation

Today, money is lent and production goods are bought
and sold. If the money lent involved no cost, was
"created," not withdrawn from saving, a loan of mutuum
results. Such a usurious loan is necessarily inflation
ary, too, since purchasing power increases without a
corresponding supply of goods. This bank credit, or new
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purchasing power, is "created" (not based on saving) and
placed at the entrepreneur's disposal. Thus the entrepre
neur takes his place in the circular flow beside the
previous producers and his purchasing power its place
beside the total previously existing.
Obviously, there has been no increase in the supply
of goods existing in the economic system. Yet, with his
new and the economic's increased purchasing power he can
compete in the purchase of the existing supply of goods.
Obviously, no goods and certainly no new goods correspond
to the newly created purchasing power. What it really
amounts to is a compressing of existing purchasing power.
In the first place, the purchasing power of previous
producers in the market will be compressed (they will be
forced to save); secondly, the purchasing power in the
market for consumption goods of those people who receive
no adequate share in the increased money incomes result
ing from the entrepreneur's demand (his purchase of
goods/services) is compressed. B.W. Dempsey poignantly
expresses the effects of this increased purchasing power
entering the system without a corresponding increase in
the supply of goods as follows:
This volume of deposit currency represents not
so much a loan as a levy upon the holders of
currency and deposits. They are the ones from
whom the validity of the new fund is drawn
through los.ses expressed in higher prices to
be paid for goods when the new funds go to
market, as they promptly do. But that is not
all. Besides drawing too much of what the
government needs from the poor as compared
with the rich, finance by bank credits also
causes a large transfer of real income from
one set of people (mainly the receivers of
fixed incomes) to another set of people
[I,221-222].

The injection of pseudo-income, reasons B.W. Dempsey,
involving no cost and thus no emergent loss, being
unmatched by goods, generates higher prices and a dis
placement of incomes which were based on earlier costs.
Bank credit forces the necessary real capital out of
the public. "The real saving which is necessary for the
period of investment is in fact enforced -- at exactly
the right moment -- on consumers as a whole, for a
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smaller quantity than usual of consumption goods is
available for the consumption of the second year"
[I,200].34 This is the notion and effect of forced
saving, " a phenomenon which results from, and is meas
ured by, changes in the quantity of money or bank credit"
{I,201]. Bank credit without saving is a usurious loan of
mutuum and has a necessarily and evil inflationary
effect. Certain consumers pay the cost through higher
prices, making the real saving necessary for entrepre
neurial activity, without reaping the benefit. Illustrat
ing by means of a government war loan bond, B.W. Dempsey
relates in one long sentence how when a war loan bond is
"sold and is paid for out of funds created ad hoc, we
have a two-fold phenomenon: first, the acquisition of an
asset (the claim embodied in the bond) without any
corresponding deduction from income or capital -- in
other words, without emergent loss or cessant gain by the
new owner of the new bond; second, in the case of all
persons who participate in wartime profits, we have a
lucrum ex mutuo, arising from the fact that the lending
operations cause a rise in the price of products of
wartime industry" [I,222]. Thus, according to B.W.
Dempsey, even a person who might otherwise claim an
emergent loss cannot at the same time also benefit by the
rise of prices -- in this case, caused by the expansion
of government credit -- and on balance have any emergent
loss. Remembering that the pricing process is a social
matter, the emergent loss is to be judged "from the
business as a whole." Falling back on the above example,
through its effects, B.W. Dempsey's own "definition" of
inflation becomes clear and apropos. "Inflation is the
disturbance of the income distribution and consequent
claims on current output by the transfer of wealth to the
state to the amount of all treasury expenditure above tax
receipts and above sales of treasury securities to savers
who reduce their own expenditures by the same amount. 1135
If the power of decision is that of either the state or
34

Quoted from Wicksell, Interest and Prices, p. 156.

35Inflation as a Permanent Problem; a speech given
several weeks prior to his death to the Twelfth Annual
Conference for Correspondent Bankers (published in
brochure form by the Marine National Exchange Bank of
Milwaukee), p. 45.
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a banking System, B.W. Dempsey did not absolve from usur
ious practice [F,440-441). Only a small concession did he
reluctantly allow to the state in this regard. "If a
government merely printed paper money and passed it out,
it would be clear that whatever value the government
received as a result of the first transaction would be
something to which it had no right, unless, in a violent
emergency, this be regarded as commandeering in a very
inequitable form of taxation" [F,440). Cost does not
disappear under inflation, but shifts, and unfortunately
to the "poor" and the "receivers of fixed incomes."
Inequitable shifting of purchasing power is wrong even
though done by the state itself or a banking system -
"institutional injustice."
B.

Injustice of usury

In a static economy, as there would be no alterna
tive opportunities open to the lender for investing
savings, there is no possibility of interest. To take
"interest" would be to violate exchange justice. Money in
a developed (dynamic) economy has a common value and a
common price -- a true rate of interest -- and a lender
can be presumed to incur cost (and so gain a title) and
so can justly (and so lawfully) charge interest. When
cost is imposed upon a lender who has alternative
opportunities, there is reason for interest to be paid.
Modern economists are not primarily interested in whether
interest should be paid but whether it can be paid; more
interested in how economically it can be paid, than why
interest must be paid. Thus, as B.W. Dempsey has so ably
presented, in circumstances in which Fisher's Rate of
Return over cost would be positive, Schumpeter's entre
preneur would have superior alternative uses for capital
awaiting exploitation. Circumstances in which "the
Schoolmen would say a gain from a loan would be usury,
the Wicksell-Schumpeter train of thought sees as the
source of a disequilibrium" [I,212]. But the problem of
justice, not merely disequilibrium, arises if either the
element of cost or alternative opportunities are not
properly present.
Money loaned in the form of credit not based on
saving and so involving no cost would, according to B.W.
Dempsey, be a loan of mutuum; as such, it is usurious and
a violation of commutative (exchange) justice.
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His emphasis is on commutative justice, since a loan
of mutuum is basically a usurious contract that falls
under this justice. This does not infer that because "the
Scholastic would frown at its very first step, namely,
the gain from a loan of funds, that, not being income,
could not involve emergent loss to the lender" [I,208),
that either the Scholastic or B.W. Dempsey would limit it
to or neglect the other justices. One justice violated;
all simultaneously violated. As previously treated, B.W.
Dempsey considered that a violation of exchange justice
means a violation of social and distributive justice too:
The circumstances should be noted here that
though we have limited the discussion to
commutative justice and to considerations
drawn from reason alone (since that was the
most convenient way of dealing with usury),
additional reasons and motives upon which the
Scholastic might draw in order to persuade
participation in the social process of pricing
are not so limited. In addition to commutative
the virtues of
justice (there are]
social justice, personal charity and social
charity, both natural and supernatural, liber
ality and munificence • • • [I,215, fn. 64).
Moving from "the principle which the Schoolman
applied primarily to persons" and applying them "to a
process," the usury can then be "regarded as 'institu
tional' 11 (I,212 J • Modern economies with banking, monetary
and fiscal institutions facilitate this institutional
usury by which the "benefits of saving are swept to those
who have not saved" [F,163).
Institutional usury, then, in B.W. Dempsey's eyes,
is II a process by which governments and the banking
system introduce a usurious element into a loan contract
payable in the expanding funds" [F,441). From the
viewpoint of justice, the peculiarity of the usury
element in inflation is the fact that mutuum is a con
tract binding in commutative justice and so demanding
restitution. The diffusion of the injustice under (e.g.
wartime) inflation makes it very difficult to know who
owes restitution to whom. But this difficulty does not
deter B.W. Dempsey from condemning this process of
institutional usury. "Savers who suffer under this
procedure have suffered a loss from a mutuum loan process
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for which loss they have a right to be compensated"
[F,441]. Commenting at length, he explains the "proce
dure":
• and when investment is financed with
funds that have never been income and which,
therefore, could not possibly involve antece
dent emergent loss or cessant gain, then there
may well be lucrum ex mutuo, since someone is
enabled to cut into the market and buy at
current prices before the effect of the injec
tion of this pseudo-income has had opportunity
to operate. If the purchase of the investment
goods proves to have been ill-advised, the
actual borrower may not be the recipient of
the gain he has occasioned. But somewhere in
the economy, "windfall gains" will appear on
someone's books; the economic process then has
operated to produce a "gain from a loan" even
though no person could be shown to have been
guilty of usury. Again we have the effect of
usury without the personal fault. The usury is
institutional, systematic [I,207].
In the modern situation to which economists have applied
the concepts of emergence of natural and money interest,
divergences of saving and investment, divergences of
income disposition from tenable patterns by involuntary
displacements -- B.W. Dempsey regards all of them as
having bolstered his discussion and giving "a sufficient
common ground with late medieval analysis to warrant the
expression 'institutional usury'[I,228]. Then, too, he
calls it to our attention that "institutional usury"
seems to be what was in the mind of Leo XIII when he
wrote, "this evil (the condition of workers) has been
increased by rapacious usury which although more than
once condemned by the Church is nevertheless under a
different form but with the same guilt still practiced by
avaricious and grasping men" [F,441] • 36
The very effect of inflation would be a "disturbance
of income distribution." Simply, B.W. Dempsey in numerous
places implicitly and obliquely it is true, but in the
36
Rerum Novarum, Leo XIII; emphasis added by B. w.
Dempsey.
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light of his treatment of justice, nevertheless clearly,
expresses that the usury element in inflation violates
distributive justice. B.W. Dempsey considers a government
under wartime conditions when it "makes easy use of
inflationary methods." He then points out that the "scale
of the operations makes the usury element in inflation
very great and very obscure." Brushing aside the excuse
of obscurity, he points out that its presence is clear,
nevertheless, "from the changes in income distribution
always associated with the inflationary process even when
price changes are delayed" [Cf. F,440-441). As economist,
B.W. Dempsey was keenly interested in finding evidence of
this income displacement. He was ever alert for evidence
to prove Ludwig von Mises' statement that "changes in the
rate of saving • • • must result from the new income
distribution, the new income, in turn, being the result
of changes in the volume of money. 1137
When B.W. Dempsey refers to "usury as institution
al," or "systematic," or the need to "change the system"
or II institutions, 11 it is his way of referring to the work
of social justice.38 Granted that he spoke of the "pri
macy of commutative justice and its remorseless tenacity"
[I,2120213), he at the same time and in regard to
institutional usury considered social justice as an ever
present obligation "to create conditions which
responsible persons can readily recognize and fulfil
their obligations in commutative justice" [1,213].
He did have one concrete proposal to rectify the
"system" or money "institutions," for making them soci
ally right or just [cf. F,161). His proposal was for a
100 per cent reserve plan, "a fixed money supply, or a
supply altered only in accord with objective and cal
culable criteria;" he looked upon such a proposal as a
"necessary condition to a meaningful just price of money"
[I,210. He was confident, too, that "a Scholastic of the
seventeenth century viewing the modern monetary problems

B. w. Dempsey, s. J., Cyclical Variations in
Income Distribution (Econometrica, vol. XI, no.2; April
1943), pp. 168-169.
37

Cf. The Functional Economy, 79; 38; 324 ff.

38
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would readily favor a 100 per cent reserve plan"
[I,210).39 His own reasons for his advocacy of the
"socially just" 100 per cent reserve plan are strongly
expressed:
A system of 100 per cent reserve money, or
even a system of commercial banks for short
term credit with 100 per cent reserve with a
system of equity banks for longer investment
(provided the equity banks were mutual and the
benefits of created credit would accrue pro
rata to all savers), would eliminate the
obvious inequities and most of the cyclical
fluctuations from the present "capitalistic"
system. Either, maintained for long enough,
would correct the most undesirable features of
present income distrlbution. The fruits of
saving accruing to the actual savers would
diffuse the ownership of investment goods and
completely obscure the "class" distinctions by
making interest an important item of income
for large numbers of people [F,161].
CONCLUSION
Undoubtedly, B.W. Dempsey achieved his finest piece
of scholarly work in his research and dissertation
writing on interest and usury. In order to judge better
this contribution to interest doctrine, it was found
necessary to gather his interest writing into one
cohesive body of thought; as usual, something B.W.
Dempsey did not do. Through a study of his writings, it
is evident that his was an analysis of modern interest
theory; a painstaking research to accurately rediscover
Scholastic doctrine; a much-needed comparison between the
moderns and medievals; and lastly -- although never
formally and completely in one place -- he achieved a
synthesis of interest built upon the best of the
Schoolmen and moderns.
B. W. Dempsey drew his "proposal II for making the
"financial institution" socially just from Irving Fisher
and as so often from Joseph A. Schwnpeter; of. Jos. A.
Schumpeter, Theory of Economic Development, pp. 95 ff.
39
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For the most part, B.W. Dempsey respectfully fol
lowed Scholastic tradition on usury; on a very few
occasions, as noted, he departed from this path. Up to
now, treatment of his usury analysis was for the most
part reserved for an exposition and attempt to integrate
his views. But this concluding section provides an
opportunity to make further comments on key points, such
as the nature of interest and the barrenness of money, on
which either B.W. Dempsey "seems" to have departed from
scholastic tradition or others have explicitly named him
as doing so; then, too, certain other theories at
variance seem important enough to deserve more than mere
mention.
F.

The Nature of Interest

The problem with which Scholastic thinkers before
B.W. Dempsey were concerned throughout the centuries was
the question of the "permissibility" of interest, a
question not primarily economic but ethical. It is clear,
and our above-exposition was based on this premise, that
the moral permissibility of interest can be determined
only with reference to its economic nature. Even though
attention was primarily directed to ethical permissibili
ty, the problem demands the investigation of the economic
nature of interest.
B.W. Dempsey's analysis of interest does not differ
substantially from the majority of economic experts
except on the nature of interest. Because of what he
considers the very nature of interest, B.W. Dempsey
denies that interest is possible in a socialistic econ
omy. Since this is a divergence from the usual position,
further discussion seems apropos.
B.W. Dempsey holds that if entrepreneurs were in a
position to commandeer the producer's goods which they
need to carry their new plans into effect, there would
still be entrepreneurs' profits, but no part of their
profit would have to be paid out by them as interest. Nor
would there be any motive for them to consider part of it
as interest on the "capital" they expend. On the con
trary, the whole of what they make over and above costs
would be "profits" to them and nothing else. It is only
because other people have command of the necessary
producers' goods "that entrepreneurs must call upon the
capitalist to help him remove the obstacle which private
property by means of production or the right to dispose
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freely of one's personal services puts in their way." No
such help is needed in producing within the circular
flow, for a "going firm" can, and in principle is,
currently financed by previous receipts which stream to
them without the intervention of any district capitalis
tic agency. In a socialistic economy, the state as
entrepreneur already has possession of the means of
production (capital goods) needed for innovation. The
capitalistic agent for which interest is paid simply
would not exist in a socialistic economy. Hence, it could
not be the subject of a valuation. And consequently,
there could not be a net return corresponding to the
interest form of income. The state in a socialistic
economy has the disposal of production goods directly.
The non-socialistic exchange economy must first of all
procure them by hire or purchase -- and so interest.
B.W. Dempsey is not alone in his analysis of in
terest. He is in the excellent, select, and highly
qualified company of Joseph Schumpeter and Heinrich
Pesch. B.W. Dempsey identified himself with and made
Joseph Schumpeter•s interest analysis his own.
In a communistic or non-exchange society in
general there would be no interest as an
independent value phenomenon. Obviously no
interest would be paid. Obviously there would
still exist the value phenomena from which
interes� flows in an exchange economy. But as
a special value phenomenon, even as a concept,
interest would not exist there; it -is depen
dent upon the · organization of an exchange
economy.40
Joseph Schumpeter holds that interest must flow from
entrepreneurial profit. If the entrepreneur already
possesses the necessary productive goods, there exists no
separate function nor (capitalistic) agent to whom the
entrepreneur must pay for their use. If a separate
capitalistic agent exists due to the phenomenon of
private property, part of profit is swept to the capi
talist, and then "interest acts as a tax upon profit."
Oswald von Nell-Bruening in an article on Heinrich
40
Joseph Schumpeter, Theory o:f Economic Development,
p. 176.
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Pesch's interest theory, which is referred to as the
theory of economic service (performance), has these few
significant words to say: "Pesch observed that our modern
economy granting credit is synonymous with placing
economic power at somebody's disposal." Quoting directly
from Pesch:
This real possibility of making a profit was
caused by the mere availability of greater
monetary capital; and this availability is
caused or brought about immediately by the
lender's act of granting a loan. Thus the
lender brings about the possibility of a
greater money supply, according to the old
principle: "causa causae est causa causati 11
(Lehrbuch, 5, 727).
"This act," concludes Oswald von Nell-Breuning, "of
making available as an economic potency is an economic
service and, as such, it is worth its price, just like
any other service. 1141 If the lender and borrower are one
(under socialistic conditions) no price need be paid.
G.

Barrenness of Honey

Another point that needs discussion is the "bar
renness" of money in the modern economy which has so many
widespread opportunities for probably profitable invest
ment. Various positions other than
B.w. Dempsey's have been taken on the "barrenness" of
money. As we have seen, B.W. Dempsey remains with the
older school of Scholastics who in following closely St.
Thomas Aquinas, retaining formally intact the original
Scholastic analysis of usury, justify interest in modern
economic life only by the general application of extrin
sic titles, particularly that of the 1ucrum cessans
(emergent loss) or loss of profit from investment.
Whenever cost to the saver is present,
B.W. Dempsey would admit an extrinsic title, and hence
interest. Succinctly, "emergent loss to the lender -
cost in any form -- is the basic title to interest. All
other titles -- cessant gain, risk of capital (periculum
Oswald von Nell-Breuning. "The Peschian Interest
Theory," Social Order, April, 1951, p. 180.
41
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sortis), delay (mora) and so on -- are but special cases
of cost to the lender" [F,410).
A modification of "older" Scholastic analysis with
respect to the nature of money and capital seeks to
establish a direct and intrinsic justification for modern
interest by shifting the loan of money from the class of
mutuum to that of commodatum or locatio. 42 Today, every
loan of money is a locatio because money has a general
applicability to productive enterprise and, consequently,
money capital has a quasi-productivity. This modern
theory of justifying interest was favored by John A. Ryan
in his Distributive Justice. But since "he did not
definitely commit himself on the matter,"43 it will
perhaps be best to quote his own words. He states:
Today the majority of catholic authorities on
the subject prefer the title of virtual prod
uctivity as a justification. Money, they
contend, has become virtually productive. It
can readily be exchanged for income bearing -
bearing or productive property, such as land,
houses, railroads, machinery, and distributive
establishments. Hence it has become the eco
nomic equivalent of productive capital, and
the interest which is received on it through a
loan is quite as reasonable as the annual
return to the owner of productive capital.
Between .this theory and the theory connected
with lucrum cessans the only difference is
that the former. shifts the justification of
interest from the circumstances and rights of
the lender to the present nature of money
itself. Not merely the fact that the individu
al will suffer if, instead of investing his
money he loans it without interest, but the
fact that money is generally and virtually
42
Locatio (lease) -- a contract by which a person or
object is granted at a price for its use or product;
mutuum and commodatum have been previously defined (cf.,
also I,141).

Patrick w. Gearty, The Economic Thought of Monsi
gnor John A. Ryan (Washington, D. c.:
The catholic
University of American Press, 1953), p. 208.
43
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productive, is the important element in the
newer theory. In practice, however, the two
explanations or justifications come to sub
stantially the same thing.44

An analysis of the term "virtual productivity" of money
merely seems to mean that under modern conditions a
widespread possibility exists to apply the money to
productive purposes. The fact that money may be con
sidered productive in view of its power of representing
real capital does not make it a productive good (and
therefore the basis of a locatio). We must recall the
common doctrine that if the use of a thing involves its
consumption (e.g. mutuum), the thing itself is insepar
able from its use; and its ownership is necessarily
handed over to the borrower when its use is given to him.
The borrower is bound to restore no more than its
equivalent, for the thing and its use may not be separ
ated and charged for separately. If the use of a thing
does not involve its consumption, the thing and its use
may be separated and charged for separately. If this
occurs, the contract of commodatum, which is itself
gratuitous, becomes one of lease (locatio) and rent
(conductio), with the borrower becoming the lessee and
the lender the lessor. Thus, in locatio and conductio the
things that in question are not immediately consumed in
their proper use and can be returned identically. Because
they are not consumed in use, they are not, in this case,
actually "fungibles, "45 and may justly be leased, for
44John A. Ryan, Distributive Justice (New York:
Macmillan Company, 1942), p. 122-23.

The

Potentially :fungible goods are those highly
substitutable or standardized objects which may be
consumed in use, one unit of which may function for
another; for example, money considered in general or
money which in a particular transaction, is not going to
be spent for a good.
Actually :fungible goods are such goods that are
actually consumed in use, that do not have other units
serve for them; for example, money which, in a particular
transaction, is going to be spent or has been spent for
a good.
45
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after a period of use they are still there to be restored
identically to their owner.
In direct opposition, we have the clear statement of
B.W. Dempsey who denies that money is productive and
becomes in any sense a contract of commodatum or locatio.
He states:
Money seems to be the most highly standardized
of all goods and, hence, the perfect example
of a loan of mutuum; . for to all practical
purposes, money has value only in terms of
being spent in the more or less immediate
future. Money is the one commodity the title
to which most certainly is transferred on the
occasion of a loan and, therefore, a loan of
money has always been a contract of mutuum
[F,476).
To B.W. Dempsey, money loaned was consumed in its use,
since the identical dollar need not be returned and a
transfer of ownership took place in the transaction.
Thus, the loan of money was a contract of mutuum, not

locatio.

In the above long quotation, John A. Ryan remarks
that "the majority of Catholic authorities on the subject
(of interest) prefer the title of virtual productivity as
a justification." If this is true, it would place B.W.
Dempsey in a minority, and some further "defence" of his
position might seem necessary. But is virtual productivi
ty the "majority opinion" on interest justification?.
Certainly, the knowledgeable Lewis Watt does not concur.
He states:
Among theologians, the distinction between
loans for consumption and those for production
has found no general acceptance, nor has the
theory that money as such can be hired out for
profit. Some would say that as an instrument
of commerce money is, in a developed economy,
"quasi-fruitful," so that a charge can be made
merely for lending it; but there is at least a
strong tendency against this theory, and
instead, to justify the institution of inter
est on the ground that nowadays a loan of
money (mutuum) raises a presumption of loss of
probably profitable investment to the lender,
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for which compensation in the shape of interest may rightly be demanded.46
To sum up, interest, according to Pesch, is the
equivalent for a special service able to be valued in
monetary terms. This service is not due to a property of
money, which in itself is "barren," but is bound up with
the loan on the grounds of intrinsic circumstance.47
Again, Pesch contends "that the whole approach is
incorrect" to say that a "loan for production is entitled
to interest, but not a loan for consumption." "It is not
the purpose of the loan that is the crucial question, 1 1 he
maintains, "but whether the law of equivalence is
satisfied. This looks to what has been loaned, not to
what is to be done with what has been loaned. 1148
In reference to the long passage from John A. Ryan
quoted above on the virtual productivity of money,
Patrick Gearty seemingly enlists the approval of B.W.
Dempsey, for he points out that B.W. Dempsey made the
following observation with reference to extrinsic titles:
11 If we admit the idea of a market in which the privation
of money has a common price, these titles might be
considered as intrinsic to loans in such a market"
[I,171, n. 77 J • 49 Closer scrutiny of this footnote seems
to veto the notion that B.W. Dempsey was "approving" of
the virtual productivity of money. The above short quote
was a footnote comment of B.W. Dempsey on his own passage
contained in the text that follows:
• • • there is no title by which the lender
may receive anything beyond the principal
lent. However, any circumstance which does
alter the value of money to the lender or
Lewis Watt, S. J., Usury in Catholic Theology
(Oxford: catholic Social Guild, 1945), p. 44-45.
46

47
Richard E. Mulcahy, S. J. , The Economics of
Heinrich Pesch (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1953),
p. 133.
46

Ibid. I p. 155.

49
Patrick Gearty, The Economic Thought of John A.
Ryan, p. 208.

192

because of which he incurs a cost on the
occasion of the loan may be found a title to
compensation. These titles were called "ex
trinsic" as being something apart from the
money itself but yet involved in the loan
transaction when viewed concretely as a whole.
They were not extrinsic to the particular
loan: but since a loan may be made in which
these titles are absent, they are extrinsic to
the essential idea of a loan [I,171; emphasis
added].
These titles might be considered as intrinsic to loans in
a certain market, or a particular market; but they are
"extrinsic as being something apart from the money
itself." They remain extrinsic to the essential idea of
a loan.

B.

consumed in use

st. Thomas•s position is, briefly, this: money is
a measure of price and therefore a medium of exchange;
as a medium of exchange its normal use is to be spent; in
being spent it is lost to the buyer or used up, is
consumed in use; the use of money, then, cannot be
separated from the money itself. From this point st.
Thomas develops two arguments against usury, one that it
is unjust to make a separate charge for the use of money
over and above the money itself; the other that, as
ownership must be transferred in a loan, it is unjust to
charge the borrower for the use of what he owns. It is to
be noted that both of these conclusions are reached from
the premise that money is consumed in use. The use of
money is inseparable from the money itself; hence, first,
the lender may not charge separately for its use, and,
secondly, ownership of money loaned is transferred to the
borrower -- because, and only because, money is consumed
in use.50

st. Thomas Aquinas, S.T., II-II, q. 78; cf.
quotation of art. 1, ad corpus, in previous dissertation
text, where it is stated that this passage was an
"integral part" of B. W. Dempsey's thinking on usury.
50
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B.w. Dempsey endorses the primacy of st. Thomas
Aquinas on the problem of usury. In his story of Molina,
Lessius and Lugo he refers to them thus:
The writers [Molina, Lessius, Lugo) whom we
shall discuss considered themselves at one
with the medieval way of thinking. All three
wrote, if not strictly in form, at least very
definitely in practical content, a commentary
on Thomas Aquinas . • • they did not consider
that they brought to this work anything stri
kingly new. Their work was of a piece with
that of Aquinas and Antonius of Florence . . .
absolutely the same principles rule [I,11618].

Later in the same work, B.W. Dempsey states that
Molina does not include the notion of consumption good51
in his definition of mutuum, in which the crucial point
is the transfer of ownership, which is practicable
because we are dealing with a fungible good . • . in his
[Luge's) opinion, the norm of "consumption goods" does
not go to the heart of the matter, which for him rests
entirely in the transfer of ownership" [I,142-144). Dr.
Herbert Johnston takes sharp exception to the above
exposition as is clear from the following:
For Molina, Lessius, and Lugo, as Dempsey has
shown, the basic factor in mutuum, and so in
the question of usury, is the transfer of
ownership;. they explcitly reject the notion
of "consumed in use" as the important point.
As we have already seen at the beginning of
this paper, St. Thomas bases his treatment of
mutuum and usury definitely and explicitly on
B. W. Dempsey distinguishes between a consumption
good such as food or wine and a standard fungible good,
such as standardized chairs or highly substitutable
dollar bills. For instance, "if the folding chairs in
both schools were of the same standard model, there would
be no purpose in exercising care to return the same
chairs. The loan would be of a standard fungible good
but not of a consumption good, and the loan would be a
mutuum" [I,143).
51
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the notion of money as consumed in use: the
argument based on the transfer of ownership
depends directly on that conception and is
intelligible only in its light on this ques
tion, then, and this is the one at issue, the
work of Molina, Lessius, and Lugo can hardly
be said to be "of a piece with that of Aqui
nas."
• • . In the light of the foregoing develop
ment, it may fairly be asked whether, by
rejecting the notion of "consumed in use" in
favor of that of "transfer of ownership" as
the fundamental point in the consideration of
mutuum and usury, Molina, Lessius, Lugo and
Father Dempsey do not seem to have cut them
selves off from the authentic medieval tradi
tion on this problem and from the possibility
of a true understanding of its solution.52
In response, it should first be clear that St. Thomas
Aquinas' term "consumed in use" includes not only B.W.
Dempsey's term, consumption good, but also standard
fungible good. In an attempted refinement, B.W. Dempsey
wishes to distinguish the way wine or food was consumed
and the manner in which a standardized product such as a
folding chair was "consumed." Thus, one could hardly say
that B.W. Dempsey explicitly rejected the notion of
"consumed in use." Whether he gave it proper emphasis in
relation to "transfer of ownership" is another point of
consideration.
Dr. Herbert Johnston wrote this article attacking
B.W.,Dempsey's understanding of mutuum, and hence usury,
in 1953. B.W. Dempsey, ever alert to such articles, 53
seems to take up the charge, at least indirectly, in his
subsequent book, The Functional Economy, published in
52
Herbert Johnston, 11 0n the Meaning of I Consumed in
Use I in the Problem of Usury, 11 The Modern Schoolman,
January, 1953, pp. 107-108).

Dr. Herbert Johnston I s article with appropriate
border markings was in the possession of B. w. Dempsey.
The writer of this dissertation now has this marked
article in his possession.
53
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1958. we shall allow B.W. Dempsey to "answer" the charge
of misplaced emphasis himself.
The fact that St. Thomas [S.T., II-II, q. 78,
art. 1] draws his first example from the realm
of consumption goods has drawn some writers
off on the tangent that the injustice of usury
has something to do with consumption loans and
would not be involved if there were a question
of productive loans. There is nothing in this
text or elsewhere to justify this view. Al
though it is perfectly true that the most
tragic victims of usury may be those who
borrow for consumption purposes, this does not
of itself establish the justice or injustice
of the act, though it may be highly signifi
cant for other virtues. A careful reading of
the text will indicate that the fundamental
consideration is not the fact that consumption
goods are lent (for money cannot in any sense
be called a consumption good), but the fact of
the transfer of ownership. If I lend any
object in such a way that the borrower becomes
the owner of the object borrowed, then I
cannot charge him for the use of something
which is his. This transfer of ownership is
obvious in the case of food and drink, and
also in the case of money, "for the use of
money is the spending of it" [S. T., II-II, q.
117, 4 ad corpus]. It is less obvious but
equally true in the case of any standardized
or fungible good that can be lent in such a
way that the owner is indifferent as to wheth
er or not he receives back the identical
article lent but is satisfied if he receives a
perfect substitute.
That it is the transfer of ownership
which is significant is clear from the intro
duction of the phrase, "the return of the
thing in equal measure." When anything is lent
in such wise that the return of the original
article is not expected but the return of one
of the same sort, the debt is resolved with
payment II in equal measure. 11 A Model-T Ford
could be lent for some dangerous excursion.
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The owner of the car might be fully aware of
the dangers involved, and be fully satisfied
if he received back, not his own car, but
another Model-T of the same year and approxi
mately the same mileage [F,408].
In the light of the foregoing development, may it
not again fairly be asked whether B.W. Dempsey in any
sense "cut himself off from the authentic medieval
tradition" on this problem of usury and "from the pos
sibility of a true understanding of its solution?"
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Chapter Saven
'l'HB FUllCTIOIIAL WAGB

Whether or not within his framework of socio-economic
thought B. w. Dempsey made an outstanding recognized
contribution in the form of a FUNCTIONAL WAGE.
I. TBB PROBLEX OF WAGB ANALYSIS
A.

The State of Wage Theory

B.

Practice Outruns Wage Theory

c.

The Need of an Internal Principle of

Organization
II. TBB ANALYSIS OF TBB FUllCTIONAL WAGB
A.

The Antecedents of the Functional Wage

B.

Functional Wage through organization

C.

Functional Wage through Motivation

D.

Capital Creation by Labor

E.

Programs of FUnctional Wage Theory
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THB FtmCTIOIIAL WAGB
I.

THE PROBLBK OF WAGB ANALYSIS

A.

The state of Wage Theory

The Frontier Wage, B.W. Dempsey's last work, was
published posthumously; actually, only a few hours after
his death (July 23, 1960). It is a book about wage
analysis. The specific purpose of the book is to examine
a particular theory o( wages, namely the wage theory of
Johann Heinrich von ThUnen. This wage theory is not a new
theory; it is just over a hundred years old. B.W. Dempsey
felt that it admirably fitted into his own economic
thought. Within his lifetime, B.W. Dempsey had carefully
integrated his own thought on the basis of the best of
scholastics and what he considered the best of the
moderns, particularly Joseph A. Schumpeter. He had long
felt keenly the need of a wage theory that would fit into
his ow� mature thinking', This he found in Johann Heinrich
von ThUnen. Needless to say, he endorsed it enthusiasti
cally. Furthermore, it gave B.W. Dempsey an opportunity
to "complete" hts own economic thought, Accepting the key
ideas of van ThUnen, B.W. Dempsey now for the first time
had a doctrine of the fu�ptional wage to fit into his
functional economy. Von ThUnen attempted to establish an
economically sound and correct wage •.. The author of The
Frontier Wage was certain that van ThUnen had succeeded.
Thus, he published not only to publicize but to develop
this fact. B.W. Dempsey was convinced that his functional
wage theory presented not only an economically sound and
correct wage, but a just wage as well.
In The Frontier Wage, B.W. Dempsey reviews and
examines theories of wages that economists have presented
to the world in the past two hundred years: first, in
some detail, in their own content, and then in their
relation to one another and in their relation to the
times which produced them. Together with von ThUnen, B.W.
Dempsey draws from his survey the conclusion that, except
for very broad and obvious factors, if the economic
analyst today is asked to state with any precision what
determines this or that particular rate of wages, the
only possible answer, in B.W. Dempsey's words, is "I
don't know."

200

Not only to remedy what he considered the deficiency
of present wage theory, but also to complete his own
system of economic thought, were the reasons why B.W.
Dempsey analyzed this wage theory. More proximately, as
B.W. Dempsey admits, The Frontier Wage "owes its origin
to a cursory but penetrating remark by Joseph A. Schum
peter in his H��tory or Economic Analysis that Johann
Heinrich von ThUnen•s wage formula could not be called
unsound in itself as some had thought; and further, that
the formula in spite of the severity of its conditions
might have useful implication for some forms of profit
sharing" (W,VII].
For many years, himself deeply interested and
involved in the profit-sharing movement, B.W. Dempsey was
well aware that academic economists had ignored profit
sharing. He asked himself the question: why have academic
economists ignored profit sharing while it was obviously
succeeding and offering increasing promise? Characteris
tically, his answer was always "that the operation of
profit sharing had never been presented to the academic
world in the analytical formulae currently in vogue among
and acceptable to economic analysts" (W,VII]. Thus,
Schumpeter' s observation seemed to B.w. Dempsey, the
respectful disciple, an invitation to present profit
sharing in such form.
B.W. Dempsey was of the opinion that a fresh
analysis should be made of the problem of wages. Admit
tedly, he had come to the realization and conclusion that
the "pivotal · problem of wage determination" has no
"analytical foundation worth mentioning. 11 . "Wages are the
things men work for and live by," emphasizes B.W.
Dempsey, "and if we do not know where we are or how we
got.there in this critical field, we do not know very
much about how our economy as a whole is operating." He
cites a number of analysts of American business and
economic practice of like mind. "There exists precious
little dynamic theory of the long-term development of
wages" (W, 30) • 1 "The unsatisfactory state of this branch
of economics is an open secret or, in Veblenian terms, a
matter of common notoriety outside the profession as well
as inside it. Theoretical support can apparently be
mustered in imposing strength for almost any opinion or
Kurt Rothschild, The Theory or Wages,
Basil Blackwell and Matt, 1954, p. 157.
1

Oxford:
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even emotion" [W,30) • 2 Other quotations cited by our
author underline the fact that when the economist turns
to the general problem of wage determination "his voice
becomes muted and his speech halting: 113 that wage eco
nomics is in a "muddled state": that an economist can
safely deny that there is "any theory to evaluate. 114
"At present there is no comprehensive theory of wages
that commands general acceptance. 115
B.W. Dempsey feels that the "ideological and
propaganda significance" of being unable at present to
put forth an adequate wage theory is "overwhelming. 11
Marxism has no such embarrassment, even though "it is
totally unembarrassed by facts."
B.

Practice Outruns Wage Theory

As our curve of achievement has gone up, our curve
of explainability has gone down. If we [Americans) cannot
tell even ourselves why and how we pay the wages that we
do, B.W. Dempsey explains, "the curve of explainability
is very low indeed. 11 "Fortunately for us," he hastens to
add, "the reason for our inability to explain ourselves
lies in the simple fact that 'American practice in this
regard has outstripped theory'." Clearly, B.W. Dempsey
was of the opinion that, in a number of important ways
which have been inadequately recognized, practice outruns
theory.
M.Brienfenbrenner,
"A
Contribution
the
to
Aggregative Theory of Wages, 11 Journal of Political
Economy 64 : 459-69, December 1956.
2

Paul Samuelson, "Economic Theory and Wages," in D.
M. Wright, ed., The Impact of the Union, New York:
Kelley and Millman, 1956, p. 312.
3

D. w. Taylor and H. c. Pierson, eds., New Concepts
in Wage Determination, New York:
McGraw-Hill Book
Company, 1956, pp. 3, VII.
4

J. M. Clark, "Wage Theory is an Age of Organized
Labor," in Philip D. Bradley, ed., The Public Stake in
Union Power, Charlottesville:
University of Virginia
Press, 1959, p. 303: cf. w, 30-32 for further citations.
5
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First of all, many organizations have introduced
profit sharing programs -- which have no home in present
"academic" wage theory. Eloquently, B.W. Dempsey, long an
ardent advocate of profit-sharing, eulogizes this
practice:
Profit sharing by widening the function of
enterprises opens the door for the release of
human capacities that Marx, the European
Doctor of Philosophy, locked up with his
theory of class conflict.
Long ago America was warned that unless we
manifested the same inventiveness and re
sourcefulness in social dynamics as we have
manifested in physical production and in
distribution and sales promotion, we would
lose our momentum and be confronted with
economic and social decline. our progress in
the field • • • and their application by the
Council of Profit Sharing Industries are among
the finest signs that we are re-ordering
ourselves on some solid basic compass points
and using the recovered principles of func
tional economy with strong effect [F,265]. 6
Secondly, in almost all industries wages are higher
than any "outmoded" wage theory warrants. Part of this
margin is represented by a pension, welfare, stock
ownership or other similar fund, and especially in the
growth of these pension funds which somehow are tied to
output. Implicitly and in practice, wage theory is being
outrun. "Failure to recognize explicitly what is being
done," B.W. Dempsey states categorically, "greatly limits
the effectiveness and benefits of what is actually being
done" [W,31].
Thirdly, American production is organized. Referring
to large scale businesses such as "motor, steel and chain
stores," B.W. Dempsey points out that the methods
developed in such huge industries are studied and adapted
by much smaller units "which also have good ideas of
their own." certainly, in consequence of the higher
standard of living, some workers become savers and thus
6

Cf. F, 260-265; F, 364-365; W, 146.
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make a beginning of becoming capitalists [cf., F,129]. In
no way does this present phenomenon fit into current wage
theory. "When we recognize where we are and what we are
really doing, we don't look quite so foolish when we try
to explain. If our practice has outrun our theory let us
keep the good practice and formulate a new theory. 117
c.

The Nead of AD Internal Principle of organization

A most familiar theme running through all of B.W.
Dempsey's writings is the need for an intrins,ic principle
of orderly cooperation. In countless places [F,21, 57,
390; W,128-129] he alludes to this intrinsic principle of
socio-economic life. When two or more difficult things
converge on one objective, this new combination, this
unity of diverse things, has been produced by order of
some kind. To paraphrase B.W. Dempsey's thought in
reference to the factors of production, as expressed
frequently throughout his writings, these factors do
actually co-operate in the production of goods and
services. Furthermore, the economic processes are somehow
coordinated into a system, or waste would be too common
and overwhelmingly great. Obviously, therefore, "the
relations between labor and management should be con
sciously cooperative as their substantive interests are
complementary." The factors are in fact unified and the
processes do reach an end.
B.W. Dempsey considers "the Ricardo-Marxian view" of
the economic system which is widely accepted, explicitly
or implicitly, as furnishing no intrinsic principle of
orderly cooperation and coordination of factors of
production -- land (nature), labor (man), and capital -
nor coordination of the economic processes -- production,
distribution, exchange, consumption. An economic system
that assumes "an ineradicable clash of wills and inter
ests," an essential opposition of factors in processes,
provides no rational intrinsic basis for the orderly
cooperation which is actually essential. B.W. Dempsey
believes that on the American economic scene this
internal organization of factors and processes was
practically achieved in contradiction of their proposed
beliefs:
7
B. W. Dempsey, "The Wage Frontier, 11 Review of
Social Economy, September, 1960, p. 108.
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As long as people's common sense caused them
to act in violation of their own (Marxian
class conflict) professed beliefs, we could
get along. When serious economic troubles,
like price collapse following wartime infla
tions, made an opposition of interest seem
real at the time, and revealed the lack of an
internal principle of organization, economics
turned outside itself to politics. Labor and
business alike appealed to Civil Government to
impose on economic activity from without some
kind of order and unity, which it was incapa
ble on its own terms as then professed of
providing from within [W,129].
B.W. Dempsey's views continue in the same vein. He
regarded Ricardian economics as having a "radical defi
ciency" that could furnish no positive principle of unity
within the economic unit because such an economic system
believed that economic activities possess "in the free
struggle of competitors •
. a principle of self
direction which governs it much more perfectll than would
the intervention of any created intellect." This view
overlooked the possibility that the free self-determining
intellects which bring the goods to competitive markets
could alter their own economic organization. When they do
alter, competition and free markets, as B.W. Dempsey
posits, remain a strong and useful economic stimulus and
discipline, but a secondary one. To directly quote:
"Markets presuppose organization and organizations; they
do not create it or them; but man's own organization for
production can create and control and adjust" [W,174]. In
conclusion, the author of The Frontier Wage sees the lack
of such an internal principle of organization in Ricar
dian economics "that sent both management and labor,
sometimes one, sometimes the other, sometimes both, to
the doorstep of the state begging for an extrinsic prin
ciple of unity to supply the one they lacked as being its
basic deficiency" [W,174-175]. To establish such an
intrinsic principle as a basis of a functional wage is
the purpose of The Frontier Wage. The indispensable
condition of social order is "to abolish conflict between
Quadragesimo Anno, n. 88.
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the classes. 119 Only the establishment of an internal
principle of organization can abolish class conflict. The
basic problem, therefore, is to find a wage theory that
will furnish an intrinsic principle of organization for
a functional economy; such a principle understood would
remove the prevailing practice and pseudo-principle of
class conflict.
The nineteenth century bequeathed us only one
wage theory, the Ricardo-Marxian with variant
forms, surprisingly combined with a labor-cost
theory of exchange value • • • Marx simply
took Ricardo's subsistence theory and class
conflict, subtracted the right of private
property from the system and emerged with the
exploitation theory; labor produced the whole
value, labor got less than the whole value.
Therefore labor was "swindled" • . . But to
posit class conflict on principle is an eco
nomic process where cooperation is obviously
essential if anything at all is to be produced
is an irrational and inherently contradictory
analysis. This would be true if factors and
classes were co-extensive which, in America,
they are not. But it is the vestiges of this
one wage theory, the child of nineteenth
century erroneous analysis, in our business,
labor and economic thinking which furnish the
explanation of our utter lack of a workable
wage analisis in the face of our productive
triumphs. 1
To regard present day Marxism as a viciously
aggressive empire willing to extend its domi
nation by any means whatever is only political
common sense. To regard Marxism as a political
economic system with any claim to serious
attention by Americans is indefensible.
American twentieth century practice has com
pletely outrun nineteenth century Ricardo-

Quadragesimo Anno,

9
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No.

The Frontier Wage, p.

81.
98-88].
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II.

Marxian class conflict theory. Both Ricardo
Marxian capitalism and Ricardo-Marxian soc
ialism belong to economic history. The future
belongs to American Functional organization if
we will stop trying to impose anachronistic
categories on the facts.11
TRB ANALYSIS OP TRB PUNCTIONAL WAGB

B.W. Dempsey bases his functional wage, which is an
integral part of his functional e�onomy, on the "adequate
wage theo:r;:y" of Johann H. von ThUnen. His "rediscovery"
of von Thonen gave him an opportunity to integrate and
complete his own analysis of a "functional economy." In
no way was this "rediscovered" wage theory a stranger, or
something completely alien to B.W. Dempsey's thought, but
in reality, as we shall see in the ensuing treatment, a
continuation of his own thought. It is not our task to
give ThUnen's thoug�t and contribution, but B.W. Demp
sey's. Upon von ThUnen, B.W. Dempsey built; his wage
theory he made his own -- merged, integrated, developed
it into a consistent whole.
If the hundred-year-old wage analysis of von ThUnen
is so useful, why has it not gained wider acceptance?
Why had it to be in a sense "rediscovered?" Schumpeter
in his History of Economi�.Analysis puts his finger on
the precise reason. Von ThUnen called his wage a "natu
ral" wage, "but of course, this wage is not natural in
the sense that the free market mechanism tends to produce
it" [W,371) • 12 He distinguished carefully between what
was natural in the sense that the market mechanism tended
to produce it and the wage which emerged in an economy
with r�tional and human reorganization. By natural wage,
von ThUnen meant a wage that was commensurate with human
nature concretely considered. "A wage that is conformable
to intellectual activity and to a full use of all men's
abilities is a wage that is conformable to human nature"
[W,135 J. "Yet so bemused by the power of the market
11Ibid.,

pp. 108-109.

Joseph Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis,
p. 467; Schumpeter devotes several p�ges to von ThUnen,
pp. 465-68; in these pages von ThUnen's famous wage
formula is explained.
12
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system was the nineteenth century, 11 relates B. W. Dempsey,
"that any economic magnitude not so produced could be
ignored and was. 1113
A.

The Antecedents of the l'Unctional Wage

Briefly, the foundation of B. W. Dempsey's functional
wage analysis was von ThUnen's treatment of the Isolated
State. on the frontier of the Isolated State, the worker
"with courage and industry" could clear land, make his
own farms, and create his own capital; or even more
easily, groups of associated savers and capital-producing
workers could clear and then work the land. When the
return came in, what they would pay themselves as wages
and what they would take as return on their capital
production depended entirely upon the workers• free
decision. As long as these conditions lasted, wages
within the frontier had to be sufficient to compensate
the worker for this opportunity foregone, or he would not
forego it. The wage emerging under these conditions was
a wage commensurate with human nature and in this sense
a natural wage. B.W. Dempsey expresses ThUnen's purpose
practically:
• he set about to do what he could to
install a wage system that would promote his
workers a family living wage, give them some
incentive to increase output by improved
methods, and make a start on building up a
capital sum and these are the essential ele
ments of a wage "conformable to human nature"
[W,48].
Under the market mechanism, if the worker has no
income but wages and if wages are in no way related to
product, then the worker's sole advantageous course is to
raise wages to the highest level economic pressure can
get him. If the worker has no income but wages and if
wages are in no way related to product, the lower the
employer can keep wages, the higher his investment income
will be. Under these conditions, one is forced to
conclude, total output definitely will be less than it
13

The

Wage Frontier, p.

102-103.
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could be under alternative workable forms of organi
zation.
What von ThUnen has done, in short, is to give
mathematical expression, supported by economic analysis
and quantitative expression under the limited conditions
of the frontier of an isolated state,14 to an alterna
tive form of organization in which wages are related to
output.
Firstly, a wage system, and therefore a wage theory,
must recognize and reconcile two legitimate goals of the
two most active factors of production. Workers are
interested in subsistence, "not Ricardian minimal
subsistence but adequate means of life;" a man "works for
a living." On the other hand, management is primarily
concerned with output. A practical wage system must be
one which by intelligent organization taking human beings
as they are "genuinely integrates these two most reason
able concerns." "In the divorce of the worker from his
product," states von ThUnen, "lies the source of the
evil" of the opposition of classes, of the meager wage he
observed actually being paid because total output was so
low and the worker had neither motive nor opportunity to
increase it.
Secondly, production is a cooperative effort.
Conscious organization is necessary to achieve, not only
among fellow workers but among all the factors of
production, the kind of cooperation that maximizes output
and minimizes cost. Such organization does not replace
competition,· but conditions it, alters it; competition
remains "a powerful economic force" but organization
precedes it. "Certai"nly intelligent organization and not
a bare formula," opines B.W. Dempsey, is the core of von

14
•
assumes that the isolated state is in a
static condition; that the laborers are equal in intel
ligence, skill, etc.; and that perfect competition
pervades the entire state. He assumes that beyond the
margin of cultivation there is a limitless territory
whose fertility is equal to that of lands already under
cultivation, and he maintains that the rate of wages and
the rate of interest existing at the margin of cultiva
tion determine the rate of wages and rate of interest
throughout the entire state [W,110].
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ThUnen 's thought. 15 Organization is simple recognition
of the fact that, "save for the rare individual working
quite alone," total output is the result of coordinated
effort. "This kind of functioning organization," comments
e.w. Dempsey, "is essential to high output at low cost
and it is not produced by a market mechanism • • • When
organization succeeds in integrating all elements in the
production unit and giving them sound motives for
cooperation in maximizing output and minimizing cost, the
performance is so transformed that it may well seem to be
a wholly new thing. " 16
ThUnen was not only an excellent theorist, but a
practical man. He considered that an approach to a
natural wage tied to output is better than no such link
at all. "This much is evident," he states, "that even if
a complete return to the natural wage (commensurate with
human nature) were not possible, the bad conditions would
be mitigated to a great extent if the workers could be
given even some part of their wage in proportion to the
product of their labor" [Text W., 328; italics added).
Basing his treatment on von ThUnen, B.W. Dempsey in
summary fashion outlines the frontier wage on three
frontiers [W,178-182). This frontier wage "is the wage
that prevails when workers have real and practical
alternatives of creating capital of their own" [W,178).
The frontier wage is encountered and so can be described
on three frontiers: the "analytical" frontier, the
"geographical" frontier, and the "organizational"
frontier.
First, the analytical frontier, also termed the
"theoretical" frontier (cf. W,181), had as its essential
characteristic that what the worker produced over and
above subsistence for himself and family he had the
opportunity to turn into capital in the form of improv
ement of his own property. On this "theoretical" fron
tier, economic organization is such that the workers and
the capital providers are assumed to be the same people.
Thus, when economic organization is composed of capital
creating labor, either simple opposition of interest or
"class conflict" are impossible. Even when the workers
and capital providers are not the same people, the
15The
16

Wage Frontier, p. 104.

Ibid., p. 105.
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economic organization is most advantageous, providing
there is to some (increasing) extent workers• participa
tion in capital 9.wnership. While this frontier is
conceived by von ThUnen as a ..theoretical condition, B.W.
Dempsey points out that 11 ThUnen explicitly appealed to
the American frontier as substantially verifying his
•unrealistic' conditions and as having in fact achieved
a natural wage" [W,170].
Second, the frontier wage was actually met on the
American geographical frontier during all but the last
decade or two of the nineteenth century. Having estab
lished 1 the size of the maximum wage that can be main
tained in his �.laboratory on the frontier of the Isolated
State," von ThUnen turned confidently from his theoreti
cal (analytical) frontier model to the "North American
States" to point out that here his analysis was verified.
The reason for its verification, B.W. Dempsey acutely
points out, "was that as long as it was at all possible
for a man to take a rifle and an axe and head for the
wilderness and return a landed proprietor, the employer
on the seaboard had to pay a wage sufficient to make some
resist this temptatJon" [W,5 J. This wage actually was
high enough (von ThUnen estimated it to be three times
the comparable European rates) that some were able to
save and to head west fairly well-equipped. "The high
wage designed to keep men from the frontier," B.W.
Dempsey emphasizes, "made possible a rate of saving, a
degree of capital accumulation, so high that those who
did take to the frontier did not have to do so empty
handed, but many were able to go forth quite well
equipped with the all important capital goods" [W,179).
The third and last frontier, the organizati9nal
frontier, "recognized originally perhaps by ThUnen
alone, 11 is the presentation of the opportunity and
challenge to create realistically within the producing
organization the conditions which duplicate the oppor
tunity and motivation for creative and constructive
activity once exercised on the geographical frontier. The
essential characteristic of the geographical frontier, as
of the theoretical frontier wage, was "that what the
worker produced over and above subsistence for himself
and family could be made in the form of improvement of
his own property if he was willing to work at it 11
[W,182 J • The task of the organizational frontier makes an
advance, for it is 11 to duplicate realistically, honestly,
and vividly the motivation and opportunity to maximize
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output and lower costs that existed when real alterna
tives and opportunities to go west were presented to the
worker" [W, 182] • The sums the workers earn and save arise
solely out of the efficiency earnings that are made
possible by organization of free, self-determining
persons:
To minimize this combination of current total
output and ultimate human potential, it was
necessaey to go beyond the mere symbols of his
(von ThUnen's) formula. The formula was estab
lished under conditions where workers and
investors were the same people but it remains
valid when workers and investors are different
people. But obviously the best results would
be obtained where workers participated in
capital creation by saving as well as by its
physical creation. Therefore the more fully
workers could participate in investment income
the better, and therefore the more fully their
increasing compensation could come to them in
forms which could be invested and yield fur
ther investment income, the greater would be
the total return and the greater the rate of
progress. This required organization and to
his own analytical front��r and the American
geographical frontier, ThUnen added the orga
nizational frontier and left it for future
students to conquer with appropriate organiza
tional innovation. 17
within this rediscovered Thunian framework, in true
innovational fashion, B.W. Dempsey constructed his
functional wage system.

B.

Functional Wage Through organization

In his last year of life, it "greatly pleased" B.w.
Dempsey to be able to complete his functional economy
system. Sufficient has been mentioned to indicate his own
recognition of the need of a .functional wage theory to
develop, integrate, and complete his works. In that year,
he was fond of rethinking and mulling over St. Thomas's
17

The Wage Frontier, p. 106.

212

Joseph
Schumpe:�er's
economic
social
writings,18
thought, 111 and Johann Heinrich von ThUnen's20 writings
on wage. These were his inspiration, the mentors of his
mature thought. This dependence becomes abundantly clear
in our subsequent treatment.
In the "current style of economic analysis, 11 once an
analytical sequence is started in the Schumpeterian21
circular flow, as is often done, from a static or steady
equilibrium, there is no way to change this situation
except by entrepreneurial innovation which changes the
production functions. Yet the common experiences of many
enterprises, even with those which do not share "prof
its, 11 is that real changes do occur which are not
entrepreneurial innovation in character. Yet, obviously,
at least in some broad sense, "innovation has occurred
and it is not basically entrepreneurial innovation." To
account for this innovational phenomenon, B.W. Dempsey
analyzes certain functions and makes several useful
distinctions. In outline form:
1. FU.nction of Management: (The preservation of
equilibrium). Management adjusts an enterprise in equi
librium to the inevitable minor variations, foreseeable
at least in a general way, in the quality of materials,
the sequence of orders to be scheduled, the shifting of
personnel to cover vacancies, and so forth [W,162-163;

128-129; 148].

2.
Function of Enterprise: (The disturbance of
equilibrium). The entrepreneur introduces the truly new
1 8St. Thomas:
Summa Theologiae: Commentaries on the
Ethics and the Politics.

Joseph A. Schumpeter: The Theory of Economic
Development; History of Economic Analysis.
19

20Johann Heinrich von ThUnen:
The Isolated State in
Relation to Agriculture and Political Economy, Volume
Two.

Theory of Economic Development,
21Schumpeter,
Chapter I, "The Circular Flow of Economic Life as
Conditioned by Given Circumstances"; also cf. pp. 63-89.
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idea, process, or product, which brings with it new
production functions (Text, W,246-248; F,353-364].

3. FU.nation 0£ the Labor Force: (The perfecting or
completing of equilibrium or innovation).
The big new idea of the entrepreneur involves
hundreds of little new ideas; and the work force, in a
plant that has been genuinely motivated and integrated by
being tied to output so that everybody is genuinely
interested in maximizing output and minimizing cost, can
and does provide the "innumerable minor internal innova
tions" that adjust a true entrepreneurial innovation to
a new equilibrium.
Although B.W. Dempsey, in a heading in his Func
tional Economy, refers to The Worker as Entrepreneur
(cf., F,364], he distinguished carefully this internal
"innovation" from true enterprise because it is without
risk, and from true management because it is innovation.
But, at the same time, he insists that it is a fact; "and
every time a man in the plant says, 'why don't we try it
this way?' and a cost saving results, we have an example
of this internal innovation."
Schumpeter in his classic analysis of the
function of enterprise quite legitimately
stripped the economic process of development
down to its barest bones in order to isolate
the function of the entrepreneur. This was
proper and instructive and illuminated the
process as never before. However, the utility
of this device does not require us in real
life to find enterprise pure and unmixed. The
experience of the member firms of the council
of Profit Sharing industries continuously
reveals among the working personnel of these
firms the qualities of mind and will that are
proper to the entrepreneur. "Why don't we try
it this way?" coming from the men on the floor
who really know the operation, is a common
experience in firms whose profit sharing
program has awakened the human impulse to
progress. Likewise, the acceptance of respon
sibility for the care of property and equip
ment, for the avoidance of waste, breakdowns,
or schedule snarls rests upon the other half
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of the entrepreneurial function, the action of
the will.
The funds which sound profit sharing makes
available for distribution to workers are not
wages; they are efficiency earnings that the
co-ordination of many little entrepreneurial
acts makes possible [F,364-365]. 22
Since man cannot determine values directly, he must
turn to the thing he can determine: his course of action,
which can affect cost and supply through organizational
change. According to present socio-economic theory, wages
tend to the minimum of subsistence through the opposition
of factor class interests. As B.W. Dempsey points out,
"the notorious unsatisfactory state of wage theory arises
from the fact that firms try to buy a commodity -- man
hour input -- which cannot be quantified and measured and
packaged like a commodity and may not be delivered on
time even if it could be" [W, 160] • In a functional
economy, the functional wage would become attainable
through organizational change -- and only this way. once
having admitted internal innovation -- that is, the self
determination of men to set up organizations which are
expressive of human nature -- into the circular flow,
"there is no limit to its horizon." The whole human
race, organized for unity, can raise itself to uncondi
tional freedom"· (Text, W,337].
In concrete economic terms related to wage payments,
the ability to make choices is that which.differentiates
labor from the other factors of production once their
owners have put them into specific form. Investors in a
par.ticular industry make choices, and their choices are
embodied in plant and equipment. Suppliers of a particu
lar enterprise using the sunk costs of their previous
investment in plant and equipment use working capital to
turn out materials which are sold. The machine and the
materials once specified in a definite form can be
In reference to the above, B. w. Dempsey states in
a footnote that "As might b� expected, the work of that
first-rate economist (von ThUnen) on re-examination fares
very well in explaining a •wage consistent with human
nature' when the small entrepreneurial roles are recog
nized" (F, 365] •
22
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accurately priced in a market and can go on the books of
a company at a definite cost. All of these items become
permanently committed. But the value of the machines and
materials (other than secondhand or scrap) depends
chiefly on the continuing contribution by labor which
every day has the opportunity of making a fresh choice of
the direction and degree of its commitment and effort.
commitment of labor is not permanent as the other factors
of production are. Thus, it follows that the value of the
machinery and materials is determined by the effort which
labor chooses to expend in the productive process. B.W.
Dempsey, by way of example of this freedom of commitment,
indicates "make work rules" and the "slow-down strike."
Since investment in plant and current operation by
suppliers is free in the first commitments, the necessity
of adequate motivation for fixed and current investment
has always been recognized. What has not been recognized
is that the "commitment of labor remains free day by day
and that the application of effort and intelligence is a
voluntary daily commitment" [W, 135]. Therefore, the
contribution of a voluntary agent cannot be priced in a
market in the same way as non-voluntary agents such as
machinery and materials can be priced. Labor cannot
simply be a cost to be minimized, but is a collaborator
within the firm which needs full motivation to release
its full powers, the same as any other voluntary contrib
utor such as the entrepreneur or the investor does. The
capacity of labor to commit or inhibit its contribution
of personal assets does not only occur at the moment of
first employment or at the time of contract negotiations,
but remains real every single day of employment when the
commitment of the free agent may be altered or reversed.
c.

Functional Wage Through Motivation

"Mo.�ivai.ion and organization are the poles around
which__ ThUnen's world revolves" [W,62]. B.W. Dempsey built
on ThUnen foundations of motivation and organization, and
again these are the poles, commensurate with human
nature, upon which a functional wage system is built.
Organization alone is not enough. Unless a simple,
intelligible, and acceptable motivation is presented to
the worker, he will neither use his intelligence nor his
freedom for the purpose of maximizing output and minimiz
ing unit cost. Nor will this motivation just happen.
Thus, the stress on proper organization, for "organiza-
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tion must furnish adequate motivation to the worker to
use his intelligence and freedom" [W,135). "The ultimate
root of any human organization is in motives, in the
will" [W,148). It has long been recognized that workers
grow and develop when they are given motive and opportu
nity to develop their capacity for responsible action
[cf. W,162-163). In the words of B.W. Dempsey:
Unless a simple, intelligible, and acceptable
motivation is presented to the worker for
contributing to cost reduction, variable unit
direct cost is not simply subject to manage
ment decision except through the negative and
costly procedure of dismissal. Without such
satisfying motivation, cost reduction is
something "they" do: co-operate is something
"we'! may or may not do [W,159).
In a sound socio-economic organization, a worker has
"simple, intelligible, rewarding, and rewarded motiva
tion" to integrate his actions with the objectives of the
firm because he participates in the net result. The firm
is an organization, as B.W. Dempsey puts it, when "what
'they• want and what •we• want coincide." Motivation is
always necessary for the release of human powers and free
commitment which is the only way a rational person,
complete and self-possessed, can become a part of any
organization.·

D.

capital creation �Y L�r

. The word "capital" is used in a confusing variety of
senses. The use of the word capital is perhaps most often
confused with a supply of money with which an enterprise
does business. This, however, is a transferred meaning of
capital. "Money is not capital, but is merely the means
of getting capital" [F,24].
In its economic sense, capital is saved-up resources
and saved-up labor employed in the production of goods
and services. Though man and nature are the ultimate
factors of production, capital is not simply man or
nature, but it is a man-made instrument of production,
desired not for its own sake, but for the sake of the
things that it will produce. Capital goods are productive
tools, in contrast with consumer goods which yield direct
satisfaction to the one who uses or consumes them.
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capital is the word used to describe all tools, machines,
sources of power, or alterations of nature (roads, for
example) that are produced not for their own sake, but
for the sake of things that can be produced with them.
Capital goods have in general these three charac
teristics: their production involves the passage of time,
in some cases a very long time; they are intermediate
goods, not ordinarily consumable nor intended for
consumption; they can enormously increase human efficien
cy. To this bare outline of the nature of capital, B.W.
Dempsey fully subscribes [cf. W,245, 143-145, 358-361,
113-114, 119; F,24-25, 195). Thus, its significant
features are that it enormously increases man's efficien
cy and control of nature, that it involves saving, at
least in a sense of non-consumption, and finally, that
saving and the construction of the goods involve the
passage of time.
B.W. Dempsey explains by example how capital in
volves saving and some expenditure of time in its
buildup:
A pioneer fisherman, for example, can catch
fish by throwing his lines from the shore. If
he builds a boat, however, he increases the
range of his activities, and ultimately in
creases his catch of fish. During the period
when he is building the boat, he is unable to
fish, and in this phase the saving or under
consumption consists of the fish that he does
not eat, because he did not catch them. Sec
ondly, if he threw all of his cut logs into
the fire to keep himself warm some evening, he
would have no logs with which to build his
boat and thirdly, the construction of the boat
takes time [F,25).
B.W. Dempsey fully recognized the capital-creating
function of labor, and made much of it. Capital, he
insists, is the product of labor; but this product in
turn replaces human labor and itself serves for the
further production of new capital. Between capital and
labor, accordingly, an intimate connection and substi
tutability occur which seem to be indissoluble. Since the
original capital [cf. text, W,249-255) is born wholly of
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labor, labor is the onlf proper standard for the cost of
production of capital.2
In several other ways, B.W. Dempsey saw capital as
caused by labor. First, by saving -- in the sense of non
consumption, man places an always indispensable condition
of capital formationi and the manner of the saving may
raise it from the status of a condition to that of a
cause. B.W. Dempsey explains:
At the very least, if logs are actually used
for consumption purposes, such as the making
of a warm and cheery fire, they will never be
used for capital purposes, no matter how well
suited they may have been for such purposes
[W,114].

Non-consumption is the first minimum negative condition
of capital formation. Second, man is the immediate
physical, efficient cause of capital. Man "moves one
thing from here to there and removes another from the
path of the first" -- all activities that are designed to
increase output. Third, man is a further cause by his
intelligence -- he makes the land more productive than it
was in its natural form.
The moving of this and that
grading,
draining, watering, planting, the removal of
badly placed shade trees, the keeping of well
placed fruit trees -- these are all directed
by intelligence. _To explain capital, which to
be must involve a method
of production in
some sense superior, we must appeal not only
· to man's labor of muscle but to his labor of
mind. Without man's physical and intellectual
labor capital is and remains unintelligible
[W,115].

23
Cf. Joseph Schumpeter, History of Economic Analy
sis, p. 590 n., on the necessity of repeated emphasis
that the use of labor as a standard of value has no
connection whatever with a labor theory of valuei cf.
W,164 fn.
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E.

Programs of Functional Wage Theory

True profits are the result of innovation. True
profits are distinct from mere wages of management and
normal interest on investment. To fully bring out the
function of the labor force as intrinsic innovators and
their corresponding relation to "profits," B.W. Dempsey
turns to a profit sharing program as an example. He
looked upon the introduction of a "sound profit sharing
program" as an organizational innovation as real as "the
conception of the supermarket or the shopping center"
[W,161). Briefly, we shall sum up the reasons, in summary
fashion, why he considered profit-sharing as a program
that would in actual fact furnish the proper organization
and motivation for a functional wage system.
First, since a sound program requires the full
understanding, acceptance, and concurrence of the workers
as well as of management, the introduction of the program
could be considered as entrepreneurial innovation on the
part of both labor and management.
Second, while the basic major commitment to pro
cesses, products, and quantities is the domain of man
agement, the innumerable recurrent minor decisions by
which the basic decision is actuated and by which costs
are minimized are the domain of the workers in the midst
of the process. Of course, the promptness and accuracy
with which these little decisions whose cumulative
importance is so great are made depends primarily upon
the motivation which has been presented to and concurred
in by all voluntary inputs.
Third, even in the most highly automated process, as
well as in the most elementary manual operations,
B.W. Dempsey would hold that the observation of the man
who sees the process most clearly and closely may be the
source of a great number of minor internal innovations.
Certainly, the cumulative effect of even these minor
intrinsic innovations can be powerful if they are numerous.
B.W. Dempsey would conclude from the above that
"there is literally a world of difference between that
minimal return which is the exclusive and excluding right
of the stockholders, born of opposition of interest and
strongly perpetuating the dual situs of decision, and the
expanding return born of voluntary concurrence of all
voluntary inputs including individual workers when they
are given motive and opportunity to develop their
capacity for responsible action" [cf. 161-163).
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In his constant effort to put his theoretical
writings into practical form through example, illustra
tion and program, B.W. Dempsey did not hesitate to
suggest the elements of a suitable practical wage con
tract to fit his functional wage theory. 2•
1. A basic organization contract of stable cooper
ation an4 cooperation in pro4uction. This he assures us
would do away with the "necessity of putting on a show of
class conflict every two or three years."
2. A guarantae4 annual wage at about 60 par cant of
present levels. This he would consider the minimum family
wage element in wages.
3. A pro4uct income basa4 on total net revenue of
the operation with some cognizance of the part which
labor coats are of total costs. This he would consider
the product element in wages, healing the "divorce of the
worker from his product." "Product income," B.W. Dempsey
advocates, "should be paid in two parts, one part cash,
one part paid into a fund which yields income for pension
and welfare purposes, either in the stock of the company,
in mutual funds, in the stocks of companies with equally
sound policies, or in any other prudently managed fund."
COHCLUSIOH
B.W. Dempsey always felt that a sound economic
community should conform to certain principles. He never
felt that sound economic organization could be blueprint
ed. He viewed his life work as an endeavor to discover
these underlying principles of economic organization. He
sought out those principles that unite economic society
according to what men do and contribute, namely their
function. The subtitle of "The Frontier Wage," The
Economic Organization of Free Agents, shows how natural
it was for him to assume that to strive for the "natural
wage," a wage that corresponds to human nature, is good.
But to show that a wage theory is commensurate with human
nature means to call attention to the fact that, realis
tically, production is a cooperative free effort,
requires intelligent organization and adequate motiva-

•The Wage Frontier, p. 109.
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tion. Briefly, the proper economic organization of free
agents implies the embodying of the underlying principles
of an adequate wage theory.
Admittedly, it is too early to fully evaluate the
degree of his wage contribution. That B.W. Dempsey has
made a contribution by 1':is "re-discovery," by refining
and development of von ThUnen, at least this, surely, can
be granted without argument. His own claims for his wage
theory are valid norms for its evaluation and the worth
of his contribution. A rapid enumeration of some of the
claims made by B.W ... Dempsey in his presentation and
development of von ThUnen•s wage theory should assist us
with evaluation. His "functional" wage analysis:
1.

Denies and elbainat;es class conflict; as a principle.

If a functional wage analysis in economics is a
fact, class conflict becomes an untenable theory; not
only the pseudo-principle of class conflict, but the very
fact of class conflict is counteracted by a tenable
functional wage theory.
2.
Est;ablishes an int;rinsic principle o� cooperat;ion.
With the disappearance of the guilds, an internal prin
ciple of organization or order in economic life was lost;
functional wage theory claims to have recovered this
principle -- this should be a great and fundamental
contribution. Such a functional wage theory furnishes an
intrinsic principle of orderly cooperation, thereby
furthering the coordination of factors of production -
land (nature), labor (man), and capital, and the coordi
nation of the economic processes -- production, distribu
tion, exchange and consumption. "Extrinsic unity imposed
by the state can be no substitute for the recognition and
cultivation of the intrinsic unity that actually exists
and produces in daily operation" [W,172].
3. Is a t;heo.ry #;hat; cat;ches up vi t;h wage pract;ice in t;he
United States. There is a need of a theory that hauls
alongside of current wage practice where to some degree
proper organization, adequate motivation, and intelligent
cooperation make every man a potential capitalist. "There
exists then, in the United States, genuine functional
communities, large groups of people who have a common
interest, a common task, and a common purpose. These
persons, regardless of location form a functional
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community quite as real and almost as important as the
civil municipality" [F, 320-321]. There is, therefore,
need of a fresh analysis of the functions of the entre
preneur, of management, and of labor.

,. Completes his functional system of economic thought
which is recognized as a contribution, by integrating

into a functional economy a corresponding functional wage
theory. In such an economy, innovation by free and

intelligent economic agents can be continually absorbed.
Organizational innovation can be recognized precisely as
an innovation by a free agent, and group action is
provided a place in the analysis.
Is a •rediscovery• and presentation of .. the •key•
contribution of a great economist, von ThUnen. Even
though such a presentation would have merely historical
value, this is a significant contribution of economic
ideas. Furthermore, it can surely be considered as a
presentation of "new" wage theory to the "academic" world
in the analytical formulae currently in vogue and
acceptable to economic analysts.
5.

,. JlaJces a just wage possible. B.W. Dempsey was convinced
that his functional wage theory presented not only an
economically sound and correct wage, but a just wage, as
well. Previously, B.W. Dempsey placed most of his
emphasis on exchange justice -- particularly as his
treatment had to do largely with the application of price
determination to the area of interest rates. But in the
area of the just wage, contributive (social) justice
becomes more operative. Admittedly, if every market were
fair, then every worker should be getting a living wage,
and that, in exchange justice.
Most often this market is not fair, and in B.W.
Dempsey's opinion, this is due to a market not organized
along functional lines. In such a "malfunctioning"
economy, quite apart from the employer's ability to pay
a living wage, B.w. Dempsey would deem it impossible to
show that the employer has a strict obligation to pay a
wage above the going rate. He held that under these
conditions the full-time effort of an experienced, able
bodied worker may or may not command a living wage at the
going rate. When such a worker cannot command a living
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wage, then for some reason "the market in that industry
is badly organized."
• . . not that the employer has an obligation
to pay a wage which he could not long pay, but
rather that all parties: workers, managers,
owners, bondholders and possible consumers,
have an obligation to consider their position.
They must set about establishing a market that
serves both those contributing to the industry
and the purposes of the community of a
whole.25
That is, while a living wage cannot be shown to be due
any worker in commutative justice apart from market
conditions, it is readily shown that an "equally impor
tant obligation exists" in contributive (social) justice.
In his opinion, his functional wage theory would remedy
such a badly organized market, render the industry
socially just and so the industry would provide a living
wage at the going rate. A truly just wage can exist and
be preserved in a properly organized, that is, a socially
just economic community. B.W. Dempsey attempts to
organize such a community.
once a market has been established "that serves both
those contributing to the industry and the purposes of
the community as a whole," an employer has an obligation
to pay a living wage, and a worker can command a living
wage in exchange justice. Then a just basic wage should
be paid to an employee for his labor and assumed by
management as a cost of doing business. But the employer
cannot determine what is the just total wage for the
employee until after the product has been sold and the
net profits realized. Only after that, under functional
organization, can the true value of the employee's labor
be determined. A just total wage, therefore, must be
geared directly to profits and must include a share of
those profits. B.W. Dempsey is quick to point out that
"this presupposes that the employees have expanded their
extra cooperative efforts so that good profits can be
realized."
Since you cannot pay a total just wage
without paying the employees "their profit share" (as von
25
Bernard W. Dempsey, "Economic Community," Social
Order, April, 1955, p. 151.
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ThUnen stated), then employees have a right to their
profit share and can demand this share. Under functional
wage organization, this share is owed to them in exchange
justice. Such a presentation gives a theoretical under
pinning to such programs as profit sharing. Thus, the
remedy of the deficiency of wage theory could be claimed
as a contribution.
7.

Gives labor groups an adequate philosophy of labor. A

philosophy built upon intelligent cooperation rather than
conflicting interest is more consonant with the nature
and dignity of a man. Sharply critical of the current
labor movement (sometimes others mistakenly believed he
was anti-union), he based his criticism on the willing
ness of the movement to accept apparent gains in social
justice at the expense of subsidiarity. To him this was
tantamount to the acceptance that the "end justifies the
means." Unions, in his opinion, have "confronted [us]
with a gain in objective social justice combined with a
loss of subsidiarity function and a sharpening of class
conflict with the state now involved in the conflict"
[F,448]. By objective social justice, he meant a condi
tion that, although it may be judged to be contributive
to the common good, is brought about by forces other than
the exercise of social justice. An economy organized on
intelligent cooperation and motivated along functional
lines would eliminate class conflict, be protective of
subsidiarity,. be consonant with social justice, and
therefore be the basis of a satisfying philosophy of
labor.

8. Consonant with the social principles put forth in the
soc-ial encyclicals. B. W. Dempsey himself, while admitting

they are not identical, perceive� the "intimate parallel"
in two analyses, that of von ThUnen and that of Pius XI
in Quadragesimo Anno; he quotes the following passage to
exemplify what is parallel:
Man's productive effort cannot yield its
fruits unless a truly social and organic body
exists, unless a social and juridical order
watches over the exercise of work, unless the
various occupations, being interdependent,
cooperate with and mutually complete one
another, and what is still more important,
unless mind, material things, and work combine
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and form as it were a single whole. Therefore,
where the social and individual nature of work
is neglected, it will be impossible to evaluate work justly and pay it according to jus
tice.26
This does not mean to infer that B.W. Dempsey considered
the wage contract unjust. Far from it, as he quotes the
following from Pius XI, referring to it as being "clear"
in itself and "common teaching among qualified Catholic
scholars: 11 "the wage contract is not in itself an unjust
contract. 1127 Commenting, he says, "participation, though
eminently desirable on many grounds, cannot be shown to
be a matter of natural right and, apart from a specific
contract freely entered into, is not a matter of commuta
tive justice" (F,264]. Yet, if the innovating function of
the worker gives him the "ethical claim" to participate
in "profits," as B.W. Dempsey seemingly indicates (cf.
W,139], how can a wage contract which seemingly does not
admit this function be just?
How B.W. Dempsey would answer this is not precisely
known.26 But his earlier well-stated position is clear.
"Certain programs, of which profit sharing is the most
common and most successful, cannot be demonstrated to be
obligatory in either commutative or social justice"
(F,204]. Yet, at the same time, he admits that these
programs "may be of greatest practical benefit in
creating an atmosphere in which these obligations are
easily fulfilled." The following Papal quotation not
only indicates B.W. Dempsey's position and reason for it,
but gives the reason why he was "so pleased" to toil on
The Frontier Wage. He was eager to find ways that the
wage contract could be modified somewhat by a contract of
partnership:
In the present state of human society, how
ever, we deem it advisable that the wage
contract should when possible be modified
Quadragesimo Anno,

No. 69, 74-75.

Quadragesimo Anno,

No. 64 � F,204.

26

27

26Cf. The Functional Economy, Chapter II, "Basis of
Just Wage," pp. 204-277.
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somewhat by a contract of partnership as is
already being tried in various ways to no
small gain both of the wage earners and of the
employers. In this way, wage earners are made
sharers in some sort in the ownership, or the
management of the profits [F,205].29
Does B.W. Dempsey's "functional wage theory's" use
of the term "profit" fit into normal economic theory?
According to the "functional approach" profits are a
residual income created by the external innovations of
the entrepreneur. When capital is borrowed, payment is
made prior to the residual determination of profit in the
form of interest -- "a tax on profits." When the worker
makes internal innovations, the return to him can be a
sharing in profits. But is this last real innovation?
Where is the risk element?
The noted authority A.
Vermeesch indicates common traditional doctrine when he
states that under the term "labor" there is included all
those who supply labor, whether of a manual, intellectu
al, or directive character.30 Seemingly, B.W. Dempsey
would grant that a worker may forego payment for his
intellectual (innovating) endeavors as part of a wage
contract. His worker is an innovator who assumes a
certain "risk" by being willing to depend upon anticipat
ed profits as part of his reward. B.W. Dempsey attempts
to establish something other than a legal basis or
agreement for. the worker's participation in profits. He
bases it on the worker's economic function of being an
internal innovator who assumes some risk because he
forgoes his assured wage contract payment for the
anticipated reward of "innovating" endeavors.
, Assuming the worker as innovator, is there a real
obligation in commutative justice to reward him by profit
sharing?
Certainly, labor's reward under the wage
contract is determined by the value of the work, not by
any right to the final product of his labor. Does this
change?
It would seem that labor, under the wage
Quadragesimo Anno, No. 65.

29

30
A. Vermeesch, Quaestiones de Justitia (Brugis:
Beyaert, 1901), p. 499 ff.; Cf. also his commentary on
the encyclical Quadragesimo Anno in "annotationses,"
Periodica, vol. XX (February, 1931).
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contract, would have no right in commutative justice to
demand any portion of profits while the old contract was
in force. B.W. Dempsey looks upon profit sharing as a
desirable goal in social justice, as an organizational
means of changing the level of wages. Once the level is
changed through an employer's action, is he not bound by
the higher level in commutative justice? By then has it
not become the "common estimation? 1131
Does II income from superior worker efficiency"3 2
fall under profits or economic rent? If it falls under
economic rent, the "functional wage theory" fits more
snugly into normal economic theory. Suppose the return
that was expected by the employer from an excess of price
over cost was to be derived not from an innovation by
him, but from a higher level of efficiency that could be
attributed solely to his own workers (not to his manage
ment and not to workers in other plants). Would he be
obliged in commutative justice to give such to his
workers? Such a return of course would not come under
the definition of a "profit."
Would not the answer be that he would be obliged
even though those workers were already receiving a living
wage? Could he not consider this type of income to the
workers of one particular firm over the level paid to
workers in all firms and, therefore, over the common
anticipated productivity of that type of worker, to be an
economic rent because of a greater comparative efficiency
Economic rent, a differential sur
in his workers? 33
plus, should be paid to that factor responsible for its

31 Cf.

Chapter II, "The Just Price."

32W, 182
-- "These [capital] sums are amassed at
nobody's expense:
they arise out of the efficiency
earnings that are made possible by organization of free,
self-determining persons."

0. von Nell-Bruening, Reorganization of Social
Economy (transl. from German by B. W. Dempsey) (New York:
Bruce, 1939), p. 169; "It is clear that efficiency must
be compensated for. consequently, better performance can
demand a higher compensation, and it is superfluous to
state this explicitly."
33
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existence. 34 Just as the renting of land of greater
fertility demands a higher return, so workers with a
higher efficiency that is relatively scarce may demand a
singular reward additional to the wage commensurate with
the common productivity of all workers. Is not the
employee entitled in commutative justice to a wage that
represents the economic value of his labor and to a rent
that is due his particular service?
Many probing questions could be added. Those above
were not intended to exhaust the possibilities of B.W.
Dempsey• s functional wage approach. They were rather
leads which readily suggested themselves, built around
the one topic or problem: B.W. Dempsey's concept of
profit.
Certainly, some of the above claims of making a
contribution to wage theory seem valid. While it is too
early -- The Frontier Wage was published late in 1960 -
to make an adequate evaluation of his contribution,
internal evidence gives indications of a real contribu
tion. True evaluation of these claims must await the
sifting of experts over a period of time.

34

Ibid., p. 169.
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